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Nonlegal Regulation of the Legal
Profession: Social Norms in Professional
Communities
W. Bradley Wendel 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1955 (2001)
In this Article, Professor Wendel analyzes the advan-
tages and disadvantages of community-based responses to un-
ethical behavior by lawyers. The limits of formal legal regula-
tion of the legal profession are well known. Additional ques-
tions have been raised about the efficacy of motivating lawyers
to act ethically merely by giving appropriate instruction. What
is left, therefore, is a complex and little-studied, but very real,
array of informal sanctions. These sanctions are controlled by
individual members of the professional community, not by the
court or organized bar, and therefore operate largely without
the transparency and procedural regularity of formal legal re-
gimes. The advantage of this decentralized sanctioning process
is that punishment can often be imposed quickly, and with
relatively low transaction costs, because an enforcement agency
is not required to engage in expensive information-gathering
processes. Informal regulation of legal norms also avoids some
of the difficulties that would arise if ethical norms were em-
bodied in formal disciplinary rules.
Professor Wendel, however, cautions against becoming
overly enthusiastic about informal, community-based sanc-
tions. A professional community that is too inward-looking,
that is content to regulate itself without checks from the out-
side, may develop pernicious norms as well as beneficial ones.
Furthermore, the resistance to external sources of normative
control can make a community slow to change. Informal sanc-
tioning practices can sometimes be used against unpopular or
less powerful subcommunities, and members of these commu-
nities may be stymied in their attempt to reform the commu-
nity's practices by the lack of extra-community regulatory au-
thority. Community-based sanctions can also spiral out of con-
trol and spawn endless feuds. Because the sanctioning author-
ity is another community member, the lawyer who is sanc-
tioned may retaliate in kind, and possibly overretaliate,
prompting a further round of sanctioning. Finally, even if one
approves in general of informal regulation of professional
communities, it is difficult to apply this kind of regulatory
scheme to large-scale, impersonal settings such as the commu-
nity of practicing lawyers in major commercial centers.
Professor Wendel does not argue for the complete adop-
tion or rejection of community-based sanctions. Rather, the
claim developed in this Article is that courts, legislatures, and
the organized bar ought to be sensitive to the advantages and
pathologies of formal legal regulation, on the one hand, and of
informal regulation on the other. In the case of the legal pro-
fession, some areas of conduct are best left to informal control
by local communities, while others are appropriately the prov-
ince of formal regulation.
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What should be done about lawyers who persist in violating
ethical norms that are not embodied in positive disciplinary rules?
That question has been a recurrent theme in recent legal ethics
scholarship. One response has been to propose, experiment,
amend, tinker, draft, comment, and redraft, in an attempt to codify
the standard of conduct observed to be flouted widely by the
practicing bar. Bar associations and courts are seemingly engaged
in a never-ending process of promulgating new codes of
professional conduct or rules of procedure under which lawyers
may be sanctioned for such conduct as bringing frivolous lawsuits,
abusing the discovery process, sleeping with their clients, or
engaging in discrimination based on race or sex.1 Critics fault the
project of regulating lawyers through legalistic rules for being
predominantly motivated by the organized bar's protectionism or
other self-interested reasons;2 for fostering a minimalist or
"Holmesian bad man" interpretive stance toward moral questions;3
for slighting the importance of non-legal considerations, such as
religious commitments, in professional morality;4 for overlooking
the importance of dispositions, character, or other internalized
aspects of ethical norms;5 or for failing to account for ethical
1. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The
Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925 (1989); Judith L. Maute, Sporting Theory of
Justice: Taming Adversary Zeal with a Logical Sanctions Doctrine, 20 CONN. L. REV. 7 (1987); L.
Ray Patterson, A Preliminary Rationalization of the Law of Legal Ethics, 57 N.C. L. REV. 519
(1979); Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and
the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223 (1993).
2. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L.
REV. 639 (1981); Stephen Gillers, What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A
Critical View of the Model Rules, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 243, 266-72 (1985).
3. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 78-84 (1994); David Luban &
Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
31, 57 (1995); William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional
Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 30; William H. Simon, The Trouble With Legal Ethics, 41 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 65 (1991); Serena Stier, Legal Ethics: The Integrity Thesis, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 551 (1991).
4. See, e.g., Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEX. L.
REV. 963 (1987); Amelia J. Uelmen, Can a Religious Person Be a Big Firm Litigator?, 26
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1069, 1075, 1080-83 (1999); Symposium, The Relevance of Religion to a
Lawyer's Work.- An Interfaith Conference, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1075 (1998).
5. See, e.g., Tanina Rostain, Ethics Lost: Limitations of Current Approaches to Lawyer
Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1273, 1303-24 (1998); cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING
AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 134 (1996). For a similar argument at a more general level, see
Edmund Pincoffs, Quandary Ethics, in REVISIONS: CHANGING PERSPECTIVES IN MORAL
PHILOSOPHY 92 (Stanley Hauerwas & Alasdair Maclntyre eds., 1983).
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pluralism, justified disagreement, or the complexity of moral life. 6
A fairly stable consensus now seems to exist in the legal ethics
literature that rules of "ethics," stated in the form of enforceable
penal codes, have limited utility to remedy many of the observed
problems with the professional conduct of lawyers.
One alternative approach, therefore, has been for lawyers or
judges to produce an aspirational code of conduct-not the basis
for judicially-enforced sanctions, but a statement of the highest
ideals of the profession, toward which lawyers should aim.7
Unsurprisingly, commentators find fault in these proposals as
well. Some ask whether virtue can be taught to lawyers or law
students.8  Others pose a related question, namely, how
exhortations to virtue can motivate lawyers in light of changing
circumstances 9-for example, the much-observed (and frequently
exaggerated) transformation of legal practice from a public-
spirited profession to a business. 0 These critics note the
6. See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter's Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade, 74
TEX. L. REV. 259, 317-20 (1995); Reed Elizabeth Loder, Tighter Rules of Professional ConducL
Saltwater for Thirst?, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 311 (1987). For my own view, see W. Bradley
Wendel, Professional Roles and Moral Agency, 89 GEO. L.J. 667 (2001) (book review) and W.
Bradley Wendel, Value Pluralism in Legal Ethics, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 113 (2000).
7. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. Or. E.D. WASH. L.R. 83.1(k) (incorporating civility code into federal
district court local rules; highly aspirational provisions include "I will advise my client that
civility and courtesy are not to be equated with weakness"); Dondi Prop. Corp. v. Commerce
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 F.R.D. 284, 292-95 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (incorporating Dallas Bar
Association's Guidelines for Professional Courtesy and professionalism "creed" into standing
orders for litigation in that district); Marvin E. Aspen, The Search for Renewed Civility in
Litigation, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 513, 519-20, 524-30 (1994) (discussing Seventh Circuit's proposed
Standards for Professional Conduct).
8. See, e.g., Amy Gutmann, Can Virtue Be Taught to Laubyers?, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1759
(1993). This is not an idle question-people have been asking whether virtue can be taught since
at least the time of Socrates. See PLATO, MENO (W.K.C. Guthrie trans., Edith Hamilton &
Huntington Cairns eds., 1961). For an extremely cynical comment on the capacity of legal ethics
education to inculcate virtue, consider the comments of President Nixon's lawyer John Dean: "'I
knew that the things I was doing were wrong, and one learns the difference between right and
wrong long before one enters law school A course in legal ethics wouldn't have changed
anything.' " Thomas Lickona, What Does Moral Psychology Have to Say to the Teacher of
Ethics?, in ETHICS TEACHING IN HIGHER EDUCATION 103, 129 (Daniel Callahan & Sissela Bok
eds., 1980) (quoting John Dean in a 1979 interview at Boston University Law School).
9. See, e.g., David Luban, Epistemology and Moral Education, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 636,
645-47 (1983) (discussing the claim that "mere knowledge of what is moral carries with it the
motivation to be moral"); Richard A. Posner, The Probletnatis of Moral and Legal Theory, 111
HARD. L. REV. 1637, 1664-68 (1998) (arguing that moral beliefs do not directly motivate
behavior).
10. See, e.g., SOL M. LINOWITZ & MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAVYERING
AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1994); DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESrS OF
JUSTICE: REFOR1,ING THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2000); American Bar Association, ".. In the
Spirit of Public Service": A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism, reprinted in
112 F.R.D. 243, 251-61 (1987); Norman Bowie, The Law: Front a Profession to a Business, 41
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institutional forces that may militate against ethical behavior,
such as intense competitive pressures created by decreasing client
loyalty to a single law firm, inroads into the traditional domain of
legal practice by accounting firms and other multidisciplinary
practices, and the prevalent second-guessing by in-house legal
personnel of decisions made by outside counsel; the willingness of
clients to sue for malpractice, which causes lawyers to cover their
proverbial behinds without regard to externalities; the
bureaucratization of law practice, with teams of lawyers working
under senior partners with a quasi-managerial role; the
burgeoning docket of many state and federal courts, which reduces
judicial oversight of lawyering behavior; and a "win-at-all-costs"
mentality that causes supervising lawyers to look askance on
subordinates' ethical qualms. In the face of these powerful
countervailing forces, an aspirational code of conduct, pitched in
terms of virtue and the "highest ideals" of the legal profession,
indeed seems to be a flimsy reed upon which to hang an argument
for doing something against one's self-interest. Finally, some
commentators worry that judges might use professionalism or
civility codes as a weapon against lawyers they dislike, on the
pretext that the lawyers' conduct is "unprofessional," even though
the codes are not intended to be a basis for sanctions."
The remaining category of responses to observed unethical
behavior forms the subject matter of this Article. One frequently
encounters the claim that informal mechanisms of social control,
exerted within the boundaries of a professional community, should
be adequate to restrain obnoxious lawyers. 12 One prominent legal
VAND. L. REV. 741 (1988); Sandra Day O'Connor, Professionalism, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 5, 6 (1998);
Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy,
and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 909 (1999). As some of these recent critics fail
to acknowledge, lawyers have been complaining for over 150 years about the transformation of
law from a profession to a business. See SAMUEL HABER, THE QUEST FOR AUTHORITY AND HONOR
IN THE AMERICAN PROFESSIONS 1750-1900, at 222-24, 236-37 (1991).
11. See generally Monroe H. Freedman, The Ethical Danger of "Civility" and
"Professionalism," 6 N.Y. ST. B. ASS'N CRIM. JUST. J. 17 (1998); John Leubsdorf, Using Legal
Ethics to Screw Your Enemies and Clients, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 831 (1998).
12. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 8.3 (5th ed. 1998); ROBERT
F. COCHRAN, JR. & TERESA S. COLLETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE RULES OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 188-89 (1996); Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Procedure Entitlements, Professionalism,
and Lawyering Norms, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 801 (2000); Warren E. Burger, Standards of Conduct
for Prosecution and Defense Personnel A Judge's Viewpoint, 5 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 11, 13 (1966);
Frank H. Easterbrook, Adversary Inferences, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POUY' 503 (1996); Marianne
M. Jennings, The Model Rules and the Code of Professional Responsibility Have Absolutely
Nothing to Do With Ethics: The Wally Cleaver Proposition as an Alternative, 1996 WIS. L. REV.
1223; Eleanor W. Myers, Teaching Good and Teaching Well: Integrating Values with Theory and
1958 [Vol. 54:1955
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ethicist has even urged that lawyers rediscover the nineteenth-
century tradition of the gentleman as a polestar for understanding
the obligations of their role. 13 Somewhat less aspirationally (and
anachronistically), others claim that reputational constraints
ought to be sufficient, in many cases, to motivate lawyers not to
violate important community norms. Once word gets out that
Lawyer X is a jerk, the argument goes, opponents of Lawyer X will
act to keep him in line, by refusing to extend routine courtesies
and becoming uncooperative in scheduling and other
administrative matters, and by practicing "by the book"-sending
confirmation letters after every informal conversation, contesting
minor procedural points, and otherwise being sticklers for detail
where a lawyer with a better reputation might not be subjected to
such pedantic quibbling. Eventually, this endless nit-picking will
be costly to Lawyer X, either in terms of his professional self-
esteem, or in purely economic terms, as matters that should be
routine and inexpensive turn into quagmires worthy of Jarndyce
and Jarndyce. Clients may avoid Lawyer X, aware that the costs of
a dispute or transaction involving that lawyer will be increased
due to the lawyer's obstreperousness in discovery, pretrial
litigation, and negotiations. 14 Judges, too, may look with suspicion
upon Lawyer X's arguments, and may be less willing to give
credence to that lawyer's interpretation of close questions of law or
fact. 15 Finally, the obnoxious lawyer may be denied access by his
peers to referral networks and prestigious bar association
positions which offer power, visibility, and professional
Practice, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 401, 418-19 (1997); Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a
Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491, 494-99 (1985); Charles Yablon, Stupid Lauyer Tricks:
An Essay on Discovery Abuse, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1623-24 (1996); Neil H. Klausner. Note,
The Dynamics of Rule 11: Preventing Frivolous Litigation by Demanding Professional
Responsibility, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 300, 330 (1986).
13. See THOM11AS L. SHAFFER & MARY M. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR
COMMUNITIES: ETHICS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1991); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Gentleman in
Professional Ethics, 10 QUEEN'S L.J. 1 (1984) [hereinafter Shaffer, Gentleman); Thomas L
Shaffer, Lawyer Professionalism as a Moral Argument, 26 GONZ. L. REv. 393, 397-407 (1990); cf.
Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Honor as a Deficient Aspiration for "the Honorable Profession " The
Lawyer as Nostromo, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 859 (2000) (taking a more skeptical look at lawyers'
aspirations to honor).
14. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 643 (1995) (Kennedy, J..
dissenting) C(Mhis problem is largely self-policing: potential clients will not hire lawyers who
offend them."). The counterexample to Justice Kennedy's argument is, of course, the client who
hires lawyers precisely because they have a reputation for behaving unethically, thinking that
having a "junkyard dog" as an attorney will be an advantage.
15. See Easterbrook, supra note 12, at 510-11; cf. Drope v. Lissouri, 420 U.S. 162, 176-77
(1975) ("[J]udges must depend to some extent on counsel to bring issues into focus.").
2001] 1959
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development opportunities. 16 In any event, state enforcement
mechanisms, beset by the attendant problems of insufficient
resources to detect and punish offenses at an optimal level for
deterrence 17 and susceptibility to being co-opted or "captured" by
powerful groups,18  are not invoked in this type of norm
enforcement.
The concept of a community is pervasive in academic
writing about the legal profession. A leading professional
responsibility casebook observes that apart from the malpractice
and professional discipline systems, preventing professional
failures is largely the task of "internalized standards of
professional conduct that are written in the hearts and minds of
each lawyer and are reinforced by the monitoring and criticism of
other lawyers." 9 Legal theorists, particularly those with an
economic orientation, have endorsed the idea of controlling lawyers
through informal community-based sanctions, which they refer to
as reputational markets. Ronald Gilson and Robert Mnookin, for
example, hypothesize that in some situations clients may prefer
lawyers who are known to be cooperative, rather than unduly
strategic or adversarial, in negotiation.20 Daniel Fischel, similarly,
in the course of his controversial article proposing the abolition of
the attorney-client privilege, observes that the economic function
of lawyers is primarily to serve as reputational intermediaries for
clients, thereby lowering transaction costs for honest parties. 21 As
a result, lawyers have an incentive to cultivate a reputation for
honesty and trustworthiness, in order to maintain their value to
clients as guarantors of good reputation. In a similar vein, legal
ethicist William Simon argues that lawyers can attract clients by
making their commitment to fair dealing credible to third parties;
clients will come to value these "high commitment" lawyers as
signals of their own trustworthiness, and a race to the bottom,
16. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.1 (1986).
17. See Rostain, supra note 5, at 1307-12.
18. See id. at 1316-19; Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive
Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 34-44 (1991).
19. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 19-20 (3d ed.
1999) (emphasis added).
20. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation
and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 522-34 (1994).
Reputational sanctions have long been perceived as a means to enforce ethical duties. Consider
the advice of Sharswood, one of the first legal ethics scholars, to "shun most carefully the
reputation of a sharp practitioner." GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETaICS 73
(6th ed. 1930).
21. See Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1998).
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where clients seek out the meanest, nastiest lawyer in town, can
be avoided. 22 Interestingly, the ABA's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct also contemplate some role for reputational markets in
regulating lawyers, stating that in addition to taking guidance
from the rules and interpretive commentary, "a lawyer is also
guided by ... the approbation of professional peers."23 Finally, a
few scholars of the legal profession have advanced an even
stronger version of the reputational-markets argument, that
informal sanctions are all that exist to restrain unethical behavior
by lawyers, because of the difficulty that state disciplinary
agencies have investigating and prosecuting claims.24
The idea of using informal, community-based social control
mechanisms to regulate the behavior of lawyers is related to
another argument that has emerged in the legal ethics theory
literature-namely, the claim that legal ethics is fundamentally a
matter of professional judgment, not simply following the rules
laid down. As David Luban and Michael Millemann argue, the
essence of the lawyer's work is exercising judgment on behalf of
clients, and the essence of legal ethics is applying good moral
judgment to one's own professional activities. 25 Anthony Kronman
has, of course, also sought to restore the exercise of the
Aristotelian virtue of practical wisdom to what he believes is its
rightful place at the heart of legal education. 2 Luban and
Millemann recognize that the ideal of political fraternity and the
commitment by lawyers to promoting the well-being of the public
domain is an unlikely basis for a robust conception of professional
ethics in the contemporary political climate. But they believe that
it is nevertheless possible to teach a faculty of judgment, which
22. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYER'S ETHICS 203-
09 (1998).
23. MODEL RULES OF PROFVL CONDUCT, pmbl. 6; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT, Scope T 2 C'Compliance with the Rules . . . depends . . . secondarily upon
reinforcement by peer and public opinion.").
24. See Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-Firin Litigators: Preliminary
Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 709, 716 (1998) (reporting on conclusion of ABA study of
large law firm litigation practice that "there were few positive incentives, other than self-respect
and the good opinion of judges and of lawyers from other firms to practice ethically"). This
statement ignores the role of malpractice judgments and litigation sanctions in deterring
misconduct. See generally David Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lauorers?, 105 HAR%. L REV.
799 (1992). It is nevertheless true that even when these remedies are taken into account, there
is a large universe of lawyer misconduct that cannot be deterred by any effective formal legal
sanctions.
25. David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 31 (1995).




consists of "identifying which [moral] principle is most important
given the particularities of the situation."27 This is not an anti-
theoretical stance2 8 -it is always possible to critique one's
judgments with reference to higher-order principles-but a
recognition that abstract principles are not self-applying.
Subsuming a particular case under universal principles, selecting
one value among several competitors as the most important, and
analogizing a present case to the past are all examples of
exercising judgment. The paradigm of legal ethics as the exercise
of judgment is related to the call for employing informal sanctions
to regulate lawyers, because ethical judgments presuppose shared
community standards. The community serves as a resource for
making ethical decisions, by showing how ethical values are
introduced in a process of explanation and justification for the
actions of real people engaged in real life in all its complexity. 29
Pure reason alone is insufficient to constrain judgment.
Furthermore, without shared norms, ethical restraints on lawyers
would be vulnerable to challenge as illegitimate, being based in
something other than positive law or universal moral principles.3 0
As a final illustration of the frequency with which concepts
of community crop up in legal ethics discourse, consider the
tendency of judges to appeal to the "lore" or unwritten normative
standards of the legal profession, which are supposedly accessible
to all lawyers. In the case of In re Snyder, the United States
Supreme Court said that what would seem to be an undefined,
practically meaningless phrase--"conduct unbecoming a member of
the bar"-was not unconstitutionally vague if read in the context of
the "lore of the profession."3' Although at one point in the opinion
27. Luban & Millemann, supra note 25, at 39.
28. Cf. Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773 (1987).
29. See, e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 97-112 (1993);
RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM 38-40, 57-58 (1983). The most
prominent contemporary philosophical proponent of tradition- and community-based reasoning
is Alasdair MacIntyre, about whom I will have more to say in Section V.
30. The problem of legitimate authority arises because the lawyer is required to take tho
requirements of ethics as preclusive-that is, as giving him/her reasons to take or refrain from
some action. These shared professional norms take the place of the reasoning the lawyer would
otherwise have gone through; thus, in order not to be an unjustified infringement on his/her
autonomy, the norms must be based upon those ethical considerations the lawyer would
otherwise employ in his/her deliberation. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 347
(1977) (observing that legal positivists emphasize the stability and predictability of standards
that would be upset if public officials were permitted to rely on their own conceptions of
morality); see generally Joseph Raz, Authority, Law, and Morality, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN 210 (1994).
31. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 644-45 (1985).
1962 [Vol. 54:1955
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the Court seemed to equate professional lore with the positive
disciplinary codes promulgated by state bar associations, 32 the
Court also appeared to concede that the competing demands of
zealously advocating one's client's cause and advancing the cause
of justice must be resolved "in light of the traditional duties
imposed on an attorney,"33 which are not neatly captured in the
disciplinary codes. In another case, the Court conceded that
tribunals are not constitutionally required to anchor a narrowing
construction of standards for lawyer discipline to the state bar's
ethics rules:
Given the traditions of the legal profession and an attorney's specialized
professional training, there is unquestionably some room for enforcement of
standards that might be impermissibly vague in other contexts; an attorney in
many instances may properly be punished for conduct which all responsible
attorneys would recognize as improper for a member of the profession.3 4
In other words, the Court argued that by belonging to a community
and sharing in the practices of similarly situated professionals,
lawyers become acquainted with professional norms that are not
reducible to concise disciplinary codes.35
In this Article, I wish to look critically at the call for a
renewed focus on reputation, professional "lore," and informal
enforcement mechanisms. In doing so, it will first be necessary to
construct some kind of explanatory framework, to understand how
32. See id. at 645 (guidance is provided by "lore of the profession as enmbodied in codes of
professional conduct") (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
33. Id. at 644-45.
34. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 666 (1985) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 555 (1968) (White. J.,
concurring) C'[Certain kinds of conduct . . . will be grounds for disbarment . . . [includingi
conduct which all responsible attorneys would recognize as improper for a member of the
profession.').
35. For other courts that have accepted the argument that professional norms are
sufficiently clear to provide guidance for lawyers, see Howell v. State Bar of Texas, 8,3 F.2d
205, 208 (5th Cir. 1988); In re Phelps, 637 F.2d 171, 175 (10th Cir. 1981); In re Bithoney, 486
F.2d 319, 324-25 (lst Cir. 1973); United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 367 (7th Cir. 1972)
(stating that standards of appropriate behavior at trial "have become solidified in tradition and
do not need elaboration" by courts); In re Frerichs, 238 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Iowa 1976); Attorney
Grievance Comm'n v. Alison, 565 A.2d 660, 667 (NMd. 1989); In re Hinds, 4.19 A.2d 483, 497-98
(N.J. 1982). The Eleventh Circuit appears to take the position that the "lore of the profession"
must be set forth in disciplinary codes in order to serve as grounds for sanctions. See In re
Finkelstein, 901 F.2d 1560, 1565 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 645 (1985)).
That court faulted the district judge for suspending a lawyer from practice based on violations of
a "transcendental code of conduct... [which] existed only in the subjective opinion of the court"
Id. However, the court was focused on whether the lawyer had notice of the code of conduct
which he allegedly violated, leaving open the possibility that an uncodified but suitably clear
professional norm could form the basis for discipline, even in the Eleventh Circuit, if the lawyer
knew or should have known of its existence. Id.
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professional communities regulate the behavior of individual
members. It is one thing for courts to appeal to professional lore,
but quite another to account for how these norms are developed,
transmitted to novices, and enforced against deviant community
members. The linchpin of this analysis is the concept of social
norms, which has recently received a great deal of attention from
legal scholars. 36 My project may therefore be described as an
attempt to give a theoretical account of the development,
transmission, and enforcement of social norms in the community of
practicing lawyers. (The lessons learned from this analysis of
course have wider applicability.) I will consider three attempts
that have been made to understand social norms, which I will refer
to as the honor/shame model, the rational choice model, and the
civic republican model.37
These models of community social control respond to some
of the shortcomings of "legal centralism '' 38 in professional ethics,
which is the position that regulation of lawyers ought to be
accomplished through rules and enforcement mechanisms that
originate with government actors. Legal centralism assumes that
the state ought to have a monopoly on the regulatory function and
should be the sole source of enforceable rights and obligations. My
purpose here is not to rehearse the criticisms of legal centralism
that have been advanced by legal ethicists and law and economics
scholars. In brief, legal centralism has been challenged as
empirically inadequate as an explanation of behavior. Legal
centralism assumes that people act with full knowledge of the
relevant legal norms that govern their conduct. Applied to lawyers,
this is probably not an unreasonable assumption, although even
experienced lawyers are frequently ignorant of some of the
technicalities of professional responsibility doctrine. (More
commonly, lawyers are aware of the governing legal norms, but
assert a contradictory set of norms, often produced by the
36. See, e.g., Symposium, Law, Economics, and Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996);
Symposium, Norms in Moral and Social Theory, 100 ETHICS 725 (1990).
37. By "formal" and "informal," I mean to distinguish mechanisms for norm enforcement'
that do and do not depend on the exercise of state power. In this usage, I track Ellickson, one of
the pioneers of the study of informal norms and their interaction with law. ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 1 (1991). Whore state
actors intervene in professional regulation, they are bound by the requirements of duo process
and the rule of law-enforcement must not be arbitrary, notice and an opportunity to be heard
must be given to the target of the enforcement action, relatively determinate standards must be
employed, and so on. Informal regulatory strategies, being unconnected with state action, are
not so constrained.
38. Id. at 137.
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organized bar's ideological vision of ethical lawyering.39) With
respect to non-lawyers, however, knowledge about the law is scant,
even among fairly sophisticated actors.40 Furthermore, scholars
have determined that informal social norms, rather than legal
rules, largely determine conduct in many interactions. For
example, retailers are frequently willing to make accommodations
for their customers even though not required by law, because they
fear reputational injuries resulting from customer complaints. 41 In
industries in which the participants deal with one another on a
repeat basis, a complex series of norms can be generated, making
little or no reference to state-sponsored legal norms, as Lisa
Bernstein's investigation of the diamond and grain industries has
revealed.42 It is the task of a model of social norms to explain how
these community-based enforcement practices work, in the absence
of coercive state authority.
The honor/shame model draws from the extensive scholarly
literature on how certain small-scale, relatively homogeneous
societies have, outside the domain of law, regulated their
members. 43 Although much of the study of rituals of social control
through dishonor and shaming draws from the history,
anthropology, or literary studies of communities remote in
temporal and geographic space, such as the Classical or modern
Mediterranean, medieval Iceland, or the antebellum South in the
United States, advocates of the honor/shame model claim that
many modern practices of social control would be familiar to
students of these other cultures. Appropriating a Wittgensteinian
39. See Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1389
(1992).
40. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 22, at 41, 58-62; Daniel J. Givelber et al., Tarasoff, Myth
and Reality: An Empirical Study of Private Law in Action, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 443, 483-90.
41. See H. Laurence Ross & Neil 0. Littlefield, Complaint as a Problem Solving
Mechanism, 12 LAW & SOCY REV. 199, 211-26 (1978). I am grateful to Kent Greenawalt for
offering this example.
42. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Cour: Rethinking the Code's Search
for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996) [hereinafter Bernstein, Merchant
Law]; Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System. Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) [hereinafter Bernstein, Opting Out].
43. See, e.g., A.W.H. ADKINS, MORAL VALUES AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR IN ANCIENT
GREECE, FROM HOMER TO THE END OF THE FIFTH CENTURY (1972); RUTH BENEDICT, THE
CHRYSANTHEMUM AND THE SWORD (1946); DOUGLAS L. CAIRNS, AIDOS: THE PSYCHOLOG- AND
ETHICS OF HONOUR AND SHAME IN ANCIENT GREEK LITERATURE (1993); KENNETH S. GREENBERG,
HONOR & SLAVERY (1996); HONOR AND SHAmE: THE VALUES OF MEDITERRANEAN SOCIETY (J.G.
Peristiany ed., 1966) [hereinafter HONOR AND SHAME]; WILLIAM IAN MILLER, BLOODrAKING AND
PEACEMAKING: FEUD, LAW, AND SOCIETY IN SAGA ICELAND (1990); FRANK HENDERSON STEWART.
HONOR (1994); BERTRAM WYATT-BROWN, SOUTHERN HONOR: ETHICS & BEHAVIOR IN THE OLD
SOUTH (1982).
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metaphor, a proponent of the honor/shame model might argue that
informal practices of norm elaboration and enforcement in
contemporary professional communities are a language-game
whose grammar overlaps to a considerable extent the grammar of
language-games understood by members of traditional honor
societies. 44 By delving into the rich comparative historical and
anthropological literature on honor and shame, we can better
understand how various subcommunities in our modern society
influence behavior among their members and preserve and
transmit moral lessons throughout the community. 45 Section II of
this Article provides an overview of the honor/shame model of
informal community-based sanctions.
The second conceptual framework that has been brought to
bear in understanding how communities control behavior in the
absence of explicit legal sanctions is rational choice theory.46 Some
law and economics scholars have begun to apply rational choice
44. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 7, 23 (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1958) C'I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the
actions into which it is woven, the 'language-game.' "). Consider also the related concept of
"forms of life." See id. § 19 C'[T]o imagine a language means to imagine a form of life.").
45. One example is the world of managers in large American business corporations. See
generally ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS (1988). Many
of Jackall's findings will be discussed throughout this Article. Law professor William Ian Miller
also writes perceptively about how practices of honor inform contemporary social mores. See
WILLIAM IAN MILLER, THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST (1997) [hereinafter MILLER, DISGUST]; WILLIAM
IAN MILLER, HUMILIATION AND OTHER ESSAYS ON HONOR, SOCIAL DISCOMFORT, AND VIOLENCE
(1993) [hereinafter MILLER, HUMILIATION]. Finally, sociologist Elijah Anderson has studied
extensively the culture of honor in the American inner city. See, e.g., ELIJAH ANDERSON, CODE
OF THE STREET: DECENCY, VIOLENCE, AND THE MORAL LIFE OF THE INNER CITY (1999)
[hereinafter ANDERSON, CODE]; ELIJAH ANDERSON, STREETWISE: RACE, CLASS, AND CHANGE IN
AN URBAN COMMUNITY (1990). Even a tough-minded rational choice theorist like Jon Elster
accepts that decentralized coordination of human societies can be accomplished through "codes
of honor, or the ability to make credible threats and promises." JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF
SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 251 (1989).
46. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000); William K. Jones, A Theoly
of Social Norms, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 545; Symposium, Law, Economics & Norms, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1643 (1996); Richard H. McAdams, Comment: Accounting for Norms, 1997 WIS. L. REV.
625 [hereinafter McAdams, Accounting]; Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The
Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003 (1995)
[hereinafter McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict]; Richard H. McAdams, The Origin,
Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 339 (1997) [hereinafter
McAdams, Origin]; Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and
Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, On the
Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2029-30 (1996) [hereinafter, Sunstein,
Expressive Function]; Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903
(1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Social Norms]. The classic study from the law and society
movement (which is often at loggerheads with law and economics) is Stuart Macaulay, Non-
Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 44 (1963).
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concepts to informal community norms that influence actors'
behavior, even in domains that are otherwise subject to extensive
legal regulation. The insight of this scholarship is that informal
customs and norms can be as important as legal sanctions when an
actor is running through a cost/benefit analysis. People reckon
community-based sanctions as costs that must be taken into
account, or appeal to informal norms as signals of their reliability
as contracting partners. These informal social norms either
replace, supplement, or stand in tension with formal legal norms.
Metaphorically speaking, this means that "law"-at least law-like
constraints on behavior-can be made from the bottom up, as well
as from the top down.47 Social norms are decentralized, in the
sense of being created by all (or at least a significant subset of)
community members, rather than being imposed on the community
by a legislator or judge.48 Individual members of a business or
professional community check one another's behavior through a
variety of sanctioning devices: "social norms, commercial custom, a
concern for relationships, trust, honor and decency, or fear of
nonlegal sanctions such as reputational damage or termination of
a beneficial relationship."49 Section III discusses the rational
choice model of community norm enforcement and argues that the
informal sanctioning structure proposed by rational choice
theorists has a great deal in common with the honor/shame model.
Finally, legal theorists in several disciplines-most
prominently in constitutional law50-and scholars working in
related fields51 have sought to revive the civic republican tradition
in American law. For some legal ethicists, republicanism is a
welcome counterweight to the pernicious individualism and
selfishness they perceive at the heart of the dominant conception
of lawyering.52 (And it is certainly opposed to the conception of
rationality as self-interested utility maximization proposed by
47. Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach
to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996).
48. Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms. 144 U. PA. L REV. 1697, 1700-
01 (1996).
49. Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 42. at 1788 (internal quotation marks omitted).
50. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988) [hereinafter,
Michelman, Law's Republic]; Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court 19S5 Term-Foreword:
Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); Suzanna Sherry. Civic Virtue and the
Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein,
Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).
51. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1967); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND
THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975).
52. See, e.g., Shaffer, supra note 4.
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rational choice theorists.) Rather than directing lawyers merely to
seek to advance their clients' ends through any arguably legal
means, civic republican ethics charges lawyers with the duty to
ascertain the common good and attempt to harmonize their clients'
projects with social justice. Lawyers in this vision of the
professional role are not amoral instruments, mouthpieces, or
hired guns-instead, they are quasi-public officials who justifiably
may assert limited moral authority over clients. This authority is
legitimate because it is exercised with reference to a knowable
conception of public good and civic virtue, one which clients would
rationally endorse. Lawyers, on this account, are independent both
of the state and of their clients' partisan interests; they serve as a
repository of secular moral values, much as Durkheim had
imagined. 53 Section IV provides a brief account of the civic
republican tradition in American political thought and shows how
it undergirds much contemporary academic writing about legal
ethics.
The bulk of this Article is critical, and will be taken up with
a series of arguments against devolving too much power to the
professional community through the mechanism of social norms.
Many communitarians tend to idealize small-scale, homogeneous
associations, without mentioning some of the injustices that can be
created by this form of regulation. It is true that some
communities foster salutary values, and manage to control
harmful behavior efficiently, but it is equally true that other
communities have fostered the worst kind of injustices, such as
exclusion, discrimination, and marginalization of disfavored
subcommunities. To put it simply, there is no guarantee in the
concept of a community that the community's norms will be those
that ethically ought to be endorsed. Unless informal social norms
are kept in check by extra-community criticism, nothing prevents
the community's values from moving toward vice instead of virtue.
In addition to the tendency of communities to relativize truth to
power, to disable moral criticism of the community's values, and to
be applied in a discriminatory manner, informal social norms may
also be criticized for their tendency to spawn multiple-iterations of
revenge-taking, which can spiral out of control into full-blown
feuds. (In the domain of lawyering, this danger is familiar as the
phenomenon of satellite litigation over sanctions motions.) Finally,




there is the problem of applying social control schemes best fitted
for employment in small, homogeneous groups to large-scale
pluralistic groups like the community of practicing lawyers in a
sizable city. Section V considers these objections in detail.
II. HONOR AND SHAME
I use the label "honor/shame" model advisedly, fully aware
of its anachronistic resonance. In this discussion, it refers to a rich
set of social responses to deviant behavior, responses which
depend on considerations of reputation, social standing, and public
approbation, and which are enforced without state intervention,
through threats, gossip, retaliation, ostracism, or public displays of
ridicule. It is in this sense that the term "honor" has been used by
writers as diverse as political philosopher Charles Taylor and
rational choice scholar Jon Elster.54 The task of the following
section is, in part, to persuade the reader that the mechanism
described as the honor/shame model provides a workable account
of how relatively small communities control behavior in the
absence of formal legal regulation.
A. The Priority of Community
"Honor" is a quality attributed to a person who displays a
character in conformity with the foundational constituent moral
values of a society. It is measured with reference to an idealized
community, which embodies and expresses the fundamental values
of the social order. Ascribing honor or dishonor to a person
requires a constructive moral argument about the foundational
norms of the community in which that person is embedded. In this
way, the community becomes "the final arbiter of morals and
justice."55 Indeed, in societies or subcommunities governed
primarily by norms and practices of honor, scant basis exists for
ethical evaluation apart from the highly contingent customs of the
community.56 Thomas Shaffer, a cautious proponent of the
practices of honor in legal ethics, concedes that "the gentleman's
ethic is rooted in his culture; I do not claim any other foundation
54. See ELSTER, supra note 45, at 251; CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF 20.21
(1989).
55. WYATt-BROWN, supra note 43, at 369.
56. Id. at 54, 113-14.
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for it." 57 Honor therefore has the effect of disabling criticism of
community mores from some external critical standpoint. If
cultural mores are the only institution that individuals in society
regard as a legitimate source of ethical guidance, the claims of
other institutions are rendered hollow. This is one reason why,
historically speaking, some honor societies have exhibited hostility
toward religious authority, which by its nature denies customary
community practices any role in grounding objective ethical
precepts.58
The inextricable connection between the ascription of honor
and the community's foundational values distinguishes honor from
other moral virtues, such as trustworthiness, fairness, loyalty,
integrity, and courage. It may be true that a community values a
particular virtue highly, as in the priority given to courage by the
Greeks, in which case that community's conception of honor would
place great weight on that virtue. There may be other
communities, however, in which valor in battle is not highly
prized, and in these cases, we would not expect possession of the
virtue of courage to be a prerequisite to honorable status. In
contemporary discussions, "honor" tends to be used synonymously
with integrity or honesty in the context of university honor codes,
and with courage, patriotism, and loyalty in the military context.
More generally, honor today is taken to mean "respectability: a
reputation for fair dealing, honoring your contracts, paying your
debts."59 Continuing this theme, in corporate law, honor is
sometimes used as a synonym for fiduciary obligations. 60 In the
57. See Shaffer, Gentleman, supra note 13, at 26 n.92; see also 5 OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 368 (1933) (defining "code of honour" as "the set of rules and customs which
regulate the conduct of some particular class of persons according to a conventional standard of
honour").
58. See WYATT-BROWN, supra note 43, at 126-27, 132, 150; see also MILLER, HUMILIATION,
supra note 45, at 128 ("Our views of... the emotions of honor are indelibly affected by the
inversion of heroic virtues wrought by Christianity, whose moralists helped turn the emotions of
heroic society into deadly sins."); HABER, supra note 10, at 9-13. As Ed Brewer has reminded
me, however, it is not true that all traditional honor societies have been hostile toward religion;
the relationship between the culture of honor in the antebellum South and religion is
enormously complicated, with the norms of one sometimes reinforcing the other, sometimes
standing in opposition. See Shaffer, Gentleman, supra note 13. My colleague Ed Craun, a
medievalist, also pointed out that the honor codes of knights, embodied in the chivalric
romances, were actually promulgated originally by clerics, who had sought to reduce the
brutality of warfare. Perhaps all that one can confidently assert, in light of this evidence, is that
the relationship between honor codes and religious authority is contestable.
59. Eugen Weber, The Ups and Downs of Honor, AM. SCHOLAR, Winter 1999, at 79, 87; see
HABER, supra note 10, at 98.
60. See William W. Bratton, Game Theory and the Restoration of Honor to Corporate Law's
Duty of Loyalty, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAw 139 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995).
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rhetoric of the legal profession, honor has been used to indicate
learning, public-spiritedness, and independence from clients.61
It is important to understand that all of these communities
recognize the concept of honor, even though they elaborate diverse
conceptions of honor.62 For this reason, it is not improper to speak
of the mafia as being an honor-governed community, even though
mafia norms certainly exclude virtues such as compassion, a
disposition to obey the law, and honesty (at least vis-A,-vis the
state).63 Indeed, in a talk on honor, one of my colleagues suggested
that the two modern institutions that best exemplify honor norms
are the military and the mafia. In response, he received an angry
letter objecting to his characterization of mobsters as men of
honor, somehow equivalent in moral stature to George Patton or
Douglas MacArthur. The letter writer made a common analytic
error, however, in confusing the values recognized by a particular
subcommunity with the concept of honor generally. Honor is
simply the expression of the foundational norms or virtues of a
community, and can therefore vary dramatically in content
according to the identity of the community in question. It is almost
certainly the case that Patton and MacArthur were more virtuous
persons than the average wiseguy, but this evaluation requires an
extra-community standpoint from which to argue that the values
exemplified by the honor system of the military in the United
States are more attractive ethically than the values respected by
61. See HABER, supra note 10, at 221-25. Unfortunately, the legal profession has frequently
sought to protect its standing in the eyes of the lay public and its own self-conception as a
learned elite by excluding immigrants, Jews, people of color, and women from its ranks. See id.
at 222-23, 228-30.
62. For the concept-conception distinction in philosophy, see DWORKIN, supra note 30, at
134-36; CHRISTINE KORSGAARD, THE SOURCES OF NORMLATIVITY 113-14 (1993); JOHN 1AWS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). A concept is a definition of a term, while a conception is what a
particular person or group means when they invoke that concept. Cruel and unusual
punishment and due process, for example, are constitutional concepts, which have changed over
time, although the fundamental constitutional concepts have remained unchanged. One can
therefore argue that capital punishment should now be held to be cruel and unusual
punishment, even though it was accepted at the time of the framing of the constitution. This
evolution in conceptions of cruel and unusual punishment does not show that the constitutional
norms as laid down by the Framers have changed, only that the present-day community of
judges understands a different conception of cruel and unusual punishment.
63. Admittedly, my understanding of the social norms of mafiosi is based mostly on fiction.
movies directed by Francis Ford Coppola and Martin Scorsese. and the television series The
Sopranos. For additional information on social norms in the mafia, see BILL BONNANO. BOUND
BY HONOR A MAFIOSO'S STORY (1999); NICHOLAS PILEGGI. WISEGUY (1987).
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La Cosa Nostra. This is obviously not a difficult argument to
sustain, but it is nevertheless one that must be made.6 4
The community relies as a criterion for evaluation upon an
idealized personality, considered representative and exemplary
within a particular society. 65 By propagating hero myths and
didactic stories, and by elevating real persons in the eyes of others
as bearers of special prestige, the community transmits its norms
to the uninitiated through the histories of individuals facing moral
challenges. Many philosophers have asked the question, "How are
norms embodied in the social practices of . . . communities, and
how do such communities reach objective-intersubjective-
agreement?" 66 The ethic of honor answers this question by holding
up for admiration figures who are widely accepted as persons of
honor and saying, in effect, "What that person does is what you
should do as well. '6 7 An honor society therefore fosters an ongoing
64. Kent Greenawalt raises a difficult question at this juncture-namely, whether there is
anything in the concept of honor that imposes a substantive limitation on the range of
conceptions that can be elaborated. In ordinary usage, we can speak of mobsters or inner-city
gang-bangers as exemplifying honor cultures, so it is clear that the moral evil of a community's
ends or frequently employed means does not disqualify the community from being one governed
by honor. Also, the Southern slaveholding culture was complicit in a monstrous evil, and it is
considered one of the best historical examples of an honor society. Honor systems place a great
deal of emphasis on hierarchies, respect, and deference, and are characterized by pervasive
competition for status and challenges to the status of others. A persistent theme of William Ian
Miller's writing, however, is that these conditions hold true in many modern domains. See
MILLER, DISGUST, supra note 45; MILLER, HUMILIATION, supra note 45. At a minimum, we can
say that ethical systems that do not rely on external validation of claims to respect are not
honor-governed. For example, Christian virtues such as mercy, humility, and self-abnegation
are inconsistent with the ethics of honor (as Nietzsche recognized), as are rule of law values
such as impartiality. A utopian society, such as a hippie commune or a Communist workers'
paradise, in which hierarchy had been abolished, would also not be an honor-governed
community. Perhaps the salient distinction is between an honor system, and a normative
domain in which honor norms play a subservient role. Something like this notion is suggested
by Charles Taylor's three axes of moral concern. See TAYLOR, supra note 54, at 15-16. In a true
honor culture, such as Homeric Greece, the third axis-pertaining to how we succeed or fail in
commanding the respect of others-is primary over obligations toward others and
considerations of how a good life ought to be lived. See William Lad Sessions, Three Concepts of
Honor (Sept. 10, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (distinguishing honor
groups that incorporate moral principles into their codes from those that do not).
65. See HONOR AND SHAME, supra note 43, at 9, 10.
66. RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM 25 (1983).
67. See HONOR AND SHAME, supra note 43, at 19, 22 C'Honor... provides a nexus between
the ideals of a society and their reproduction in the individual through his aspiration to
personify them."). A contemporary example is the "WWJD"-what would Jesus do?-heuristic
employed by some evangelical Christians (often teenagers) in the United States. Selling
merchandise emblazoned with "WWJD," with the apparent purpose of reminding wearers
always to keep the exemplar of Jesus in mind, has become a multimillion dollar business. See,
e.g., Emily Nussbaum, Status Is for Evangelical Teenagers: Jewelry for Jesus, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
15. 1998, § 6 (Magazine), at 93.
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process of introspection about the ideals to which the society
aspires. 68 This mechanism of norm transmission is highly effective
at coping with moral complexity. Rather than reducing societal
expectations to a code of rules, with exceptions, qualifications, and
exceptions to exceptions, stories about honorable figures
accommodate situational sensitivity and particularity (what a
lawyer might call the "equities" of a case) by using fully realized
descriptions of the character of the protagonist and the antagonist,
the surrounding circumstances, the past history of the dealings
between the parties, and the particular issue in dispute.0
Of course, by using idealized personalities as a criterion for
moral evaluation, the ethics of honor falls into evident circularity.
How does one know to whom to look in order to discover the
qualities that are deemed exemplary in a particular society? The
customary response is to rattle off a list of names of persons widely
regarded as honorable-John McCain, Robert E. Lee, Atticus
Finch, Michael Corleone, whoever. This "photo album" method of
describing the qualities of a gentleman, however, "succeeds only
because we know before we start what a gentleman is."70 (It is
nevertheless a useful source of ethical instruction, because we may
learn a great deal about the good life by carefully studying the
lives of those exemplary figures.) If there is an intra-cultural
breakdown in agreement about who ought to be honored within
that society, however, merely proposing examples and
counterexamples of honorable individuals is certain to be a
fruitless exercise. In a sense, therefore, the success or failure of
the photo album method is a litmus test for the presence of a
community that is sufficiently cohesive to support the discourse
and practices of honor.
Because in the honor/shame model, social standing is
established with reference to the norms and ideals of a community,
68. Peter Berger, On the Obsolescence of the Concept of Honor, in REVISIONS: CHANGING
PERSPECTIVES IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 172, 174 (Stanley Hauerwas & Alasdair Maclntyre eds.,
1983).
69. See MILLER, HUMILIATION, supra note 45, at 119; Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering
Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. Rv. 1745, 1749 (1996) (stating that social norms "embody and convey
information"). For observations on the situational nature of ethical reasoning in law practice,
see Robert L. Nelson, The Discovery Process as a Circle of Blame Institutional, Professional,
and Socio-Econornic Factors that Contribute to Unreasonable, Inefficient, and Amoral Behavior
in Corporate Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 773, 780-81 (1998).
70. See Shaffer, Gentleman, supra note 13, at 7; cf EDNA U. ELI2IANN.MARGALIT, THE
EMERGENCE OF NoniS 105-06 (1977) (arguing that a small, cohesive group and its norms evolve
contemporaneously, enabling individuals both to recognize others as persons of honor, and to
constitute the group's identity in part through its agreement on exemplary members).
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one's feeling of entitlement to respect and worth must be validated
externally, by that community. Community approbation begins as
a sentiment peculiar to an individual-a claim to honor-but this
claim must be critically evaluated by others before honor can
properly be said to belong to an individual. 71 Honor in this model is
an ascription, not a subjective personal quality, so it may be taken
away by the actions of others, even though no actual change in the
character of the dishonored person has occurred. 72 It is not
synonymous with "self-esteem," inherent human dignity, or a
sentiment of entitlement to respect. Rather, it is dependent upon
the individual's reputation or standing in a community. 73 The
claim, "I am an honorable person," may be answered by the
community, "no, you are not," in which case the claimant would be
perceived as vain, the object of ridicule and scorn.74
Historian Kenneth Greenberg recounts many of the ways
that other members of society might answer an individual's claim
to honor in the negative, most seriously by "giving the lie," or
accusing the claimant of projecting a false image of himself.75
Duels frequently resulted from accusations of lying, not because
truth-telling was a signal virtue in the antebellum South, but
because the congruence between a person's public persona and the
way he was perceived by the community was so essential to social
standing. An individual accused of lying was told in no uncertain
terms that his peers did not agree with his claim to respect, and
because "giving the lie" was a public act, there was no way for the
71. This definition of honor as depending both on an individual's self-esteem and social
validation of worth, which is generally accepted in the anthropological community, has boon
most clearly enunciated by Julian Pitt-Rivers. See Julian Pitt-Rivers, Honor, in 6
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 503, 508 (David Sills ed., 1968); Julian
Pitt-Rivers, Honour and Social Status, in HONOUR AND SHAME: THE VALUES OF MEDITERRANEAN
SOCIETY 19, 22 (J.G. Peristiany ed., 1966) [hereinafter Pitt-Rivers, Social Status]; see also
GREENBERG, supra note 43, at 7; WYATT-BROWN, supra note 43, at 14.
72. See STEWART, supra note 43, at 19-21; see also MILLER, HUMILIATION, supra note 45, at
119 ('As a linguistic matter people are not said to be shamed or to feel shamed or shame.
Shame, rather, is something done to people, or people endure it or suffer it, or it will come to
them, or they simply have it."); Pitt-Rivers, Social Status, supra note 71, at 67 ('Just as the liar
is only dishonored when, impugned as a liar, he fails to vindicate his honor, so the cuckold is
only dishonored when public recognition is given to [that] fact ...."). Many theorists who have
studied social norms without reference to the ethics of honor have misunderstood shame as
merely an emotion that one feels, not as a sanction imposed by the community. Cf. Sunstein,
Expressive Function, supra note 46, at 2030.
73. See KORSGAARD, supra note 62, at 117 (distinguishing honor, sin, and moral
wrongness-three different ways of conceiving of losses to one's human identity).
74. Pitt-Rivers, Social Status, supra note 71, at 22, 72; see HONOR AND SHAME, supra note
43, at 11.
75. See GREENBERG, supra note 43, at 8-9, 19, 32.
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accused to recover from this humiliation other than by a dramatic
reassertion of the claim to honor, often in the form of a challenge
to the accuser to a duel. Similarly, inner-city youths are
exquisitely sensitive to "dissing," or overt evidence of disrespect,
and will pick fights over seemingly inconsequential insults, in
order to prove that they are entitled to respect. 76
In some cases, the community's ridicule may be misplaced,
if the facts that would entitle the claimant to respect are unknown
or misapprehended by observers. In that case, the claimant may be
entitled to honor, but receive none. Alternatively, an individual
may succeed in fooling observers into believing that he exemplifies
the central moral vision of the community, even though he may in
fact be a scoundrel. This latter possibility has been considered
throughout the history of moral inquiry, as in the story told by
Glaucon in Plato's Republic of a shepherd who discovered the ring
of Gyges. 77 The magic ring made the shepherd invisible, so he could
steal, kill, and sleep with the king's wife, while continuing to bask
in his reputation as a just man. Glaucon intended this story to
show that people desire the appearance of justice, not justice itself,
but the story also can be read as a critique of a moral system that
relies on outward appearances and community reaction as a
criterion of praiseworthiness. The deceiver has not earned the
right to be accorded honor, but the practice of judging on the basis
of outward appearances tends to obscure the recourse to rights or
facts of the matter.7 8
The disconnect between externally validated claims to honor
(or appearances) and the reality of a matter is illustrated by a
fascinating scenario in which former Senator John Randolph of
Virginia, a person of unquestioned honor in his community, was
able to lie blatantly to another person and have his version of
events accepted as the truth, even though it was clearly false.79
Randolph had invited another man to dinner, but had forgotten
about the invitation. When the man showed up at Randolph's
house at the appointed time, Randolph answered the door and
without hesitation stated, "Sir, I am not home." The other man
simply walked away, without any thought of accusing Randolph of
lying. Obviously the invitee did not believe the literal truth of the
76. See ANDERSON, CODE, supra note 45, at 67-79.
77. See PLATO, Republic, Book f1 (Paul Shorey trans.), in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES 358c-
360d (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1961).
78. I am grateful to Kent Greenawalt for raising these problematic cases.
79. GREENBERG, supra note 43, at 31-32.
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statement, but was constrained to accept it as true because of the
authority belonging to Randolph by virtue of his status. Because
Randolph had previously earned the ascription of honor from his
community, he was in no danger of being exposed as a liar-in fact,
the power resulting from his social standing was so great that
others were forced to accept his story as true, despite all evidence
to the contrary. "A Southern gentleman could wear anything-even
a dress or a lie-as long as he could prevent it from being
removed."80 Honor is power, and Randolph's standing in the
community enabled him to prevent others from unmasking him as
a liar. (Foucault would be quick to observe the extent to which
truth becomes relativized to power in societies governed by norms
of honor.8 1) This story shows that standing within the community,
which is prior to the ethical evaluation of an act, enables the actor
to define the truth for others, despite the extra-social reality of the
event in question.
82
In philosophical terms, honor provides a bridge across the
is/ought gap, but at the cost of radical relativization to
conventional morality (though by no means to purely subjective
preferences, since the validity of an individual's principles is
contingent upon community approbation). "[W]hatever is becomes
right, the de facto is made de jure, the victor is crowned with
laurels . . . the tyrant becomes the monarch, the bully, a chief."8
3
The ethics of honor depends for its validity on the prevailing
morality of the society from which claimants to the title of
"gentleman" arise. As we will see in Section V.B below, there is
accordingly not much room for dissenters in an honor-based
culture, at least not for dissenters who aspire to be regarded as
80. Id. at 25. The reference to wearing a dress is an allusion to the widely reported story
that Jefferson Davis, the former Confederate president, had been captured by Union soldiers
while trying to escape disguised as a woman. Northern newspaper readers delighted in this
story, and seemed to understand implicitly that being unmasked--called a liar-was the worst
possible humiliation that could have been inflicted upon Davis by the Northern soldiers. See id.
at 24-31.
81. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER
WRITINGS 1972-1977, at 131 (Colin Gordon ed., 1980).
82. Robin LeBlanc suggests an alternative reading of the Randolph story that does not
depend on his ability to force others to accept a lie. She suggests that "I am not home" was
clearly understood by the would-be guest as meaning "I am not available to receive visitors."
This interpretation does eliminate the falsity of Randolph's statement, but leaves unchanged
the central lesson of the story, which is that powerful members of a community were able to
define the terms of their interaction with others at will.
83. Pitt-Rivers, Social Status, supra note 71, at 38. Wyatt-Brown appropriately refers to
the congruence of public sentiment and ethical norms as "tyranny of the community." Sec
WYATT-BROWN, supra note 43, at 357.
1976 [Vol. 54:1955
NONLEGAL REGULATION
honorable. As a result of the derivation of honor norms from
community mores, it is possible to construct rules or codes of
honor, which closely track the value structure of a society. The
price of openly breaking one of these rules is the loss of honor, so
all one must do to understand the ethics of an honor-governed
culture is to observe who is dishonored in the eyes of his peers, and
thereby deduce a general ethical maxim, such as "keep your
promises," or "be generous and hospitable. " 84 Because of the
necessary link between social approbation and honor, the concept
of honor is not reducible to integrity or authenticity, either of
which may be defined as being true to one's commitments.85 Honor,
instead, requires an individual to submit her value commitments
to the community for acceptance or rejection. The duality of
honor-the claim and the external vindication-thereby provides
the community with leverage to control individuals without resort
to cumbersome formal processes like legislation and adjudication.
B. Rituals of Dishonor
In the honor/shame model, the community not only confers
respect but also acts to mark off certain persons as shamed, or
utterly lacking in worth. In traditional honor societies, rituals
were developed to enforce social values outside the domain of
institutions like the state and the church.86 Shaming, however,
need not always be divorced from political or ecclesiastical
authority. Historically, state authority was frequently coupled
with shaming rituals to impose certain kinds of punishments, such
as branding, the pillory and stocks, forced public apologies, and
even contemporary variations like "Megan's law" and publication
of the names of prostitutes' customers.87 Where no effective legal
sanctions were available, extreme transgressions of community
norms could warrant an extravagant public display of outrage
involving a multitude of people, such as tarring-and-feathering,
84. STEWART, supra note 43, at 24.
85. See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, INTEGRITY (1996); EDWARD SHILs. TRADITION 10-11
(1981); CHARLES TAYLOR, THE ETHICS OF AUTHENTICITY (1991).
86. See, e.g., HABER, supra note 10, at 95-96.
87. See James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE
L.J. 1055, 1060-62 (1998). Richard Posner argues that apart from the possibility of being
removed from office (a legal sanction), an aspect of shaming (an informal, or nonlegal sanction)
attended the impeachment of President Clinton. See RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE
193-95 (1999).
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exile, lynching, or the peculiar ritual known as the charivari. 88 For
less serious offenses, milder sanctions were available, such as
gossip, shunning the offender, the assignment of nicknames, or
folk art forms such as ballads about cuckolded husbands sung at
Carnival time.89 The active participation in righting perceived
wrongs is one of the principal sources of satisfaction in
communities governed by norms of honor and shame. The cathartic
effect of taking personal responsibility for setting things straight
helps explain why, in the Old South, extra-judicial rituals like
lynching and the charivari retained their popularity for so long:
"People thought they needed to see the actual triumph of right
88. See TAYLOR, supra note 54, at 290 ('Charivaris were noisy manifestations of public
collective ridicule."); WYATT-BROWN, supra note 43, at 440-42. The charivari is called the vito in
Andalusia, and there consists of an "assemblage of young men with the equipment of horns and
cowbells and the composition of... songs." Pitt-Rivers, Social Status, supra note 71, at 50. See
also the description of a Chinese raid on the home of a woman who committed adultery in
MAXINE HONG KINGSTON, No Name Woman, in THE WOMAN WARRIOR: MEMORIES OF A
GIRLHOOD AMONG GHOSTS 1, 3-5 (1976). The American ritual includes mock serenades with
musical instruments and noisemakers such as trumpets, bells, and pots and pans. One judicial
decision described a charivari as follows: "[A] bride and groom were taken against their will by
force and placed on a wagon and drawn up and down the streets, making proclamation of their
nuptials, [the mob] introducing them to people in burlesque speeches, drawing large crowds, and
causing disorder and some tumult." See Cherryvale v. Hawman, 101 P. 994, 994 (Kan. 1909); see
also Combs v. Ezell, 24 S.W.2d 301, 303 (Ky. 1930) (couple charivaried for 2-3 weeks by rotating
shifts of men); Bruno v. State, 162 N.W. 167, 167 (Wis. 1917) (describing charivari party's
activities as "firing a gun and exploding dynamite near the house, ringing bells, beating on tin
pans, and making the other noises which usually characterize this highly refined and humorous
proceeding"). Unsurprisingly, numerous criminal murder and assault cases, as well as civil
battery cases, have arisen out of disputes incident to charivaris in the United States. See, e.g.,
State v. Voss, 199 P. 87 (Idaho 1921) (reversing manslaughter conviction of object of charivari
who shot and killed one of the mocking party who had tried to enter house through bedroom
window); Gilmore v. Fuller, 65 N.E. 84 (Il1. 1902) (one member of charivari party not liable for
negligently shooting another, since both parties had consented to participate in an illegal
activity); Walker v. Commonwealth, 31 S.W.2d 721 (Ky. Ct. App. 1930); People v. Warner, 167
N.W. 878 (Mich. 1918) (reversing attempted murder conviction against charivari target who
shot party member); Choate v. State, 258 P. 360 (Okla. Crim. App. 1927); Palmer v. Smith, 132
N.W. 614 (Wis. 1911); Higgins v. Minaghan, 47 N.W. 941 (Wis. 1891) (holding target of charivari
not liable for the injuries he inflicted when he fired on the crowd that had assembled for a third
night, causing extreme fright and distress to the defendant's wife and small children).
89. The literature on social sanctions is vast. For examples from anthropology and history,
see for example STEWART, supra note 43, at 111; WYATT-BROWN, supra note 43, at 446-47; Pitt-
Rivers, Social Status, supra note 71, at 47-48. For sociological studies of gossip and reputation,
see for example M.P. BAUMGARTNER, THE MORAL ORDER OF A SUBURB (1988); David M. Engel,
Cases, Conflict, and Accommodation: Patterns of Legal Interaction in a Small Community, 1983
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 803, 857-58; Sally Engle Merry, Rethinking Gossip and Scandal, in
TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF SOCIAL CONTROL 271 (Donald Black ed., 1984); Richard
Schwartz, Social Factors in the Development of Legal Control: A Case Study of Two Israeli
Settlements, 63 YALE L.J. 471 (1954). Compare the economics literature on reputational
sanctions. See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 37; ELSTER, supra note 45, at 97-151; McAdams,
Origin, supra note 46; Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 46.
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over wrong, not just be told about it in a newspaper summary.9 0
The same considerations explain the political appeal of recurring
proposals to reform criminal law by including punishments
explicitly designed to communicate a stigmatizing message, such
as ordering offenders to display license plates reading "DUI
convict," or publishing the names of prostitutes' clients in the
newspaper or on billboards.91
In anthropological, sociological, and historical studies and
in literature, honor is invariably linked with the idea of
reciprocity, with paying back what is owed, either returning gifts
in kind, or retaliating for offenses against one's honor.92 Since
honor is ascriptive, one is constantly in danger of having one's
status diminiihed by the actions of others. Challenges in
traditional honor societies were frequent, and demanded
retribution.93 "To leave an affront unavenged is to leave one's
honor in a state of desecration."94 (Similarly, gifts and other acts of
generosity had the capacity to serve as a catalyst for conflict, since
the act of giving a gift to another implies a great deal about the
respective status of the individuals involved. 95) Social practices
90. WYATT-BROWN, supra note 43, at 458; see also Weber, supra note 59, at 80 (stating that
the hero of the Song of Roland is "interested in public displays of courage because his honor
depends on what other people think").
91. See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternatit'e Sanctions Mfean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 630-
52 (1996) (noting the expressive value of shaming sanctions).
92. See ELSTER, supra note 45, at 116-18; GREENBERG, supra note 43, at 54-55; ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUsTIcE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 14 (1988) CTo deprive another of what is
due to someone occupying his role ... is to infringe upon the ... honor of the other. And ifI am
dishonored, as Achilles was by Agamemnon, then I am required to seek redress."); MILLER,
supra note 43, at 179-220; MILLER, HUMILIATION, supra note 45, at x, 16-17; Pitt-Rivers, Social
Status, supra note 71, at 58-59.
93. See, e.g., ANDERSON, CODE, supra note 45, at 73-75 (stating that, on the street,
challenges to the respect of others increases the challenger's share of respect, or 'juice");
GREENBERG, supra note 43, at 8-9, 16-23 (describing how accusations of lying and, more
dramatically, nose-pulling functioned as challenges to the self-presentation of a person of
honor); Weber, supra note 59, at 82-83.
94. Pitt-Rivers, Social Status, supra note 71, at 26; see also ELSTER, supra note 45, at 118-
21.
95. See GREENBERG, supra note 43, at 65 (giving gifts was the distinguishing mark of a
man of honor in the antebellum South, since only masters, not slaves, could give gifts, and the
institution of slavery was deeply implicated in the pattern of social relationships among whites);
MILLER, HUMILIATION, supra note 45, at 16-17; cf. Eric A. Posner, Altruism, Status, and Trust in
the Law of Gifts and Gratuitous Promises, 1997 WIS. 1, REv. 567, 585-92. The anthropological
writing on gift-giving is strongly influenced by the work of Marcel Mauss, who observed the
function of gifts as creating solidarity in precapitalist societies. See, e.g., Marcel Mauss, Gift,
Gift, in THE LOGIC OFTHE GIFT: TOWARD AN ETHIC OF GENEROS1TY 28 (Alan D. Schrift ed., 1997).
The connection between gift-giving and the social practices of conferring honor and shame is
well known. The potential for giving insults and provoking violence is always inherent in acts of
generosity. As Bertram Wyatt-Brown notes: "[Hiospitality could not be divorced from honor....
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such as duels accordingly evolved, to allow an affronted person to
regain his honor in a public display of his worth. 96 In societies
based substantially on honor norms, challenges and attempts to
vindicate honor could spiral out of control, with the disputants
rallying kinfolk to their aid and spawning massive blood feuds of
recrimination and revenge-taking. 97 Other communities managed
to channel some of this behavior into less destructive practices, but
even highly bureaucratized, law-governed societies occasionally
manifest a preoccupation with challenges to someone's social
standing. In the American South in the nineteenth century, for
example, elaborate codes regulated the conduct of duels, to prevent
spontaneous outbreaks of difficult-to-control physical violence. 98
Some societies have even incorporated redress for loss of honor
To refuse an offer of magnanimity--even if only a drink in a grog shop-was to insult the donor,
by throwing doubt on his claim to worthiness as a companion." WYATT-BROWN, supra note 43, at
337; see also Rob Atkinson, Liberating Lawyers: Divergent Parallels in Intruder in the Dust and
To Kill a Mockingbird, 49 DUKE L.J. 601, 615 (1999) (observing that Chick Mallison's offer of
payment to his host's wife after Lucas Beauchamp rescued him "is meant, we recognize, not so
much to pay them for their trouble as to put them in their place; it is less a payment
compensating them for their services than a gratuity implicitly confirming their servility").
The honor codes of medieval Albania, known as the kanun, have been written down in one
form or another; many provisions of the kanun deal with hospitality and gift-giving. See TIlE
CODE OF LEKE DUKAGJINI (Shtjefdn Gje~ov ed., Leonard Fox trans., 1989). These norms appear
ridiculously complicated to an outsider (for example, "First the master of the house drinks a
glass of raki, then the guest drinks one; the guest first dips a morsel of food, then the master of
the house dips one," id. §§ 662-63), but reveal the touchiness of host-guest relationships whore
the social status of both parties is at stake. Id.
Contemporary charities have exploited the potential for conflict surrounding the practices of
giving, essentially converting philanthropic events into social spectacles in which honor and
shame may be meted out by the elite according to which of their number are in attendance. See
generally FRANCIE OSTROWER, WHY THE WEALTHY GIVE: THE CULTURE OF ELITE PHILANTHROPY
(1995).
96. See, e.g., GREENBERG, supra note 43, at 58, 62, 74 (stating that the central purpose of
the dueling ritual was to reaffirm the equality of the participants, after the status of one had
been called into question by the other); Douglas H. Yarn, The Attorney as Duelist's Friend:
Lessons from the Code Duello, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 69, 84-87 (2000). Interestingly, the
public may turn against the accuser if it seemed that the interests at stake were insufficiently
weighty. For example, historian Eugen Weber describes the excesses of the French fad of
dueling in the nineteenth century, where the eagerness of Frenchmen to embrace what had
been an aristocratic privilege quickly turned challenges to a duel into a form of banal
ostentation. See Weber, supra note 59, at 88; see also Robert Nye, The End of the Modern French
Duel, in MEN AND VIOLENCE: GENDER, HONOR, AND RITUALS IN MODERN EUROPE AND AMERICA
82 (Pieter Spierenburg ed., 1998).
97. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER BOEHM, BLOOD REVENGE: THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF FEUDING IN
MONTENEGRO AND OTHER TRIBAL SOCIETIES (1984); ALTINA L. WALLER, FEUD: HATFIELDS,
MCCOYS, AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN APPALACHIA, 1860-1900 (1988); Scott Anderson, The Curse of
Blood and Vengeance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1999, § 6 (Magazine), at 29. For an extremely
interesting and accessible description of feuding in medieval Iceland-perhaps the best example
from history of a pure honor society-see MILLER, supra note 43.
98. See Yarn, supra note 96, at 86.
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into positive law; for instance, a substantial juristic literature
exists in Germany on precisely this phenomenon. It is an
actionable offense against A's honor to be called a swine by B, but
if A actually were a swine, B will have committed no crime.99
Similarly, the nature of the offense varies according to whether B
calls A a swine in front of witnesses or in private-only the former
is a challenge to A's standing in the community, his claim to
honor.100 The German concept of reputation or honor therefore
comports with the practices of more traditional honor societies,
which recognize an external, or objectified, component in addition
to the subjective sentiment of a feeling of honorableness. In many
respects, the law of defamation in American jurisprudence
recognizes the same reputational interests as the German law of
honor. 101
The German legal system made insults actionable because
doing so properly accounted for the role of interested observers in
meting out honor and shame. Challenges to others, redemption of
honor through vengeance or duels, and the cathartic effect of
shaming rituals are all part of the very public morality play
enacted by honor systems. Each move and countermove in the
language-game understood and spoken by members of an honor-
governed society is directed not only at the challenger but at
spectators-members of the community who will ultimately decide
the issue of the relative status of the disputants. 10? The
community's reaction to an event is the dispositive factor in
determining whether the event is a wrong, justifying retaliation, or
an occurrence of no account; accordingly, individuals in an honor-
governed society are constantly attempting to divine public
sentiment and influence the interpretation placed by the
community on past events.103 To this end, the American practice of
dueling even evolved the custom of "posting," whereby the friend or
second of an aggrieved party could plaster signs all around the
town denouncing the rival as unworthy of being regarded as a
99. See STEWART, supra note 43, at 14-15.
100. Id. at 15.
101. Interestingly, the German institution that regulated lawyers' behavior was called an
Ehrengericht--court of honor-until 1994. See Detlev F. Vagts, Professional Responsibility in
Transborder Practice: Conflict and Resolution, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 677, 680 n.9 (2000).
102. See MILLER, supra note 43, at 189 CDisputants had to 'sell' their choices of action to
others. To do so the choices had to accord with people's sense of right and propriety.").
103. See id. at 216-18.
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gentleman. 0 4 After being posted, a formerly honorable person was
no longer entitled to be treated with deference by social peers.
Although claims to honor must be confirmed by individuals
other than the claimant, and shaming is a necessarily public act, it
is important to recognize that the standards constructed by an
honor society are not imposed coercively on properly socialized
members of the community-these principles are internalized and
become part of the set of value commitments of the individual. 105
"In shame we fail against a standard or norms whose validity we
accept." 0 6 Honorableness becomes part of the character of the
agent, so that in acting, the agent acts because she is the kind of
person who performs that kind of action, not because she is
consciously worried about what other people will think. 10 7 I will
have more to say in Section V.E about what communities can do in
the face of outsiders who deliberately hold themselves apart from a
community, in the hopes of free riding on the cooperation displayed
by the compliant individuals who are bound by the community's
standards. But in the case of those who do conform to the
expectations of observers, habituation eventually takes over, and
externally imposed sanctions no longer bear all the weight of social
control.
C. The Honor/Shame Model in Modern Life
In contemporary American society, informal means of
control operate constantly, although we may not consciously
recognize them as supervenient upon considerations of reputation.
For example, Robert Ellickson describes how cattle ranchers in a
rural community in California frequently use truthful, negative
gossip as a means of controlling deviant behavior, and have at
104. See Yarn, supra note 96, at 90-91 (reprinting a sign from the dispute between two
prominent Virginia politicians in 1807, which culminated in signs being posted on all street
corners in Washington reading: "In justice to my character I denounce to the world John
Randolph, a member of Congress, as a prevaricating, base, calumniating scoundrel, poltroon
and coward."). And who says that politics today is nastier than it has ever been?
105. ELSTER, supra note 45, at 131 (adducing a trivial, but colorful example: "I do not pick
my nose when I can be observed by people on a train passing by, even if I am confident that they
are all perfect strangers whom I shall never see again and who have no power to impose
sanctions on me."); MILLER, HUMILIATION, supra note 45, at 118; GABRIELE TAYLOR, PRIDE,
SHAME, AND GUILT 57-68 (1985).
106. MILLER, HUMILIATION, supra note 45, at 127.
107. See ROM HARRt & MICHAEL KRAUSZ, VARIETIES OF RELATIVISM 162 (1996) ("At the
heart of moralities of honour is the idea that the moral life is not so much a life exhausted by
the doing of one's duty and fulfilling one's obligations as of being just the sort of person who
does their duty and fulfills their obligations.").
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their disposal a gradation of increasingly more drastic means of
keeping recalcitrant members of the community in line, such as
herding the cattle of a miscreant into an inconvenient location. 03
The available methods of community norm enforcement even
include violent self-help, such as killing cattle, reserved for
extreme cases. Elijah Anderson shows how groups of streetwise
youths control individuals' behavior through ridicule, teasing, and
other acts of verbal aggression. 10 9 William Ian Miller is another
astute observer of these phenomena, even in settings that seem
less disputatious than the rancher society described by Ellickson
or the inner-city street corners observed by Anderson:
Even in the noise and bustle of the conventional turn taking among group
members treating the rest of the table to pitchers of beer, we tend to notice if,
time and again, the same person seems to be last to volunteer in hopes that
people will have had their fill before it comes to him to have to pay. Eventually
that person will be saddled with a reputation for being cheap, or shamed by
pointed teasing into shelling out, or even, finally, uninvited. This last sanction
becomes inevitable for those souls who are immune to the repayment obligation,
having by a quirk of character an absolute preference for bearing the cost of
being thought cheap than for bearing the cost of a pitcher of beer."10
Another story in Miller's book can be described as a professional
charivari or, in his terms, as a witch-burning: a member of an
informal social reading group was enough of a boor that the
remaining members eventually conspired to shame him by failing
to show up at his house for a group meeting, on the pretext that
they would prefer to watch a regional finals college basketball
game."' Group members had been trying for weeks to send subtler
signals to the loutish peer, but after he repeatedly demonstrated
108. See ELLICKSON, supra note 37, at 57-59; see also ROY B. FLEMMINO ET AL., THE CRAFr
OF JUSTICE 10 (1992) (discussing how "grapevine gossip" enforces lawyering norms in small
professional communities); Vagts, supra note 101, at 688, n.60 (observing that small
communities of lawyers can be, and have been, regulated by rules stated in general terms, using
concepts like honor, good taste, or ddlicatesse).
109. See ANDERSON, CODE, supra note 45, at 151-53, 157.
110. MILLER, HUMILIATION, supra note 45, at 21. Pitt-Rivers describes a similar conflict,
only in reverse, over picking up the check in contemporary Spanish villages:
Paying is a privilege which goes to the man of precedence since to be paid for
places a man in a situation of inferiority. Hence disputes about paying the bill
which occur whenever there is no clearly defined superior who can claim the
right to do so. (In such situations a man must put up a good fight in order to
defend his honor even though he may be delighted to lose.)
Pitt-Rivers, Social Status, supra note 71, at 59-60. Again, these examples show only that a
properly socialized individual would feel compelled to pick up the check. Free riders may exist,
who secretly hope not to get stuck with the bill, but unless they are utterly indifferent to public
opinion (in which case they probably lack for drinking companions), they realize the importance
of pretending to bear a fair share of the burden.
111. See MILLER, HUMILIATION, supra note 45, at 1-3.
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his ignorance of the norms he was violating, a more spectacular
ritual was required. The rogue member got the message and
stopped showing up at reading group meetings. Although Miller
confesses to feeling considerable embarrassment after the fact
arising from playing a part in this ritual, it is clear from his
account that it was rather satisfying at the time for the group to
repay all of the annoyances they had suffered at the rogue
member's hands.
In the internal self-regulatory practices of the legal
profession, shaming rituals often take the form of "war stories,"
gossip about lawyers who exhibit antisocial behavior and the
subsequent retaliation by the lawyers who have been wronged.
During my judicial clerkship, I spent each Friday at the Tanana
Valley Bar Association lunch, an extraordinary gathering of
characters from the Fairbanks, Alaska bar. The judge for whom I
clerked had risen through the local bar to become a prominent
Fairbanks lawyer, and eventually a federal appellate judge, and he
wished to expose his prot6g6es to what for him had been a valuable
process of informal norm elaboration in a small-town bar. Perhaps
none of us at the time thought of the bar lunch as a ritualized
practice for transmitting ethical lessons (it was in some ways for
us a chore, since the clerks were the inevitable butt of ribbing by
the local lawyers), but that was exactly its function. The stories
told around the tables involved cases the lawyers had handled, and
usually contained a moral about what kind of conduct would be
tolerated by the community and, by contrast, what would result in
some kind of informal retribution."
2
Sanctions recounted in these war stories included a refusal
by an aggrieved lawyer to agree to a request for a continuance; in a
later case against the same opponent, a motion with a quick
turnaround time conveniently filed as the offending lawyer was
about to take a vacation; exclusion from the referral network that
tends to keep even relatively inexperienced lawyers busy with the
cases rejected by others; withdrawal of customary courtesies not
required by procedural rules, such as scheduling depositions by
112. Other legal ethicists, particularly Stephen Gillers, have recognized the didactic
functions of stories about lawyers. Gillers even advocates using popular culture media such as
television shows as a resource for teaching students about how norms of professionalism are
elaborated and transmitted in practice. See generally Stephen Gillers, Taking L.A. Law More
Seriously, 98 YALE L.J. 1607 (1989). For the significance of stories, communities, and
interpretation in the jurisgenerative process, see Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982
Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
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agreement rather than by serving subpoenas; and a rapidly
disseminated reputation that the offending lawyer could not be
trusted, leading other lawyers in town to be much more "by the
book" in their relations with the offender, and therefore more
expensive to deal with. Significantly, the conduct that would bring
down such a penalty was exactly the sort of thing that proponents
of ethical reform of the bar are constantly citing as examples of
unethical practice: discovery abuse, such as obstreperousness in
responding to interrogatories, refusal to cooperate in deposition
scheduling, and abusive behavior toward witnesses and opposing
counsel in depositions; refusal to agree to even reasonable requests
for continuances; sandbagging by disclosing surprise witnesses or
exhibits on the eve of trial; and most of all, going back on one's
promises. (These behaviors are often known by the moniker of
"Rambo" tactics."3 ) The informal penalties imposed by the
community of lawyers, and recounted in endless stories told for the
benefit of newcomers, were far more effective than any change in
the rules of professional conduct, which depend for enforcement on
overworked courts and disciplinary committees, and which may be
skirted by careful lawyers.
The bar lunch is, in some ways, the modern successor to the
practice of lawyers riding circuit with other local lawyers and
judges. Consider this description:
In the rural districts, between about 1800 and 1870 .... [s]ettlement was sparse;
court thus must be held at various county seats within a judicial circuit. Travel
was hard, dangerous, and lonely; it was natural that the judge and the lawyers
should ride the roads together, put up at the same tavern, share the same
table.... If there was little formal discipline, there was nonetheless pressure to
conform to group standards-pressure that made itself felt in the long
discussions and exchanges of professional talk as horses stumbled or wagons
bumped their way over the indifferent roads between courthouses; pressure that
was expressed through the mock courts that were held of an evening at the
tavern, to call one of the brethren to account for conduct that day in court.1 4
113. The first use of the term "Rambo" lawyering, after the character played by Sylvester
Stallone in the 1982 movie First Blood, is unclear, but the expression was well enough
established by the mid-1990s for Mary Ann Glendon to call the Rambo lawyer "[t]hat familiar
creature." GLENDON, supra note 3, at 51; see also Thomas M.t Reavley, Rambo Litigator Piltting
Aggressive Tactics Against Legal Ethics, 17 PEPP. L. REv. 637 (1990). The rallying cry of the
Rambo lawyer is perhaps best expressed by one big-firm litigator in New York City, who
observed, in a quotation that has been repeated frequently, "'In the American legal system...
being a complete asshole for your client has a high payoff' " LINCOLN CAPLAN, SKADDEN:
POWER, MONEY, AND THE RISE OF A LEGAL EMPIRE 138 (1993) (quoting unnamed partner).
114. JAMEs W. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 286 (1950).
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Of course, before achieving prominence as a leader in the bar,
Abraham Lincoln rode circuit in exactly this manner. 115
Interestingly, one of the founding missions of the American Bar
Association was to "encourage cordial intercourse" among members
of the bar; the aim was to recreate the convivial atmosphere of the
county seat courthouse or the long rides between stops on a circuit,
where lawyers could relieve the tension of their adversarial
profession through friendly banter. 116 If friendly banter failed, the
informal gatherings of lawyers could also serve as a means to
"post" recalcitrant lawyers by informing the community of their
improper behavior. 117
For a lawyer, this sort of social control begins early in one's
career. Every law student is familiar with shaming rituals used by
the community to control deviant members, with "deviant" being
understood as meaning "talks too much in class, sucks up overtly
to professors, seems unduly impressed with himself," and so on.
The classic law school shaming ritual, played at virtually every
school with which I am familiar, is variously called gunner, turkey,
keener bingo, depending on the current epithet for describing
obnoxious students. Students create bingo boards, using the names
of frequent volunteer speakers, and keep track of who talks in
class during a particular day, with the objective of making a row of
student names, five across, down, or diagonally. The rumor quickly
gets out that students are playing gunner bingo, and classmates
who may have been overzealous in their classroom participation
usually calm down. 118 Many women lawyers report that they have
115. See DAVID H. DONALD, LINCOLN 145-48 (1995).
116. See HABER, supra note 10, at 225-26.
117. See Yarn, supra note 96, at 107. Occasionally this sort of "posting" occurs directly, as in
a story related in a legal ethics casebook about a state court motions calendar proceeding. See
COCHRAN & COLLETT, supra note 12, at 180. One of the lawyers had sought to bold his
adversary to a written discovery schedule, although he had agreed orally to relax the deadlines.
Id. The judge felt compelled to maintain the written schedule, because of a local rule providing
that any schedule changes had to be in writing. Id. But at the conclusion of the hearing, the
judge asked the prevailing lawyer to turn and face the courtroom, which was crowded with
other lawyers waiting to argue motions. Id. The judge asked the bailiff to get the audience's
attention, and then announced, "I just want everyone to know how Mr. X practices law. He
orally agreed to postpone certain discovery matters, but now is before this court arguing that his
word is not enforceable because the agreement wasn't in writing as required by the local court
rules. Take a good look at him now so you will know who you are dealing with in the future." Id.
at 188. Although the loss of reputation is seldom this direct or public, I think this is what
happens eventually to lawyers who engage in highly abusive practices.
118. For some representative anecdotes, see Jennifer Gerarda Brown, "To Give Them
Countenance" The Case for a Women's Law School, 22 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 14 n.61 (1999);
Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at One Ivy League Law School,
143 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 51 n.128 (1994).
1986 [Vol. 54:1955
NONLEGAL REGULATION
been particularly disadvantaged by the silencing effect of these
bingo games, lending some additional support to my contention,
explored in greater depth in Section V, that unwritten honor
(Icodes" may be differentially enforced against out-of-power groups
in a community.
Not all examples of informal constraints on lawyers are as
salutary as the norms taught at the Fairbanks bar lunch or by
lawyers riding circuit, as the gunner bingo example shows. As one
of my colleagues pointed out, if the bar lunch had been held in
Jackson, Mississippi in the 1950s, the ethical lessons would have
been quite different in some respects (although the injunctions
against discovery abuse and filing motions at inconvenient times
would have probably remained the same). Another scholar of the
interaction of social norms and principles of legal ethics has
reported on norms disfavoring the exercise of constitutional rights
by defense counsel. In one case a judge berated a public defender
for challenging the representativeness of a jury venire, saying
"You've ruined your reputation in this courthouse," and then
ordered schedule changes to inconvenience the lawyer in other
cases.11 9 Although the empirical literature on lawyering norms is
thin, to say the least, anecdotal evidence suggests that the
practices reinforced by informal shame sanctions are just as likely
to be pernicious as beneficial. For instance, many large law firms
expect partners to contribute to the political action committees
(PACs) associated with political candidates who might
subsequently function as a source of business for the firm. Often
the PACs are controlled by politicians that some of the partners in
the firm find abhorrent; nevertheless, individual partners refuse to
make contributions at their peril, for they know if they refuse, they
will be ostracized by the well-connected and powerful majority-
denied referrals of new business, cut off from valuable professional
opportunities, and so on.120 In this case, the informal social
sanction of ostracism is felt as a practical constraint that has
considerably more force than formal legal norms of governance,
established by state statutes and the firm's partnership
agreement. Legal entitlements are not much good at combating
subtle forms of discrimination, as practiced by these law firm
partners. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any changes to
partnership law that would be efficacious in the face of powerful
informal incentives. Similarly, formal law can be impotent in the
119. See Brown, supra note 12, at 809.
120. I am grateful to Barry Sullivan for this example.
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face of social norms against exercising procedural entitlements; in
the case of a norm against making formal discovery requests of
prosecutors' offices, a defense lawyer is hamstrung between the
norm and the Supreme Court's procedural default rules, which
render the failure to file a formal motion a waiver of the right to
object to the prosecutor's refusal to turn over exculpatory
evidence. 121
It is certainly true that formal legal change may affect
informal social practices, as Lawrence Lessig demonstrates in a
fascinating article. 122 Lessig offers many examples of laws that
have reshaped the social meaning of ordinary activities, such as
laws requiring passengers to wear seat belts in taxicabs. Once
there is a legal requirement to wear a seat belt, the driver can
understand the passenger's act of buckling up as compliance with
law, rather than an implicit comment on the driver's ability, which
is evidently how seat belt wearing was viewed in many cultures
before mandatory belt laws were in place. 123 Similarly, when the
National Hockey League required players to wear helmets, it was
no longer taken as a sign of wimpiness to wear a helmet; thus, a
player who might have been concerned to avoid injury, but who
was also conscious of his reputation for toughness, would be able to
wear a helmet without the stigma that would have attached before
the helmet rule was in effect. 124 In the partnership example,
however, the partners seeking PAC contributions were operating
outside the scope of their legal authority, as defined by the firm's
partnership agreement. The absence of legal warrant for their
actions did not have the meaning-generating effect that Lessig
perceives in other contexts.
Summarizing the arguments of this section, the
honor/shame model posits that a community controls its members
though informal social norms, which generally exhibit the
following characteristics:
* Structured relationships of respect and
deference, which vary by the perceived status of
the individuals involved.
* Necessity of obtaining external validation of one's
claim to respect, and the possibility of losing
status as a result of the actions of others.
121. See Brown, supra note 12, at 820-24.
122. See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995).
123. Id. at 952.
124. Id. at 967-68.
1988 [Vol. 54:1955
NONLEGAL REGULATION
* Connection between the respect accorded to an
individual and the extent to which that
particular person embodies the central values of
the community.
* Priority of community values, and the
maintenance of relationships of prestige and
respect, over other sources of authority, such as
church or state.
* Informal (that is, extrajudicial) mechanisms for
maintaining order and sanctioning violations of
social mores.
To emphasize, I do not mean to claim that the use of
concepts of honor and shame in legal ethics means that the moral
life of lawyers is coextensive with that of the antebellum South,
present-day Bedouin nomads or Andalusian villagers, Homeric
Greeks, or the Icelanders of the sagas. Any such claim would be far
too strong to be plausible. For one thing, large-scale honor-based
societies tend to exist under conditions of extreme material
scarcity, which certainly does not characterize the majority culture
in the twentieth-century United States. 125 Furthermore, as William
Ian Miller observes, "[c]lassic honor societies also seem to be
characterized by a large amount of male leisure time," 2 as
evidenced by Mediterranean coffee houses and the ghetto street
corners studied by Elijah Anderson. The frenetic, affluent world of
large-firm law practice is obviously a far cry from the communities
whose characteristics match these descriptions. The reason for
elaborating the honor/shame model is not to claim identity
between professional communities and traditional honor
societies, 127 but to critique the norm-enforcement practices of
professional communities with reference to aspects of the
traditional notions of honor that have manifested themselves in
certain other cultures throughout history. In reviewing the
anthropological, historical, and philosophical literature, one is
struck by the similarities in the concept of honor as it is elaborated
in cultures widely diverse across temporal and geographical
dimensions. The language-game of honor is consistent enough to
allow valid cross-cultural comparisons, but the diversity of
125. See MILLER, HUMILIATION, supra note 45, at 129-30.
126. Id. at 232 n.79.
127. Throughout this Article I use the term "traditional honor societies" to refer to those
cultures that have been substantially suffused with the practices of conferring honor and
shame, and have been relatively self-conscious in understanding the role of the concept of honor
in the moral lives of their communities.
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conceptions of honor is inevitable, given the tight link between the
attribution of honor to individuals and the deep constituent moral
values of a society. Thus, the honor/shame model contends that
professional communities, such as groups of practicing lawyers in
the United States, have enough in common with traditional honor
societies to make an exploration such as this one potentially
revealing.
III. RATIONAL CHOICE MODELS OF SOCIAL NORMS
The second paradigm for theorizing community norm
enforcement is the rational choice model, a label which I will use
for convenience, but which conceals surprising diversity. One
version of the rational choice model defines social norms as
principles of action that are not outcome-oriented-that is, not
conditional upon the actor's desire to achieve some objective-and
are shared with other people and sustained by the approval or
disapproval of others in the community. 128 A somewhat different
attempt to explain social norms in the rational choice mold posits
that norms are manipulable "signals" sent by strangers to
potential cooperative partners to show their reliability and a
disposition to abide by mutually beneficial schemes of
cooperation. 129 Regardless of the precise mechanism by which
norms are thought to develop, the significance of the rational
choice scholarship is the recognition that informal mechanisms of
social control operate outside the domain of law, providing actors
with a separate set of incentives, sometimes in tension with those
created by legal rules. For example, Robert Ellickson has described
the process by which cattle ranchers in rural California settle
disputes without recourse to the legal system, 130 and Lisa
Bernstein has studied commercial practices that make extensive
use of informal customs as the basis for intra-professional
regulation. 131 Other studies seek to explain how seemingly
128. See ELSTER, supra note 45, at 98-99; Jon Elster, Norms of Revenge, 100 ETHICS 862,
863-64 (1990); see also Philip Pettit, Virtus Norinativa" Rational Choice Perspectives, 100 ETHICS
725 (1990) (offering a more elaborate definition to the same effect).
129. See POSNER, supra note 46, at 5.
130. See ELLICKSON, supra note 37. An earlier, and very influential, version of the argument
developed at length in the book can be found in Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle:
Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986).
131. See Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 42; Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 42.
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inefficient practices such as dueling could ever take hold in
society.13
2
The recent spate of writing in the law and economics field
has been a welcome corrective to the oversimplified models of
rational choice which ignored social and cultural influences on
behavior, assuming that actors sought only to maximize the
satisfaction of exogenously determined preferences, and which
offered formal legal sanctions as the only means to redress a
violation of a contractually assumed duty. Some writing in the
"Cnew norms literature" has looked to anthropology and sociology
for insights into why rational actors pay attention to informal
social norms that do not seem to carry the kinds of penalties and
sanctions that are ordinarily reckoned as "costs" in rational choice
or game theory.133 Other theorists remain resolutely committed to
the assumptions of rational choice theory, maintaining that
humans are self-interested utility maximizers and that social
norms can be accounted for solely on this basis.134
As even the most enthusiastic proponents of the economic
analysis of norms admit, however, there are puzzles that remain to
be explained. For example, how are informal social norms enforced
against actors who might be disposed to violate them? One group
of theorists relies on the internalization of the norm, 35 which
seems both to beg an important question (how does the norm get
internalized in the first place?) and to fail to answer another
question (what happens if an actor violates the norm, either
through failure of internalization or as a deliberate transgression
of the internalized norm?). The emphasis on external sanctions is
also difficult to square with theories that depend upon the agent's
internalization of social norms. Other scholars appeal to external
nonlegal sanctions as norm-enforcement mechanisms, but stop
short of exploring the psychology of shame and honor that makes
many of these sanctions effective. For example, David Charny
posits the sacrifice of psychic and social goods as a cost that may
be imposed by a community on a norm violator, but he does not
have much to say about the genesis of those goods and how they
132. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 122, at 968-72; Warren F. Schwartz et al., The Duel: Can
These Gentlemen Be Acting Efficiently?, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 321, 321-25 (198.1).
133. See McAdams, Accounting, supra note 46, at 631-37.
134. See generally POSNER, supra note 46 (discussing theory that humans make choices
based on self-interest).




might be lost by the individual. 136 On a related psychological note,
some law and economics theorists talk as though norms are chosen
by a pure act of will, like taking food from a smorgasbord, 137 when
in fact persons acquire norms gradually, through processes much
less overt, conscious, and deliberative.
I believe that the most robust economic explanations of
social norms closely track the honor/shame model, only employing
different terminology. The honor/shame model posits a complex,
interlocking system of threats, sanctions, reputational
considerations, and the internalization of the principles developed
through the public elaboration of the community's norms. Thus,
the honor/shame model and the rational choice model should not
be understood as competitors, but simply as alternative conceptual
frameworks that systematize the same phenomena in slightly
different terms. For example, Eric Posner describes the shaming
practices known as charivari and posits that the charivari exists as
a way of reducing free rider problems, such as those that might
result from illegitimate children who would become a burden on
the community. 138 He subsequently defines social norms as those
patterns of behavior that are enforceable by community sanctions,
again revealing the considerable affinity between rational choice
accounts and the honor/shame model.
3 9
The first account in the rational choice camp I will examine
is Richard McAdams's theory, which proposes the enforcement of
social norms through public acts of disapproval. McAdams argues
that the genesis of norms is the desire individuals have for the
respect and approval of others, which he terms esteem. 140 People
have a preference for esteem-they would rather others have a
good opinion of them, and they are willing to some extent to
conform their actions to the expectations of others. In addition to
136. See David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV.
373, 393-97 (1990).
137. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 48, at 1706 (criticizing the argument, made by unnamed
theorists, that norms are freely chosen). Interestingly, in his subsequently published book,
Posner talks as though norms are capable of being chosen voluntarily. In some of his
examples-such as teenagers making themselves obnoxious and people controlling their
weight-he seems to assume that these behaviors are fully within the control of the actors, and
not due to other factors such as a surge of adolescent hormones or a genetic predisposition
toward a slow metabolism. See POSNER, supra note 46, at 21, 29, 101.
138. See id. at 76-77.
139. See id. at 171-72.
140. See McAdams, Origin, supra note 46, at 355-75; see also Pettit, supra note 128, at 726




relying on the intuitive plausibility of this hypothesis, McAdams
cites evidence of behavior that can be explained only by a
preference for esteem, such as cooperation in situations where the
only possible reward is the approbation of one's peers.14' People
engage in certain costly but socially beneficial activities-they
refrain from littering, clean up after their dogs in the park, recycle
their garbage, refuse to cross picket lines, or donate money to
charity-in part because they desire the approval of their co-
workers and neighbors. Individuals also feel pressure to "stand
and be counted" by acting against the norm violator, lest they be
thought to acquiesce in that person's deviance. (For these reasons,
social norms alleviate collective action problems, which would
normally arise whenever a collective good is dependent upon the
costly actions of numerous individuals.) McAdams also notes other
aspects of the esteem model that overlap with the honor/shame
model. For one thing, esteem is relative. People want to be thought
of as better than others, or as the best. 142 Thus, a system of
informal esteem-based sanctions replicates the hierarchical aspect
of honor, in which certain individuals are held up by the
community as exemplars of the kind of personality valued by the
group. Furthermore, McAdams argues that norm violations, and
the community's response to them, must be public events.143 Again,
this accords with the preoccupation of individuals in an honor-
governed society with dramatizing the community's reaction to
deviance with public shaming rituals.
If all of these conditions obtain in a group, then individuals
who violate the group's norms incur a cost-they are deprived of
the esteem which they value and seek. The capacity of a group to
impose costs on norm violators is essential to the enforceability of
nonlegal social norms. McAdams offers littering as an example of
behavior that violates a social norm. He argues that the
disapproval by others of littering imposes a cost-say, five cents
per offended neighbor-which, if the litterer would otherwise
derive an expected benefit of twenty-five cents from littering, will
be sufficient to deter littering if the expected cost of the littering-
141. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning and Deterrence, 83 vAk. L
REv. 349, 354-58 (1997); McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict, supra note .16, at 1007; Richard H.
McAdams, Group Norms, Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2237. 22,19-54 (1996).
142. McAdams, Origin, supra note 46, at 357.
143. See id. at 362-63; see also POSNER, supra note 46, at 77 (arguing that charwaris are by
design exuberant, entertaining events, which naturally draw participants and thereby eliminate




the total penalty imposed by all offended neighbors, discounted for
the probability of detection-is at least twenty-five cents.
144
Without quibbling with the concededly arbitrary numbers assigned
to the costs and benefits, it is possible to question this hypothetical
on the details of the sanctioning mechanism. Here is where the
economic analysis of norms overlaps with the honor/shame model.
McAdams and other economic theorists posit that internalization
of a norm is necessary for its efficacy, so that a norm violator will
suffer a psychological cost as a result of the transgression. Even if
none of the litterer's neighbors directly express disapproval by tut-
tutting at the litterer, conspicuously averting their eyes, or
ostentatiously picking up the litter and depositing it in a trash
can, the litterer nevertheless feels the sting of what he imagines to
be his neighbors' disapproval. He is effectively shamed by his
fellows in his community, just as surely as he would be if the
neighbors gathered for a charivari beneath his window.
As McAdams recognizes, theories which emphasize external
shaming processes, such as the rituals of traditional honor
societies described previously, are in tension with other models of
norm enforcement that focus on the internalization of norms. 45 He
is correct to query the internalization theorists on how the
psychological process of norm internalization occurs. He also
rightly notes that a norm may exist, and sanctions may be imposed
on a violator, even when the violator has not internalized the
norm. 46 Litterers may be able to escape sanctions when no one is
looking, so the community must be vigilant in its efforts to detect
and punish norm violators. This is a critical insight of the
honor/shame model, which locates the source of norms in the
community, not the individual. An individual's claim to honor must
be validated by the community, and the sense of shame or dishonor
felt by an individual must be confirmed by the reaction of others.
Furthermore, there may be dissenters in any society, who refuse to
adopt the prevailing social norms as their own. These dissenters
cannot be said to have internalized the existing set of social norms,
or if they have, they are able to violate the norms without creating
144. See McAdams, Origin, supra note 46, at 353-54, 365.
145. Id. at 377 (citing Cooter, supra note 47, at 1665 as the first contribution to the law.and-
economics literature to rely on the internalization of norms); see also Robert Cooter, Law and
Unified Social Theory, 22 J.L. & SOC'Y 50, 60-63 (1995) (defending the internalization theory);
Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized
Law, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 215, 220-21 (1994) (same).
146. See McAdams, Origin, supra note 46, at 378-79.
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undue cognitive dissonance. Dissenters can be shamed by the
actions of their fellows, but they may not feel any psychological
discomfort (which is frequently referred to as "guilt" to distinguish
it from shame) 147 as a result of their transgressions. Because
internalization cannot account for external pressure applied by the
community in the form of shaming practices, McAdams proposes
unifying internalization accounts with those models that
emphasize external sanctions. On his synthesized theory, norm
internalization is only one of several norm-enforcement
mechanisms that depend on the individual's preference for
esteem. 14 A properly socialized individual (by the standards of the
community) will be deterred from violating social norms by the
prospect of feeling discomfort or guilt, while the community may
be required to take more decisive action to impose shame sanctions
on a dissenting member. These external sanctions still appeal to
the individuals desire for esteem. (Consider the sanction of gossip,
or William Ian Miller's example of pointed teasing that convinces a
cheapskate to pay for his round of beers. 49) They do not, however,
depend on the individual's internalized disposition to comply with
the specific norm. Internalization still operates as a norm-
reinforcing mechanism, but it does not carry all the weight of
social control.
Eric Posner's contribution to the literature on social norms
is to emphasize the function of norms as sending clear signals
about the reliability or disposition of the actor. In a community of
strangers who are disposed to cooperate but ignorant of their
fellows' trustworthiness, there is a problem of selecting
transacting partners. 50 We would all like to form lasting, stable
relationships (social as well as commercial) with partners who are
unlikely to "defect" in the game-theoretic sense, by cheating or
opting for short-run gains at the expense of a longer-term
cooperative surplus. (Posner calls these "good types.") Potential
partners therefore try to advertise their reliability. The further
problem for strangers seeking cooperative partners, however, is
147. See, e.g., MICHAEL LEWIS, SHAME: THE EXPOSED SELF (1992); GERHART PIERS & MILTON
B. SINGER, SHAME AND GUILT: A PSYCHOANALTrIc AND A CULTURAL STUDY (1953); TAYLOR,
supra note 105.
148. See MfcAdams, Origin, supra note 46, at 380.81.
149. MILLER, HUMILIATION, supra note 45, at 21.
150. See POSNER, supra note 46, at 8. Compare the similar description of this problem as




that these messages may be faked. 51 Con artists may feign
reliability when in fact they are only looking for an opportunity to
take advantage of a transactional partner. As a result of this
collective action problem, formal and informal sanctioning
mechanisms have developed to handle cheaters. In the domain of
formal remedies, aggrieved parties to a contract can sue for
breach; with respect to informal sanctions, cheaters can acquire a
bad reputation and be excluded from future cooperative
arrangements.152 But what about strangers, those who have not yet
developed a reputation for fair (or unfair) dealing? Certainly in a
large, impersonal marketplace, individual actors are unknown to
most others. How are they to persuade potential transacting
partners that it is worth taking the chance on cooperating with
them?
Posner's solution is that strangers can take costly actions
that show their willingness to incur short-term losses (or at least
not realize short-term advantages) in pursuit of longer-term
cooperative gains. 15 3 In light of the expectations of others, people
can act in such a way that they are understood as being
trustworthy, loyal, and unlikely to defect from cooperative
arrangements-respectable bourgeois citizens, in other words.
These actions by participants in the marketplace create social
norms. Because of the signaling function of social norms, engaging
in costly, socially mandated behavior is a rational act, because it
ensures good types access to transactional partners with whom
they can achieve cooperative surpluses. But notice that actions in
conformity with social norms show trustworthiness only where the
actions are sufficiently costly that con men (Posner calls them "bad
types") cannot "game" the system and duplicate the signal of
reliability. "Signals reveal type if only the good types, and not the
bad types, can afford to send them, and everyone knows this." '154 So
good types invest in expensive office space, knowing that observers
151. See Alan Nelson, Economic Rationality and Morality, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 149, 156
(1988).
152. See POSNER, supra note 46, at 15-16; see also Robert Sugden, Contractarianism and
Norms, 100 ETHICS 768, 777-78 (1990).
153. See POSNER, supra note 46, at 19-22.
154. Id. at 19. Posner's typology divides the world roughly into good types and bad types
according to discount rates, or the agent's desire to obtain future benefits. People with a high
discount rate are bad types-they will refuse to cooperate if they can obtain short-term bonofits
from defecting. See id. at 18-19. Gauthier uses the terms "constrained maximizer" and




will receive the message: only a firm that is likely to be in business
for a while will be able to earn enough income to pay the rent.
Similarly, people give gifts, incurring short-term costs, to show
their commitment to the long-term success of a personal or
commercial relationship and their investment in the future
realization of cooperative surpluses. The result of all this sending
and receiving of coded messages should be a "separating
equilibrium," where good types match up with good types, and the
bad types are unable to find transacting partners.
The requirement that signals be difficult to mimic is a
serious internal problem with Posner's account (whatever one
thinks of the rational choice approach to social norms in general),
because many of the examples of social norms that one can easily
adduce are relatively inexpensive to comply with. Wearing one's
hair neatly, eating with one's mouth closed, showing up on time for
meetings, feigning interest in cocktail party chitchat, and not
being hooked on drugs-all examples from Posner's book' 55-are
certainly not the most onerous requirements, yet they do have the
status of social norms. It is difficult to imagine a realistic example
of a bad type who was so impulsive and addicted to instant
gratification that he could not spend five minutes listening to
boring small talk in order to lull a potential transacting partner
into thinking he is a good type. Moreover, many people follow
norms not because they have a low discount rate and would make
good transacting partners, but because they have simply become
habituated to following them. People say "Gesundheit" when
someone sneezes, not because they intend to show that they are
willing to take the time to worry about the health of others, but
because the action is essentially a conditioned response to the
stimulus of hearing a sneeze.
But signals cannot become too expensive to send, or too
difficult to interpret properly, if they are supposed to reduce the
transaction costs that would otherwise make it difficult for good
types to find one another in a large, impersonal marketplace. If
engaging in signaling behavior, and the associated interpretive
difficulties ("Does his behavior mean he's willing to incur the cost
of listening to my boring story in order to show that he's a good
type, or is he just dull and has nothing better to do right now?")
are sufficiently costly, the costs of signaling could exceed the costs
of using other means to ascertain the reliability of potential
155. See POSNER, supra note 46, at 22.
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transacting partners. If determining whether someone is a good
type or a bad type is sufficiently important, widely available
mechanisms exist for doing so, such as checking credit reports,
asking around about someone's reputation, and in extreme cases,
hiring private investigators. These are more expensive than
looking around to see who has brushed his hair and who is
chewing with her mouth closed, but less expensive than some of
the more elaborate signals that would have a greater likelihood of
excluding the bad types, such as throwing lavish parties and giving
costly gifts. I am doubtful as to whether many social norms can
navigate between these shoals, too expensive to feign but not so
expensive as to exceed the cost of other information-transmission
devices.
In the plus column for the signaling explanation, it does
help clarify some otherwise puzzling cases, which are not so easily
explained by the internalization theorists. For instance, Posner
raises the problem of why rules regulating marriages are
mandatory, and not merely default rules. 156 Why should the parties
to a marital relationship not be permitted to contract around
prohibitions on bigamy, adultery, and premarital sex? Posner's
answer is, in part, that the community must readily be able to
recognize deviations from expectations. If the community is to
participate effectively in enforcing the constellation of social norms
surrounding marriage, it must not be confronted with the task of
sorting out a variety of idiosyncratic alternative family structures.
One couple may have decided on an open marriage, or one within
which a small number of extramarital affairs is permissible, but no
way exists to communicate this understanding to friends and
neighbors. Thus, if social stigma and opprobrium are to deter
spouses from cheating on one another, community sanctions must
attach whenever an extramarital affair is discovered; if the
cheating spouse were permitted to plead that he or she had
contracted with the other spouse for permission to have
extramarital affairs, community norm enforcement would lose its
effectiveness. Members of the community who sanction the
deviants also benefit from the signals they send by participating in
the punishment. By showing up at the charivari, individuals signal
to others that they are "good types"-reliable people who would
15G. See id. at 78.
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make good cooperative partners. 157 Along with McAdams, Posner
can agree that people have a preference for the esteem of others,
but Posner's signaling theory helps explain why community
members would go to the trouble of participating in the shaming of
deviants.
Signaling and signal-manipulation practices certainly exist
in the domain of lawyering. One interesting example is found in a
provision of the ABA's Model Rules: "A lawyer's representation of a
client . . . does not constitute an endorsement of the client's
political, economic, social or moral views or activities." 53 This rule
seems out of place in a disciplinary code-is there a case in which
one could imagine a lawyer being punished for violating it?-but it
does make sense in terms of Posner's theory of signaling behavior.
The rule clarifies the signals, so that a lawyer representing a
loathsome client, such as John Demjanjuk (the alleged
concentration camp torturer "Ivan the Terrible") or the Oklahoma
City bombing suspects, is not taken to be adopting the client's
moral position. In an additional example, the famous "buried
bodies" case, 159 a criminal defense lawyer learned from his client
that he had killed several young women and hidden their bodies in
the wilderness. After the lawyer was criticized publicly for failing
to inform the parents of the additional victims of the location of
their daughters' bodies, the lawyer acknowledged publicly that his
client was "a bastard" and that he was acting under a professional
obligation: " 'I caused them pain ... What do you say? Nothing I
could say would justify it in their minds. You couldn't justify it to
me.' ",160 The ideology of professional detachment therefore enabled
this lawyer to show human sympathy for the parents, while
insisting that his actions were justified. This manipulation of
signaling practices is useful in these cases, because it permits
talented lawyers, whose reputations are valuable, to work on
behalf of clients who could benefit from quality representation. At
the same time, however, it makes opportunistic behavior or
157. See id. at 91-92. To give a further example, Posner suggests that people support laws
against flag desecration not because they believe that flag-burning causes serious social harm,
but because they wish to signal to others that they are the types of people who think burning
the flag is wrong, and supporting flag.desecration statutes is a powerful way to send this
message. See id. at 130.
158. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R_ 1.2(b).
159. See New York v. Belge, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Onondaga County Ct. 1975), affd, 376
N.Y.S.2d 771 (N.Y. App. Div.), affd, 359 N.E.2d 371 (N.Y. 1976).
160. Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers Be Good Ethical
Deliberators?, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 885, 903 (1996) (quoting defense attorney in "buried bodiesr
case).
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sophistry in ethical reasoning possible; talented lawyers may work
for clients such as cigarette manufacturers, who might not deserve
their services but pay well, and deflect moral criticism by
appealing to the ideal of professional independence.
One problem with this signaling mechanism, in which the
parties to a social arrangement have relatively little control over
the terms of their own relationships as compared with the
community, is that communities have historically retaliated
against relationships that they perceived as undesirable, even if
their judgments were founded only on superstition or prejudice. 6 1
The most obvious example is the stigma attached to interracial
marriages in the South in the United States, which was even
enshrined in antimiscegenation statutes in many states, 16 2 but
Posner suggests that the opposition to same-sex marriages is also
grounded in community understandings of the limits of "proper"
relationships. 163 The importance of clear signals means that
unorthodox members of the community are likely to get their
signals crossed, as it were. Being married no longer signals that
one is a conventional (i.e., heterosexual), trustworthy, self-
disciplined person if marriage is opened up to same-sex couples,
Posner hypothesizes. 16 4 The necessity of agreeing on the social
meaning of particular activities makes it difficult to engage in
unorthodox activities without calling down the associated social
stigma upon oneself, or without diminishing the social approbation
that would otherwise be owed to people who participate in the
activity. 165 Signaling also tends to reinforce pathologies, such as
racial discrimination, if members of in-power groups find it
necessary to signal their loyalty by antagonizing members of out-
of-power subcommunities. 166 As long as people have a preference
161. See POSNER, supra note 46, at 83.
162. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
163. See POSNER, supra note 46, at 85-86.
164. Id. C'One possible result is that people would become confused about how to treat the
people who declare themselves married but who do not act like ordinary married people . .. ").
Posner concedes that the signaling confusion may result simply from prejudice, and that the
commitment to enter into a same-sex marriage may be a sign of the same character traits of
constancy and self-discipline that are ordinarily evidenced by heterosexual marriages. See id.
165. To return to Posner's flag example, I may refuse to display the American flag on the
Fourth of July not because I am opposed to the American form of government, but because I
strongly dislike ritualized displays of conformity. Unfortunately, my cantankerousness is likely
to be perceived wrongly as a lack of patriotism. In times of peace, this confusion is relatively
costless, but in periods of crisis, I run a real risk of being taken for disloyal, rather than merely
independent minded, and suffering concrete detriments.
166. See id. at 135-40.
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for fitting in, they will tend not to send signals that would make
them acceptable to outsiders, but not to insiders.
IV. THE REVIVAL OF CIVIC REPUBLICANISM
At first glance, the reinvigoration of the civic republican
tradition seems to offer new hope to the project of regulating
professional communities in the face of the failure of legalistic
disciplinary codes. The republican ideal envisions citizens
connected to one another in a network of interlocking
relationships, pursuing government in a spirit of search for the
common good. Civic republicanism is a reaction to the liberal
political tradition, which insists that the state must be neutral
among competing conceptions of the good.' G7 Liberalism imagines
politics as an arena for competition for individual advantage; one
variety of liberalism, interest-group pluralism, describes rent-
seeking behavior by organized groups or factions who compete for
access to goods or power. 16 Significantly, liberalism and pluralism
regard preferences as exogenously given-in other words,
government is directed not to interfere with the formation of
preferences, but merely to distribute public goods on a market
model, with legislation reflecting the influence exerted on the
political process by individuals and groups. 169 Preferences, liberals
argue, arise independently of community attachments, chosen
autonomously by the asocial, unattached "liberal self."170 This
assumption, although it has been criticized as a caricature of
liberalism, 171 translates neatly into the theory of lawyering, where
the conventional model of legal ethics assumes that the ends of the
representation are determined by the client, and the lawyer is
simply an instrument to enable the client to realize those ends
167. See Sunstein, supra note 50, at 1570. For the claim of neutrality in liberalism, see
CHARLEs LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY, at xx (1987); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM 190 (1993) (stating that the common theme of liberal thought has been that the
state should not favor any "comprehensive doctrine" and "associated conception of the good");
Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 113, 127 (Stuart Hampshire ed.,
1978).
168. See ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY: AUTONOMy VS. CONTROL 1-
3 (1982).
169. See Sunstein, supra note 50, at 1542-43.
170. See MICHAELJ. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 54-65, 161-64 (1982).
171. See, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE ch. 4 (1989);
STEPHEN MULHALL & ADAM SviFr, LIBERALS & COMMUNITARIUNS 192-98 (2d ed. 1996); John
Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 223, 245-51 (1985).
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within the constraints given by legal norms.17 2 Republicanism, by
contrast, imagines preferences as developing only dialogically,
through a process of engagement and discussion among citizens.
A necessary precondition of republican political theory is
the opportunity for free, uncoerced public debate about justice.
Deliberation is not merely an avenue for representing existing
preferences-instead, the participants in a deliberative political
order must be prepared to revise existing preferences to bring
them into line with a conception of the public good.173 Deliberation
has both instrumental and intrinsic functions: it is required to
secure a just distribution of entitlements, free from coercive
imposition of desired outcomes by powerful factions, but
"participatory citizenship is also a good in itself."17 4 Republicanism
challenges the liberal conception of preferences as exogenously
given, because it imagines some of the goods of political action as
reflexive-that is, as available only through active participation in
self-government. Thus, a vibrant community is a good in itself.7 5
The ideal of the intrinsic goodness of deliberative political
engagement is, of course, fundamentally Aristotelian. Aristotle
held that humans were political animals at their core, and could
realize their own potential only through public participation in the
polis.176 Civic republicanism, in its revived form, is also indebted
heavily to modern discourse ethics, particularly the writings of
Jiirgen Habermas. According to Habermas, the validity of ethical
norms depends on a rationally motivated consensus among
deliberating agents. 7 7  (This deliberation is a hypothetical
construct, a thought experiment like the Rawlsian original position
or the Hobbesian social contract. 78) By "rational" Habermas means
not only "uncoerced," but also the stronger condition of
172. See the description of the "Dominant View" in SIMON, supra note 22, at 7-25.
173. See Sunstein, supra note 50, at 1549.
174. Paul Brest, Further Beyond the Republican Revival: Toward Radical Republicanism, 97
YALE L.J. 1623, 1623-25 (1988).
175. It can be difficult to distinguish some versions of political liberalism from
republicanism, when liberals start talking about the importance of community building. See,
e.g., J. DONALD MOON, CONSTRUCTING COMMUNITY: MORAL PLURALISM AND TRAGIC CONFLICTS
8, 14 (1993). Moon calls himself a political liberal, but emphasizes communitarian goals such as
enhancing engagement and deliberation. See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRAcY
AND DISAGREEMENT (1996).
176. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1235a, at 10-12 (Ernest Barker trans., 1995).
177. See DAVID M. RASMUSSEN, READING HABERMAS 56-74 (1990).
178. See Michel Rosenfeld, Law as Discourse: Bridging the Gap Between Democracy and
Rights, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1163, 1166-68 (1995) (reviewing JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS




"unmotivated by strategic considerations."179 In other words,
participants in communicative action must be aimed at reaching
understanding, not merely acquiring power or realizing some other
of their subjective ends, and they must not engage in deception,
threats, or enticements of other participants. This condition is a
presupposition of ethical reasoning; competition for selfish
advantage in a literal or metaphorical marketplace cannot claim to
be an activity having anything to do with ethics, as that term is
properly understood. Habermas also adds the stringent condition
that norms advanced in discourse must be defended without
recourse to tradition, a principle he sees as central to modernity.
1 80
This is an interesting counterpoint with the honor/shame model of
community norms, an overlap with the rational choice model, and
a critical argumentative move for civic republicans. For the neo-
republican project to succeed, it must appropriate the attractive
features of the civic republican tradition without acquiring its
unsavory historical baggage.' 81 In the critical section that follows, I
will question whether modern civic republicans can avoid
reinscribing exclusionary practices within their "revived"
republicanism.
Republicanism in political theory demands the eradication
of barriers to full and equal participation in the political process.
Economic inequality, for example, skews the quality of public
deliberation by permitting disparities in access to media of
communication. 182 The Supreme Court's notorious Buckley v.
Valeo183 decision, which equated the freedom of speech with the
ability to donate money to political candidates, represents a
dramatically unrepublican position. Republicanism can be a
radical political philosophy if it demands substantive
egalitarianism, but in fact, most proponents of some form of
republicanism stop short of calling for full economic equality.'14
Instead, they seek only to establish formal conditions for public
participation, such as the absence of coercion. These conditions
179. See 1 JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 287-92 (Thomas
McCarthy trans., 1984).
180. See JORGEN HABERMAS, THE PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY 336-67
(Frederick G. Lawrence trans., 1987).
181. See Sunstein, supra note 50, at 1539 C'[M]uch in traditional republican thought gives
little cause for celebration. Various strategies of exclusion-of the nonpropertied, blacks, and
women-were built into the republican tradition."); id. at 1565 (noting that republican regimes
tend to exclude women).
182. See Brest, supra note 174, at 1626-27.
183. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
184. See Sunstein, supra note 50, at 1552-53.
2001] 2003
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
echo Habermas's "ideal speech situation," where the participants
in normative discourse are unencumbered by morally arbitrary
constraints, such as the inability to make their voices heard.
Obviously the qualifier "morally arbitrary" needs unpacking, and
generally in a society which accepts a fairly high disparity of
material wealth among its citizens, economic inequalities are not
likely to be deemed morally significant. There is a further affinity
here among republican ideals, Habermas's discourse ethics, and
the feminist and critical race theory position on freedom of
speech. 8 5 One purpose of the First Amendment is to ensure the
free flow of ideas and information necessary for democratic self-
governance, but this function is undermined by an interpretation
of the constitutional free speech guarantee that would permit
"silencing" speech such as pornography and expressions of racial
hatred. A theory of democratic deliberation or of freedom of speech
that emphasizes the inclusion of all voices in discourse must
grapple with the possibility that seemingly neutral conditions may
influence the access of certain citizens to the channels of debate.
An intriguing commonality between civic republicanism and
other community-based theories of social norms is the emphasis on
nonstate associations, which Kathleen Sullivan refers to as
intermediate groups.186 These intermediate groups enable public
participation and political engagement, which are intrinsically
valuable activities on the republican account. 187 Intermediate
groups are also instrumentally valuable: deliberative politics is
impossible on a large scale, particularly in a heterogeneous society
like the United States, so voluntary associations physically and
logistically enable direct participation in political activity. In a
large, heterogeneous polity, political participation is likely to
degenerate into factionalism, as individuals form interest groups
to advance their objectives. Moreover, deliberation is likely to
dissolve in acrimony in the absence of at least minimal shared
value commitments; thus, smaller groups increase the likelihood
that discourse will progress toward agreement. 88 For this reason,
185. See, e.g., CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 163-97 (1987); Charles R.
Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUXE L.J.
431; Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 2320 (1989).
186. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713, 1714 (1988).
187. See Sunstein, supra note 50, at 1546-51.
188. Cf. MACINTYRE, supra note 92, at 166 ('When two rival large-scale intellectual
traditions confront one another, a central feature of the problem of deciding between their
claims is characteristically that there is no neutral way of characterizing either the subject
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small, informal groups that are independent of the state have long
been an important feature of the American political scene.189
The republican tradition provides a useful antithesis for the
conventional model of legal ethics by emphasizing the centrality of
dialogue, or "moral conversation" between lawyers and clients,
with the ambition of settling on a course of action that accounts for
the public good. This is Brandeis's famous "lawyer for the
situation" ideal, explicated again recently by William Simon. 9 0 In
the Brandeisian vision, lawyers have an obligation to ensure that
wealthy, powerful clients do not run roughshod over affected third
parties, such as employees, and create other social harms, such as
environmental damage. Brandeis recognized that justice could not
be promoted by lawyers acting only in the self-interest of their
clients, but could be realized only through a kind of detached
loyalty that sought to accommodate client interests to a negotiated
compromise-a "new framework of mutually beneficial
collaboration."1 91 Because the lawyer is encouraged to oppose her
client whenever the interests of justice require, a Brandeisian
theory of lawyering requires a robust, knowable, and relatively
uncontroversial set of public norms of justice to which appeal can
be had to settle disputes between clients and lawyers. 192 However,
these norms are not the same thing as specific legal rights; the
Brandeisian vision of lawyering, like the civic republican ideal of
government, attempts to challenge the liberal preoccupation with
individual rights with an increased focus on duties, public virtue,
and the common good. 193 To return to the example given earlier,
matter about which they give rival accounts or the standards by which their claims are to be
evaluated!'). See also the excellent analysis of how members of different normative communities
can reach conduct dialogue and reach agreement in JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL
(1987).
189. Such associations and groups were recognized by Tocqueville. See ALE2US DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 189-95, 242-45, 520-24 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence
trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1848) (describing the temperance societies, trade associations,
festival-planning boards, debating clubs, and political alliances that engage American citizens).
Some observers of American politics have become concerned by what they believe to be a decline
in participation in these groups, and therefore with a decline in engagement with others. See,
e.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
CO1MTY (2000).
190. See SIMON, supra note 22, at 123.35; John E. Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis
Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REV. 683, 685-87 (1965); Clyde Spillenger, Elusiv, e Adrocate:
Reconsidering Brandeis as People's Lawyer, 105 YALE L.J. 1445, 1470-77 (1996).
191. SIMON, supra note 22, at 129.
192. See id. at 130.
193. See, e.g., Philip Selznick, The Idea of a Coinrnunitarion Morality, 75 CAL. L REV. 445,
454-55 (1987). Brandeis was vehemently denounced, even opposed for a Supreme Court
justiceship, on the ground that his conception of the lawyer's role was antithetical to the
2001] 2005
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
lawyers in some communities have developed tacit understandings
of fair dealing among themselves and regard certain kinds of
abusive litigation practices as anathema. A lawyer in such a
community could be expected to resist her client's desires to
engage in a scorched-earth litigation strategy by appealing to these
well-known, though unwritten, rules of the game. Political
liberalism is supposed to encourage toleration and thus greater
freedom, but it ironically may have the opposite effect, such as
where it permits aggregations of private power to restrict liberty.
Brandeis recognized that merely deferring to individual
preferences does nothing to ensure substantive justice, which is
why he told one of his business clients that the demands of his
employees for higher wages were justified. 194
The republican model also dovetails nicely with other trends
in the theory of the legal profession, among them the
reconceptualization of lawyers as problem-solvers or mediators.
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, in a series of articles, has advanced a
vision of the lawyer's role that moves beyond the impoverished
model of neutral partisanship and advocacy. 195 Although her work
is not explicitly anchored in republican political philosophy, it
relies heavily on concepts like deliberation, empathy, 196 and the
common good, familiar from republican models of the political
process. Similarly, the emphasis in civic republicanism on the
common good recalls the innumerable exhortations in the legal
ethics literature and in judicial opinions, directed at lawyers,
insisting that they place concerns such as social justice on a higher
plane than self-interest. 197 As Russell Pearce argues in an
individualistic, liberal-rights model of the lawyer-client relationship. See SIMON, supra note 22,
at 129-30.
194. See ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 145-46 (1946).
195. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Problem Solver and Third-Party Neutral:
Creativity and Non-Partisanship in Lawyering, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 785, 785-87 (1999); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving,
31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 759-64 (1984); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary
System in a Post Modern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 8-12 (1996).
196. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 50, at 1555 (stating that civic republicanism "depends on a
commitment to political empathy, embodied in a requirement that political actors attempt to
assume the position of those who disagree") (footnote omitted).
197. See, e.g., Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding
Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1229, 1231 (1995) ("[Iln contrast to businesspersons, who maximize financial self-interest,
lawyers altruistically place the good of their clients and the good of society above their own self-
interest."); cf. Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 488-89 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("[M]embership [in the bar] entails an ethical obligation to temper one's selfish pursuit of
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important historical article, the vision of legal ethics embodied in
the organized bar's disciplinary code includes a healthy dose of
civic republican thought, incorporated through the lectures of
George Sharswood in the nineteenth century. 198 Religious faith is
another source of social commitment for lawyers, as exemplified by
Tom Shaffer's work on Christian lawyering. 199 The disciplinary
rules contemplate the exercise of ethical discretion by lawyers, and
imply that this discretion ought to be guided by a conception of the
public good (as opposed to the lawyer's personal moral
commitments-a quite controversial position 20O). The idea of a
lawyer as public-minded interpreter of social values stands in
marked contrast to the "hired gun" ethic that is usually ascribed to
the American legal profession by academics 201 and that is
economic success by adhering to standards of conduct that could not be enforced either by legal
fiat or through the discipline of the market.").
198. See Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes,
6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 241-42 (1992). Sharswood was the Dean of the University of
Pennsylvania Law School, an annotator of Blackstone's Commentaries, and an active state court
judge, who eventually became the Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See id. at
248-49. His lectures on legal ethics to Penn law students were published and widely circulated,
and were the profession's canonical work on the subject for well over a century.
199. See, e.g., THOMLiAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LWJMER: LAW FOR THE
INNOCENT (1981); THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (1994); see also JOSEPH G. ALLEGRETTi, THE LAWYER'S CALLING:
CHRISTIAN FAITH AND LEGAL PRACTICE (1996).
200. See, e.g., Thomas D. Eisele, From "Moral Stupidity" to Professional Responsibility, 21
LEGAL STUD. F. 193 (1997); Bruce A. Green, The Role of Personal Values in Professional
Decisionmaking, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 19 (1997); Leslie Griffin, The Relevance of Religion to
a Lawyer's Work. Legal Ethics, 66 FORDHAM L REV. 1253 (1998). 1 have argued, and so have
many other commentators, that the relevant values are political or public-that is, they are
values derived from either the social function of lawyers or from a "thin" theory of the good that
may be widely shared in a pluralist democratic society. See, eg., ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM,
ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES: THE MORTALITY OF ROLES IN PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL LIFE (1999)
(arguing that the legal adversary system is not justified in pursuing what would otherwise be
morally prohibited in the interests of making a case); NV. Bradley Wendel, Public Values and
Professional Responsibility, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1999). For related arguments in political
theory, see KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS (1995); AMY
GUTANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENr (1996). Bob Cochran has
rightly asked whether it is fair to brand religious commitments as "private," as though they are
some kind of idiosyncratic preference. To be clear, I am not suggesting that religious faith is
equivalent to mere subjectivity in ethics. Rather, the distinction I wish to draw is between
values that are grounded in institutional structures (public) and values that are based on
conceptions of the good that are not universally shared in a liberal political order (private).
Private values are roughly the sorts of considerations that are excluded by Rawis's veil of
ignorance device. See RAWLS, supra note 62, at 136-42. Rawls plainly means to exclude religious
reasons from deliberation in the original position, and it is for this reason that I place religious
values on the private side.
201. See, e.g., Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role:" A Defense, A Problem,
and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 614-19; Murray L. Schwartz, The
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frequently reiterated by practicing lawyers.20 2 Republican lawyers
are not shysters or sophists-they are a "virtuous elite" or "policy
intelligentsia," who facilitate deliberation about the public good
and who, if necessary, restrain their clients' selfish ambitions to
conform with the social purpose of the law.
20 3
V. DANGERS OF COMMUNITY-BASED SANCTIONS
The preceding sections of this Article have been largely
descriptive. They have sought to give an account of community
norm-enforcement mechanisms, as elaborated by communities of
lawyers. The remainder of the analysis is normative, providing a
sympathetic critique of these community-based enforcement
systems, and showing how community norms, although pervasive
throughout the self-regulatory practices of the legal profession,
may have limited utility in an ever more diverse bar which is
increasingly national in scope.
A. Combativeness
One objection to relying upon community-based sanctioning
mechanisms in professional ethics is that many informal social-
control systems seem to give rise to the worst features of
adversarial strife that have been so damaging to the ability of the
legal system to handle disputes fairly and efficiently. In traditional
honor societies, offenses to reputation were settled by duels, blood
Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 669, 672-75 (1978); Richard
Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 5-15 (1975).
202. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical World of Large-Firm Litigators: Preliminary
Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 709 (1998). Gordon and others conducted extensive survey.
based research of the moral decision-making practices of big-firm lawyers, discovering a
prevalent style of reasoning: responsibility for the morality or justice of a claim is ultimately
that of the client. The lawyer's job begins and ends with advising the client of the likely legal
consequences of his decisions and helping him achieve his aims within the limits of the
applicable legal rules. See id. at 710-11. More specifically, the lawyer-informants' responses
included:
"You're not hired to give moral advice." . . . "There is morality, but it is not the
domain of lawyers." "Our system of justice is not established for the purpose
of moral judgments, but to determine facts and to apply law to facts. . . ." "The
client doesn't want to have a moral dialogue with me .... You have to frame it
in other ways, explain the trouble you can get into .... " Moralizing lawyers
are not to be trusted: "Sanctimonious lawyers are the first to file Rule 11
motions, accuse you of being unethical."
Id. at 711.
203. See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 11-16 (1988);
Pearce, supra note 198, at 252-53. This line of argument is notable in KRONMAN, supra note 26.
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feuds, or fights with fists or knives, 2 4 so it seems fair to surmise
that an offense to a lawyer's self-presentation in the community
would similarly provoke some kind of retaliation. Indeed, some
observers of the legal profession have claimed that the equivalent
of a blood feud is provoked when a lawyer is dishonored. Consider
this monologue from a fictionalized federal district court judge in
Lawrence Joseph's Lawyerland:
"It's one thing to say, 'That's not what I said'-which is going on a lot these days,
everyone covering, pardon my language, their proverbial asses. But it's an
altogether different thing to say that a document never existed when, in fact, it
did, and you, or your client, destroyed it. That I don't recommend. Double-talk,
triple-talk, saying you're going to do something when you know you're not going
to"-Day shrugged--"what can you do? But saying that something happened
when it didn't? Saying that something didn't happen when it did? This is a
business in which everyone relies on representations. This is a business in which
no one ever forgets, no one ever forgives-a business in which no one ought ever
to forget or forgive anyone who goes beyond those extremely tolerable thresholds
of deceit into one of those morally. . ." Day stopped. ... "[Miere, if you ask me, is
the mind-set-a lawyer will get even. It's how the system-is there a verb
retribute? That's how the system retributes itself. It really does. How do they say
it on the street?--'what you do comes back on you.' It may take a while, but you
make a material misrepresentation of fact to another lawyer, you'd better be
prepared to be hit, and I mean hit, and hit hard. The equivalent of being, at the
very least, blindsided with a crowbar."205
Lawyerland is a work of fiction, although Joseph assures us it is
"truthful rather than factual, but solidly based on facts."206
Whether this precise conversation occurred is not important for
our purposes, since most lawyers would recognize the ethic of the
street as articulated by Judge Day.
Similar statements recur in other lawyers' descriptions of
the informal norms of legal practice. For example, Seymour
Wishman recalls that "there were some implicit, gentlemanly
rules: a lawyer wasn't supposed to give his word casually to
another lawyer, and if the word he did give was a deliberate lie, it
was regarded as a personal betrayal to be dealt with personally-
we'll get the lying son of a bitch ourselves, if not in this particular
204. See ANDERSON, CODE, supra note 45, at 66-76; MILLER, supra note 43, at 181 (CCross-
culturally, there appears to be a correlation between the existence of feud and a culture of
honor."); Cochran, supra note 13, at 884-86; Pieter Spierenburg. Knife Fighting and Popular
Codes of Honor in Early Modern Arnsterdamn, in MEN AND VIOLENCE: GENDER, HONOR, AND
RITUALS IN MODERN EUROPE AND AMERICA 103 (Pieter Spierenburg ed., 1998); Weber, supra
note 59, at 81.
205. LAWRENCE JOSEPH, LAWYERLAND 74-75 (1997).
206. Id. at "A Note to the Reader." Robert Cochran reports that in his law practice in the
1970s in Charlottesville, Virginia, a senior lawyer in his firm actually advised him that if
opposing counsel continued to be obnoxious, he (Cochran) would be bound to fight him-
literally. See Cochran, supra note 13, at 886. Fortunately, the case ended without fisticuffs. Id.
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case, then in some subsequent one." 207 Legal ethicist Geoffrey
Hazard reports that some professional obligations were "generally
regarded as a matter of professional honor, whose violation was
redressable only by retaliation. ' 20 8 These observations ring true to
a former litigator. Many methods of retaliation were available, and
it was generally understood what sorts of transgressions were
likely to provoke revenge. For instance, lawyers in complex cases
regarded contention interrogatories as something like strategic
nuclear weapons-a first strike, by serving a set of contention
interrogatories, would invariably produce a response in kind by the
opponent. 20 9 Litigators understood the logic of mutual assured
destruction, and generally refrained from employing this annoying,
ineffective, and expensive discovery procedure. New lawyers
quickly picked up this tit-for-tat strategy through hallway chat
and war stories told at department meetings and lunches.
It is true that retaliation is not the only way for an actor to
protect his standing in the community. Even in the societies in
which all social relations were structured according to practices of
honor and shaming, and which witnessed the most frequent
episodes of violence in the associated competition for social
prestige, a person might vindicate his honor through means other
than combat. Even in saga Iceland, "[b]loodtaking was not the only
course of honor. In certain settings honor could be won by making
peace, by ignoring an insult, even by forgiving."210 If the context
revealed an opportunity to win honor by behaving magnanimously,
declining to retaliate might be the honorable thing to do. Miller
acknowledges, however, that the popular conception of honor as
foolhardy aggressiveness contains a core of truth. The foundation
of a system of honor norms is still the maxim, "Don't tread on
me." 21'1 This is so because of the scarcity of glory and honor; this
207. SEYMOUR WISHMAN, CONFESSIONS OF A CRIMINAL LAWYER 52-53 (1981).
208. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyers and Client Fraud: They Still Don't Get It, 6 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 701, 711 (1993). For a current practitioner's statement of the same principle, see
John Patrick Dolan, Courtesy Is its Own Reward, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1997, at 104, 104 ("When you
demean or ridicule opposing counsel, when you convey an arrogant, sneering superiority, you
are simply setting yourself up for payback.").
209. Contention interrogatories request the opponent to state the factual basis for
contentions in a complaint or answer. See, e.g., Starcher v. Corr. Med. Sys., Inc., 144 F.3d 418,
421 n.2 (6th Cir. 1998); Cable & Computer Tech., Inc. v. Lockheed Saunders, Inc., 175 F.R.D.
646, 650-52 (C.D. Cal. 1997). They are incredibly time-consuming to answer, and are generally
acknowledged as producing little information of value.
210. MILLER, HUMILIATION, supra note 45, at 117.
211. Id.; see also MILLER, supra note 43, at 193 (noting that failure to take revenge could
lead to loss of honor); WYATT-BROWN, supra note 43, at 34 (discussing honor as won during the
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scarcity provokes hostility and conflict, because the power of a
highly esteemed individual necessarily diminishes the power of
others. 21
2
One problem with using informal community norms as a
means of social control is that the imperative of retaliation
inevitably produces lawlessness and extrajudicial score settling,
which is precisely the sort of thing that the law seeks to keep in
check. 213 Scholars who have criticized the trend toward using
shaming as an adjunct to existing criminal penalties, such as
imprisonment and fines, argue that by imposing shame sanctions,
the judicial system creates a dangerous condition of complicity
between the state and the crowd, harnessing mob psychology in
pursuit of peace and order.214 As Jeremy Waldron observes in his
review of William Ian Miller's work on the vestiges of honor in
contemporary society, "[mlodern institutions-law, state, and
economy-claim to have created a pacified society in which people
are supposed to feel sufficiently secure not to have to take their
honor into their own hands, so to speak."215 Waldron agrees with
Miller that an encounter with legal forms of action and remedies is
an exceptional event in the daily life of the average person. As he
has argued in other places, however, the existence of legal rights
and norms structures social relationships by giving private actors
the assurance that their expectations will be honored by the
state. 216 This picture would be complicated considerably by an
course of revenge). Wyatt-Brown later observes that "[t]he scheme of honor... gave too much
play to jealousy, malice, and physical and social competitiveness by endowing these basic
humanisms with the rationale of sensitivity to self-esteem." WYATr-BROWN, supra note 43, at
174.
212. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRAUNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 65 (1975).
213. See, e.g., WYATT-BROVN, supra note 43, at 463 (observing the paradox that disorder, in
the form of public acts of lawlessness, was used "to reconfirm collective order"); Weber, supra
note 59, at 84-85 (tracing the decline of honor to princes of proto-states who sought to
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate uses of violence). Robert Ellickson shows,
however, that in a close-knit society, second-order norms evolve which regulate the magnitude
of retaliation that is appropriate for a given transgression, and that individuals generally
respect these limits. Furthermore, self-help remedies are generally graduated, with less severe
sanctions preceding more drastic retaliatory actions. See ELLICKSON, supra note 37, at 211-19.
214. See Whitman, supra note 87, at 1059; cf. Lee C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society: A
Response to Critics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 979, 984 (1990) (observing that the social practice of
tolerating offensive speech can produce a disposition to refrain from retribution for offenses
where official punishment is available through the state).
215. Jeremy Waldron, On Humiliation, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1787, 1802 (1995) (reviewing
WILLIAM IAN ILLER, HUMILIATION AND OTHER ESSAYS ON HONOR, SOCIAL DISCOMFORT, AND
VIOLENCE (1993)).
216. See Jeremy Waldron, When Justice Replaces Affection: The Need for Rights, 11 HART.
J.L. & PUB. POLY 625, 643-47 (1988).
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independent set of norms that sought to structure relationships
differently, as was the case in the antebellum South in the United
States. The historian Bertram Wyatt-Brown shows how legal
authorities understood their sphere of influence as being
circumscribed by the obligations of individuals to look after their
own social standing. "The courts and lawmakers never put honor
into statutory or judicial form because it was commonly
understood that there should be a division between the workings of
the law and the stalwart defense of a man's sense of self."217
Similarly, traditional Mediterranean notions of honor removed
responsibility for protecting certain interests from the domain of
the state: "When challenged to fight, it is not honorable to demand
police protection."
218
Community norms, therefore, are hostile to the state's claim
of authority, and can work at cross-purposes with officially
sanctioned means of social control.219 As I argued previously,
informal mechanisms of retaliation are quite effective in reining in
improper behavior in a small, relatively homogeneous
community.220 A reputation for being untrustworthy spreads
quickly, as information costs are relatively low (and can be reduced
even further by instituting an information-sharing practice like
the weekly Tanana Valley Bar Association lunch).221 Moreover,
there is relatively broad agreement on what constitutes improper
behavior, and again this agreement can be reinforced by the
constant process of dialogue and norm elaboration that is inherent
in the lawyer's penchant for telling war stories. Where these
217. WYATT-BROWN, supra note 43, at 305.
218. Pitt-Rivers, Social Status, supra note 71, at 30; see also ANDERSON, CODE, supra note
45, at 71, 83, 131 (recounting stories which reveal that under the code of the street, going to
teachers or police officers for protection causes loss of respect); MILLER, supra note 43, at 192.93
(detailing aspects of Icelandic law dealing with vengeance-taking, which were infrequently
observed).
219. Cf. McAdams, Origin, supra note 46, at 386-87 (observing that some group norms
violate social norms and, indeed, may derive their appeal from their opposition to social norms).
In some communities, the isolation from state norms is understandable, such as in the inner-
city neighborhoods studied by Elijah Anderson. As Anderson observes, residents of these
communities believe with some justification that public officials have abdicated their
responsibility for policing these neighborhoods and that, in any event, the justice system is
biased against African-Americans. See ANDERSON, CODE, supra note 45, at 66.
220. See DONALD D. LANDON, COUNTRY LAWYERS: THE IMPACT OF CONTEXT ON
PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 133-34 (1990).
221. Cf. ELLICKSON, supra note 37, at 232-33; SIMON, supra note 22, at 213-14 (endorsing
specialized bar associations, like the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, which can
signal ethical commitments to third parties and thereby reduce information costs); Gilson &
Mnookin, supra note 20, at 537-41, 543-46 (noting that institutional structures, such as elite
"academies" of lawyers, may help create reputational markets, thus lowering information costs).
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conditions do not obtain, however, the practices of retaliation can
spin out of control, as each act of retribution spawns an act of
counter-retribution, and soon the relationship has degenerated
into total war. This process can be checked in a small community,
where retaliation is understood as a sanction applied to improper
behavior, and where it is possible to identify the party who is to
blame for an escalation in nastiness. In larger associations,
however, state authority is necessary to respond to some of the
incentives for strategic behavior that are endemic in impersonal,
market-oriented communities. For example, in a large urban bar,
one lawyer may not have two cases against the same opponent or
in front of the same judge in her entire career. There is little cause
to worry about retaliation in a subsequent case when in all
likelihood the offended lawyer will never again be one's adversary.
In a large community, information costs are much higher-it is
difficult for one of fifty or sixty judges on a county trial court
bench 222 to learn of sleazy behavior in one of her colleagues'
courtrooms, to say nothing of the impossibility of keeping tabs on
each member of a large subcommunity like the personal injury or
corporate transactional bar.
This latter point raises the other, and perhaps more
obvious, problem with the combativeness generated by the
enforcement of community norms, which is the potential
interminability of conflict provoked by challenges to one's claim to
respect. In many cases, the retaliation of the dishonored party is
not precisely calibrated to the extent of his shame, so that the
victim of retaliation becomes himself dishonored, and in need of
satisfaction. The dispute between two prominent Congressmen,
described by Kenneth Greenberg, escalated dramatically as the
preparation for the duel led to further insults and allegations of
cowardice, untrustworthiness, and breaches of the etiquette of
dueling.22 3 The second-order dispute over the dispute-settling
process was ended only by a magnanimous gesture by one of the
parties, which allowed both combatants to desist with their honor
intact. William Ian Miller describes larger-scale feuds among the
scattered clans of medieval Iceland, in which new debts arose that
222. In 1996, the last year I was in private practice, there were some sixty judges in King
County (Washington) Superior Court, and it was not uncommon to have a case before a judge
who was a complete stranger to the lawyer. (I remember in several instances calling around the
firm to find any other litigator who had any knowledge of a particular judge.) Egregious cases of
misconduct were reported among the judges, but stories were seldom told about the kind of
small-scale annoying behavior that is effectively controlled in a small community.
223. See GREENBERG, supra note 43, at 53-62.
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had to be repaid, killings outside the circle of original disputants
provoked fresh demands for vengeance, and social judgments
concerning the balance of blows and ripostes continually shifted.224
In one contemporary setting governed by norms of honor and
shame, impoverished black neighborhoods in inner-city
Philadelphia, ethnographer Elijah Anderson writes of street corner
"beefs" that lead to physical violence and subsequent paybacks by
the loser of the fight, who must re-establish himself as a person
entitled to respect by exacting revenge on the victor in the original
fight.2
25
Little imagination is required to envision a dispute between
lawyers that escalates from a petty quarrel over scheduling or
discovery, and deteriorates rapidly as each side strikes back at the
other with just a little bit too much force, giving the opponent a
grievance that must be vindicated at some later stage in the
proceedings. It is difficult to calibrate the level of retaliation
precisely, particularly where it is not exactly "in kind"-for
example, where a dispute over scheduling depositions provokes one
side to file a motion on the day before the start of a holiday
weekend. 226  Was the reaction excessive, given the initial
provocation? The opponent will probably think,so, and perceive an
additional wrong yet to be avenged, while the first lawyer may
think the score has been evened. Since there is no neutral referee
in one of these informal conflicts, the disputants are left to their
own devices to interpret the magnitude of the opponent's
retaliation, and the emotions generated by the skirmish make
224. See MILLER, supra note 43, at 186-87; Anderson, supra note 97, at 30-33 (observing
similar phenomenon in Albanian blood feuds).
225. See ANDERSON, CODE, supra note 45, at 78-79.
226. Compare the difficulty of adjusting the level of retaliation in real-world settings with
the neat theoretical model of "tit-for-tat" retaliation in iterated prisoner's dilemma games. See
ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 30-43 (1984). As Robert Ellickson
documents, individuals must be extraordinarily careful that their retaliation is not interpreted
as an initial act of aggression, rather than self-help. See ELLICKSON, supra note 37, at 216-19.
Similarly, Dan Kahan has noted that shaming sanctions frequently impose hidden costs, such as
a dramatic loss of earning potential caused by the damage to one's reputation, so that the total
loss suffered by the victim can be excessive in proportion to the gravity of the offense. See
Kahan, supra note 91, at 638-40 (citing John Lott, Jr., An Attempt at Measuring the Total
Monetary Penalty front Drug Convictions: The Importance of an Individual's Reputation, 21 J.
LEGAL STUD. 159 (1992)). Finally, Eric Posner criticizes government-sponsored shaming
sanctions, because it is impossible to control the level of ostracism that will be provoked by the
shame penalty. See POSNER, supra note 46, at 95-96.
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accurate assessment almost impossible. 227  In addition, the
spiraling cycle of retaliation makes resort to alternative dispute
resolution procedures much more difficult, since the lawyers
perceive that they would be backing down by seeking mediation or
settlement.2 28 Thus, the unruliness of community-based systems of
collective ordering should give pause to those who would enlist
"reputational markets" and social norms in the regulation of
lawyers.
B. Relativism
The 19th century gentleman in North America gave us slavery, Manifest Destiny,
the theft of half of Mexico, the subjugation of women, the exploitation of
immigrant children, Pinkerton detectives, yellow.dog contracts, and the
implacable genocide of American Indians. You could make a case ... that the
gentleman's ethic is not worth taking seriously. If the gentleman has left the
professions, the best thing for us would be to bar the door lest he get back in.2
This quotation from Thomas Shaffer's work on the legal
ethics of gentlemen aptly illustrates a serious shortcoming in using
community norms as a basis for regulating a pluralistic profession.
In the honor/shame model, honor tends to be a conservative (in the
sense of status quo-preserving) value, because of the centrality of
the community's judgment to moral evaluation.230 In the rational
choice model, an individual's preference for esteem will be satisfied
by appealing to the existing structure of community values, not by
challenging the beliefs of one's peers. In a community that elevates
social approbation to a place of paramount importance, and that
sanctions deviants through retaliation and rituals of shaming,
individuals cannot be expected to adopt a critical stance toward
the community's practices. In a fully developed, traditional honor
society, there simply is no external standpoint from which
criticism can be directed. In a contemporary community that seeks
227. Compare the description of the mutually enhanced aggressiveness of the lawyers for
the Office of Independent Counsel and President Clinton in POSNER, supra note 87, at 70-72
(1999).
228. Cochran, supra note 13, at 886.
229. Shaffer, Gentleman, supra note 13, at 11.
230. This is not always the case. Leftist or progressive subcommunities may arise which
exert considerable pressure for conformity on their members, but which collectively aim to
challenge the status quo. In universities, groups of women, people of color, or other historically
disadvantaged people may succeed in promulgating social norms governing such matters as
language usage-African-American is the preferred term of address over black, for example--
and this norm may be rigorously enforced by informal sanctions such as ostracism. In this case.
the honorlshame process operates to oppose the in-power group (assuming that power is held by
white men) through control over social norms.
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to enforce its norms against deviants, we might expect to observe a
dulling of individuals' critical faculties in spheres where acting
rightly is measured by conformity to the community's expectations.
If, for instance, a particular profession stringently enforces its
norms through informal sanctioning mechanisms that are highly
effective, those professionals may come to identify ethical behavior
only with conventional morality-that is, with what those in power
in the professional community do.231 A story from contemporary
society will help illustrate this point.
Sociologist Robert Jackall's fascinating and influential
study, Moral Mazes, explores the normative world of corporate
managers, who operate under an elaborate code of conduct based
on shifting allegiances within a complex organizational
bureaucracy. 232 It is Jackall's thesis that corporations generate
obligations that are enforced through informal, hierarchical
mechanisms of reward and retaliation, and that these obligations
may have no warrant in any extraorganizational values such as
rights, social good, truth, and justice. He offers the example of
Brady (known by a pseudonym, but a real person), a former
accountant for a large publicly traded American corporation.
233
Brady had discovered some possible financial improprieties,
involving only (he thought) some middle managers in other
divisions, and sought to clear up the discrepancies in the way
certain budget items had been reported. In the process, he stirred
up a hornet's nest. One of his bosses repeatedly urged him to be a
good soldier and drop the whole matter, but Brady continued to
uncover additional evidence that managers at higher levels,
including the CEO, had been cooking the books. Eventually, Brady
was fired and kicked out of his office by security guards.
What is significant about this incident for this analysis is
the different norms appealed to by Brady and the corporate higher-
ups. Savvier managers evaluated Brady's situations in terms of the
rules of the game in a large bureaucracy: Don't go over your boss's
head; if someone tells you to drop a matter, drop it without
question; don't ask too many inconvenient questions; respect the
231. Consider the "code of silence" enforced by police officers, which prevents even honest
cops from reporting corruption. See McAdams, Origin, supra note 46, at 348 & n.42, 421-22; cf.
F.H. Bradley, My Station and Its Duties, in ETHICAL STUDIES 98, 203 (R. Ross ed., 1951) ("It is
necessary to remark that the community... may be in a confused or rotten condition, so that in
it right and might do not always go together.").
232. See JACKALL, supra note 45.
233. See id. at 105-12.
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division of labor, and keep your nose out of the business of other
managers; and, above all, don't rock the boat. Brady, on the other
hand, saw the dilemma as implicating values whose genesis was
outside the four walls of the corporation-right and wrong, and
self-respect founded in a professional code that appreciates
considerations such as honesty, accountability, and fairness. The
managers were conversant with the language-game of community-
based social norm enforcement, or what might be called the honor
code of the corporation. They understood that values were radically
contingent, and depended for their justification upon the places of
the involved individuals within the corporate hierarchy. As Jackall
reports: "[T]he managers I interviewed feel that Brady's biggest
error was in insisting on acting according to a moral code, his
professional ethos, that had simply no relevance to his
organizational situation. '' 234 Brady did not appreciate the extent to
which the normative domain of the corporation was self-sufficient,
highly context-specific, and hermetically separate from other
domains, such as personal life. "A moral judgment based on a
professional ethic makes little sense in a world where the etiquette
of authority relationships and the necessity for protecting and
covering for one's boss, one's network, and oneself supercede all
other considerations and where non-accountability for action is the
norm."235 The corporate world, according to Jackall, is one in which
expediency, loyalty to one's patron, and a firm sense of solidarity
are the wellsprings of value. Where these values conflict with
those from other normative domains, the local norms of the
corporation take priority, much to the disadvantage of employees
like Brady, and those outsiders whose interests he indirectly
sought to protect.
In the context of legal ethics, the obvious parallel with the
Brady story is the reliance by the bar upon informal norms that
serve as smokescreens for lawyer self-interest, to the detriment of
outsiders. Critics have long decried the transparently self-serving
nature of many of the organized bar's disciplinary rules, and the
same criticism can be leveled against unwritten norms, such as the
profession's "conspiracy of silence"-the unwillingness of many
lawyers to testify against one another in malpractice suits.2 6 A few
234. Id. at 110.
235. Id. at 111.
236. See, e.g., Patterson v. Atlanta Bar Ass'n, 373 S.E.2d 514 (Ga. 1988) (affirming dismissal
of conspiracy claim against the organized bar, alleging that lawyers were prevented from
serving as expert witnesses in malpractice cases). As one textbook observes, the existence of
lawsuits like this one, even though they are generally dismissed for lack of evidence, 'lends
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courts have also begun to condemn explicitly some informal
standards of practice, such as the unarticulated expectations and
understandings associated with the civil litigation process, as
inconsistent with lawyers' obligations as officers of the court. In a
now-famous case, the Washington Supreme Court excoriated a
large, prestigious law firm for its handling of discovery in a civil
dispute, despite the fact that numerous bar leaders and academic
ethics experts had testified that the firm's actions did not deviate
from the customs of the litigation community in Seattle (at least
the subcommunity of large-firm litigators). 237 "Conduct is to be
measured against the spirit and purpose of the rules, not against
the standard of practice of the local bar," the court said.238 The
Fisons case plainly shows-and it has come to stand for this
proposition in the legal ethics world-that the bar's norm-
elaboration process is subject to checking from the outside, and
that courts retain authority to challenge the profession's own
understanding of its ethical obligations. 239 It was a response to a
practice that benefited lawyers alone, through the tremendous
increase in legal fees generated by "hardball" discovery practice, to
the detriment of outsiders such as clients, courts, and consumers
who bore litigation costs in the form of increased prices for goods
and services.
The Fisons case and the story of the accountant related by
Robert Jackall show the difficulty that professionals may have in
defying the norms of their subcommunities. Because shaming by
one's peers, or the inability to satisfy one's preference for esteem,
is a severe sanction, there is a strong incentive for actors to sweep
wrongfulness (in the sense of conduct that is accepted by the
community but which violates a duty of morality not emphasized
in the community) under the rug. The problem becomes
exponentially more difficult in environments, particularly small
towns, in which the actor is embedded in a network of interlocking
some support to the proposition that finding a lawyer to testify against another lawyer is still
not a simple matter." GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & SUSAN P. KONIAK, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF
LAWYERING 152 (1990).
237. See Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054 (Wash.
1993). This case, which has been cited in a few books and dozens of articles on legal ethics, is
used as a discussion problem in several professional responsibility casebooks, and was also
employed as a basis for interviews in a recent American Bar Association study of the ethical
decision-making process of large firm practitioners. See American Bar Association, Problems
Presented to Study Participants, reprinted in 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 885-87 (1998).
238. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d at 1079.
239. See generally Koniak, supra note 39, at 1389 (1992) (asserting that legal professional
ethics and the law as understood by the state compete with each other for supremacy).
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relationships, so that a lawyer relates to others not simply as an
occupant of a professional role, but also as a member of a church,
an officer in the Optimist Club, a fourth-generation descendant of
a well-established family, the Little League coach, and so on.240 A
lawyer embedded in "multiplex" relationships may find it
impossible to take on individuals who have reputations as
important personages within the community. Rural lawyers
interviewed by sociologist Donald Landon consistently reported a
palpable sense of risk inherent in challenging certain types of
defendants. The following statements by Landon's interviewees are
typical:
I represented a family in a civil rights matter against the school district. It was
the worst mistake of my career! The community held that against me for ten
years!
Recently, I took on a medical malpractice suit against a local doctor. It was a bad
mistake. I think rm finished in this community.
People here understand property suits, fence line disputes, damage suits and the
like. But they don't understand civil rights matters. You assess the situation very
carefully before you take them on.
2-SI
Lawyers in rural settings cannot afford to antagonize local
sentiments, because their economic vitality depends on
maintaining a reputation within the community as being "one of
us." Landon rightly notes that most empirical studies of the
behavior of lawyers have focused on urban practitioners at large
law firms, so our understanding of professional norms, including
the assumption that lawyering is a highly adversarial practice,
may be influenced by the bias toward studying only a small
segment of the bar.242 Of couise, there are benefits to the emphasis
on community cohesion in small towns. Some disputes, if left
unchecked, could eventually destroy the vitality of the town.
Lawyers in rural communities often take their role as officers of
the court quite seriously and act behind the scenes to calm
tempers and defuse disputes before they boil over into open
economic or social warfare. 43 In this way, the enforcement of
informal social norms promotes the long-term stability of a
240. See LANDON, supra note 220, at 123-24, 127-31.
241. Id. at 137.
242. Id. at 125.
243. See id. at 139.
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community by punishing people whose behavior is likely to be
corrosive of peaceful relationships. At the same time, however, it
stifles legitimate criticism of unjust community practices, as the
reports by lawyers who were discouraged from pursuing civil
rights suits show. Representation of unpopular clients or positions
is simply not encouraged by a social practice that depends on the
approbation of one's fellows as a necessary precondition to social
standing and the status of being an authentic exemplar of the
community's nomos.
Notwithstanding the evidence that undue concern for their
reputation tends to make lawyers unwilling to challenge the status
quo, legal ethicist Thomas Shaffer argues that the paradigm of the
gentleman lawyer ought to be revived. 2 4 In his scholarship on the
virtues and character in legal ethics, however, it seems that
Shaffer seeks to resurrect the admirable features of gentleman's
ethics without also accepting its blemishes. Actually, it is not clear
whether Shaffer is seeking to rely on community-based norm
enforcement as such, or whether he is advocating increased
attention to the character of agents and, correspondingly, to the
moral virtues. Virtue ethics is by no means equivalent to
conformity to community expectations, and there is no reason to
equate character with compliance with social norms. Similarly, a
list of virtues cannot be made equivalent to gentlemanliness by
fiat, as Shaffer seems to want to do. He enumerates the
characteristics of a gentleman-civility, self-possession, constancy
in leadership, discrimination, and diffidence-and offers this
catalogue of virtues as a model for lawyers. 245 He also claims that
personal integrity, "test[ing] occupation against selfhood, not
selfhood against occupation," 246 characterizes the ethics of
gentlemen. This list may match the qualities exhibited by
gentlemen in a particular community-fictional or actual-but the
concept of the gentleman does not by itself contain criteria that
would exclude vices such as toleration for patriarchy or racial
discrimination.
In keeping with his claim that community is logically prior
to ethics, Shaffer draws from fiction, particularly his archetypical
good lawyer, Atticus Finch, the hero of To Kill a Mockingbird.
Atticus is worthy of praise for standing with his community, but at
244. See SHAFFER & SHAFFER, supra note 13, at 13-15, 34 (1991); Shaffer, Gentleman, supra
note 13, at 40-42.
245. See id. at 8-10.
246. Id. at 14.
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the same time making a moral argument that his community has
lost its bearings. 247 The problem is, when Shaffer points to Atticus
Finch as the pinnacle of gentlemanly behavior for lawyers, he is
reading the ethics of gentlemen against itself. Finch was a
dissenter, not an archetype of his community's norms. 248 He is
obviously a figure we should admire in moral terms, but it is
important to see that the evaluative standards under which we
conclude that Finch is worthy of praise are not standards of
conventional morality-they are critical moral standards, which
depend for their validity not on the existing social practices of
Finch's community, but on some source external to social
conventions. This foundation may be the practices of another
community or tradition (Gadamer's concept of "fusion of horizons"),
moral laws rooted in the dictates of pure reason (the Kantian
categorical imperative), hybrid fact/value concepts such as the
greatest happiness principle (Millian utilitarianism), God's
revealed will, or the like. Perhaps, on the other hand, the only
thing we can agree about is that Atticus Finch is someone we
ought to admire and emulate, while deep disagreement remains
about metaethical questions such as the sources of normative
standafds used to explain this conclusion.249 But in any event, the
community, as the final arbiter of moral standards, did not
approve of Atticus's conduct, so it is not descriptively accurate to
call him a "gentleman."25 Only from a critical standpoint outside
247. See id. at 15.
248. David Luban rightly objects that if Shaffer wishes to argue from fictional examples he
must accept the constraints of the fictional worlds he cites. Thus, while he claims that the
gentleman's culture contains the resources necessary to combat gender discrimination, it is
impossible to imagine Atticus Finch as a woman, living in a small Southern town, representing
clients. "She would be a maverick, a curiosity. She simply does not fit in with their culture-
certainly not with the boys at the courthouse or the Chamber of Commerce-and to the extent
that we can imagine her fitting in, we are imagining a small-town old-South culture that has
become unrecognizably transformed." David Luban, The Legal Ethics of Radical
Conintunitarianisn, 60 TENN. L. REV. 589, 595-96 (1993) (reviewing THOMAS L. SHAFFER &
MARY M. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR COIMMUNITIES: ETHICS IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION (1991)).
249. Cass Sunstein would call this an "incompletely theorized agreement." See CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 35-61 (1996) (discussing "incompletely
theorized agreement"); see also ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEPHEN TOUL.MIN, THE ABUSE OF
CASUISTRY: A HISTORY OF MORAL REASONING (1988).
250. Cf. MILLER, HUMILIATION, supra note 45, at 116 (C[I]n an honor-based culture there was
no self-respect independent of the respect of others, no private sense of 'hey, rm quite
something' unless it was conferred publicly."). There were certainly individuals in the fictional
town of Maycomb that did approve of Atticus's conduct. The trial judge appointed him knowing
that Tom Robinson had been wrongly accused; the sheriff. Heck Tate, never lost respect for
Atticus; and the black community certainly felt gratitude for his defense. (This latter example of
community approval was memorably dramatized in the film when the black spectators in the
2001] 2021
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
of Atticus's community are we able to praise him as a person of
decency and courage.
This argument must be qualified somewhat, because it is
true that one may be a gentleman and speak out against prevailing
public opinion, if only on rare occasions. As Wyatt-Brown explains,
recounting popular reaction in the South to several attempted
slave revolts, "[a]ny forthright animadversions about a particular
case . . .threw doubt on the critic's loyalty to community values,"
and thus his status as authentic exemplar of honor.251 If a person
had already built up a sufficient reserve of honor-or social
"capital" as a gentleman-then he would have enjoyed some
latitude to dissent without having his status as a gentleman called
into question. "Some self-assured individuals boldly spoke out
regardless of consequences, a credit to their high sense of
honor.... John H. Cocke, young Edmund Ruffin, and a few others
had sufficient honor to meet the danger of public passion."252 But
these cases were rare and, more importantly, showed that even a
person widely regarded as a gentleman spoke out against popular
sentiment at his peril. What is also significant about these cases is
that Cocke, Ruffin (before his transformation into a pro-slavery
theorist), and the other courageous dissenters described by Wyatt-
Brown had already attained their status as gentlemen before they
spoke out in opposition to the position of most of their fellows.
They did not become gentlemen by rocking the boat, and they could
never have attained that station in their community if they had
not generally conformed to expectations. 253 Although Wyatt-
Brown's case histories do not definitively resolve this question, it
seems reasonable to conjecture that someone who wanted to
remain a gentleman had at most a couple of opportunities to
balcony rose as Atticus exited the courtroom.) Furthermore, as Kent Greenawalt suggests, there
would be nothing wrong with saying that Atticus would be a gentleman by our standards, even
if he was not by the standards of Maycomb.
251. WYATT-BROWN, supra note 43, at 421.
252. Id. at 421-22 (emphasis added). Eric Posner hypothesizes that rich people (who may be
persons of honor in our society, since acquisitiveness and wealth seem to be foundational
American values) can violate social norms with impunity because it is too costly for others to
ostracize them. See POSNER, supra note 46, at 27-28.
253. Cf. MILLER, HUMILIATION, supra note 45, at 110 C'In an honor-based culture the
morality of an action was never separated from who did it. The deeds of honorable people were
prima facie honorable, the deeds of dishonorable people dishonorable ...."). The proviso "prima
facie" is important here, because it shows that even a presumptively honorable person's actions
may be judged dishonorable if they stand in grave enough conflict with social norms. But
honorable people had considerable latitude to say and do as they pleased, secure in the
presumption that their actions would be treated approvingly by observers, as the story of John
Randolph's outright lie illustrates. See GREENBERG, supra note 43, at 31-32.
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criticize his own society publicly. Each one of these crusades would
probably sap a quantity of his gentleman-capital, and leave him
closer to being devalued and no longer vested with the public
approbation necessary to maintain the status of gentleman. Thus,
while it is possible for a gentleman to dissent occasionally, it is not
possible, within the scheme of honor, for a persistent critic of
social mores to become a gentleman.2
4
To underscore this point, I am perfectly happy to concede
that Atticus Finch is a good and virtuous person, and to grant
Shaffer's argument that a good person is "a coherent object of
admiration, a coherent source of moral standards, providing with
his life a scheme for the moral formation of young people."255 We
should be suspicious of any system of ethical beliefs that did not
validate a courageous lawyer for outsiders as an object of respect
and a source of moral instruction. However, these evaluations
require a critical standpoint external to the society in which
Atticus was embedded. Sometimes a gentleman may become an
internal critic, "by describing the values the community believes
but hides from."256 In that case, the gentleman is still partially
complicit in injustice, but may look to other, repressed aspects of
the community's value system as a source of moral teaching and of
criticism of the community's abuse of power. The gentleman only
remains a gentleman, however, if he endorses enough of the
commonly shared community values-remaining in complicity with
whatever injustice is thereby sanctioned-that he does not mark
himself as a rebel or a troublemaker. Where I part company with
Shaffer is at the point where he praises people of prophetic
witness, such as the lawyer Myra Bradwell, who was forbidden by
the U.S. Supreme Court to take the bar exam, in a famously
patronizing opinion, but who went on to a distinguished career as
a law reform advocate. 257 Shaffer would like to label prophets as
254. The converse of this point is also true-that is, someone who is already established as a
person of honor can get away with transgressions that would ordinarily ruin a person's standing
in the community. For example, Southern gentlemen were allowed to have sex with their slaves,
as long as it was done discreetly, while sexual relationships between blacks and whites of lower
social prestige were discouraged, to say the least. See WYATT-BROWN, supra note 43. at 308; see
also MILLER, supra note 43, at 219 ("Certain people clearly had a presumption of legitimacy [of
violence] in their favor. This presumption was one of the benefits of popularity, honor, past
successes, and a reputation for acting legitimately."); MILLER, HUMILIATION. supra note 45. at
117 (f[The honorable person got a lot of benefits of the doubt, a presumption that his doings
were honorable.").
255. SHAFFER & SHAFFER, supra note 13, at 14.
256. Shaffer, Gentleman, supra note 13, at 28.
257. See id. at 20-21. The notorious opinion is Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872).
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"gentlemen," or at least reconcile the power of prophecy as being
consistent with the attribution of honor, but the structure of the
ethic of honor denies honor to rabble-rousers. It is true that "a
prophet . . . is also, always and undeniably, within and a part of
his culture. ' 258 A part, yes, but not an exemplar of his culture.
Honor is reserved for those members of the community who
represent the beliefs of the majority most effectively; it is not
conferred on individuals who speak uncomfortable truths from the
standpoint of marginal or long-forgotten beliefs.
Perhaps the best way to understand the stories, such as To
Kill a Mockingbird and Intruder in the Dust, that Shaffer wishes
to read as fables about gentlemanly behavior, is to interpret these
novels as attempts to reform the discourse of honor, so that it is no
longer paralyzed by its inability to criticize pervasive injustice in
the community. In his thoughtful analysis of complicity and moral
tragedy, Shaffer argues that the ethic of gentlemen entails
simultaneously resisting evil and engaging with one's culture. 2 9
His interpretation of the novels on which he bases this claim is
sound, but it seems discordant with what we know about honor
from other sources. Have Harper Lee and William Faulkner
missed the essential character of honor in their own culture? I
think the answer is obviously "no," given the centrality of these
works in the literary canon of the region, and that these writers
are playing against the prevailing understanding of honor to
construct characters who are, essentially, gentlemen-critics.
Atticus Finch and Gavin Stevens represent persons who have been
formed morally by their culture, yet retain integrity, grounded in
individual conscience, from the standpoint of which they can resist
the elements of evil embedded in their culture. Of course, once the
concept of conscience is introduced into a story about gentlemen,
the story is no longer purely about honor, but also about the
dialectic between community values (which are learned by
gentlemen in their youth) and other sources of moral values. The
gentlemen-heroes of the stories reconstructed by Shaffer take
guidance from their religious heritage, and fail in heroism to the
extent they forget the teachings of their faith.
260
The community William Faulkner described was not a community able to comfort
those who suffer when the truth is told about the continuation of slavery; but the
community [Martin Luther] King [Jr.] described was a community that was able
258. Id. at 21.
259. Id. at 30-31.
260. Id. at 35.
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to hear the black church; the black church was a prophetic force; it was not
racist, and never had been; it was and always had been Southern. It could bring
its community to repentance.20
Again, it is important to observe that the figure of the
religious gentleman is a departure from the ethic of honor as it is
generally understood. Martin Luther King, Jr., although clearly a
moral hero, would never make it onto a list of "Southern
gentlemen," because the source of the values he preached and lived
was not internal to the dominant community of white Southerners.
True, the values taught by Dr. King were a part of the religious
teachings of many whites, but those religious precepts were an
indictment of community norms, not an actively lived part of them.
By endowing literary characters with some of the virtues of
religious leaders in the black church, Faulkner and Lee were able
to indict the ethics of gentlemen along with the racist values of
Southern communities, by showing that the qualities of gentlemen




The honor/shame model of community norm enforcement
shows clearly how reliance on informal social norms can be
fundamentally inegalitarian. The most common criticism leveled
against the ethics of honor is derived, quite naturally, from the
very term "gentleman." Although honor is not necessarily a
gendered concept, virtually every conception of honor that has
been elaborated throughout history seems fundamentally to
exclude women as people worthy of social prestige.2 3 In traditional
honor societies, it is true that both men and women are subject to
the claims of honor, and are potentially liable to lose honor and to
be shamed. The ascription of honor differs between the sexes in
261. Id. at 37.
262. Shaffer does recognize the tension between the ethic of honor and the stories he
recounts of Gavin Stevens and Atticus Finch. He cites Bertram Wyatt-Brown's work and notes
that honor replaces "the quest, or way, that constitutes the virtuous life" with the quest for the
approval of others, and that honor "takes the place of conscience, of personal identity" and
(implicitly) of religious truth. Id. at 39 n.125 (citing WYATr-BRO\\WN, supra note 43). Thus, his
argument should be understood not as a description of the ethics of gentlemen, but as a proposal
to reform the "false virtue of honor" with a healthy dose of religiously grounded moral learning.
See id. at 41-42.
263. See generally STEWART, supra note 43, at 107-10; Pieter Spierenburg, Introduction, in




what actions are expected of a man and a woman, and what is
necessary to gain and lose honor. Generally honor for women is
associated with chastity.26 4 Anthropologist Julian Pitt-Rivers
shows how in Andalusian society losing sexual purity causes a
woman, but not a man, to lose honor, while maintaining sexual
purity causes men to risk having their masculinity, and therefore
their honor, questioned. 265 At the same time, however, men are
liable to lose honor through the actions of women ostensibly under
their control, for it is the cuckolded husband, not the seducer of
the wife, who is shamed by adultery.266  Similarly, in the
antebellum South in the United States, men and women competed
for honor, but were judged very differently. Female honor resided
in sexual purity and public restraint, while men were given broad
license for sexual liaisons, as well as boisterous behavior such as
fighting, swearing, heavy drinking, and card playing, provided that
they safeguarded the chastity of the women under their
dominion. 267 The one exception to the pervasive emphasis in honor
societies on sexual purity for women is that women generally
functioned as guardians or arbiters of male honor, and frequently
goaded the men in their kinship circles into taking violent action
to avenge slights to their (the men's) reputations. 268 The agent
provocateur role assigned to women in the Icelandic sagas and in
Southern tradition does not mean they possessed the juridical
status of men, however. Women still had to own property and act
through men, and it was precisely this legal inferiority that
prompted women to seek out tough-minded men and prompt them
to action when they failed to be useful guardians.
264. See Spierenburg, supra note 204, at 5; see also 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 367
(1933). The third definition given in the OED article on honor is as follows: "(Of a woman)
Chastity, purity, as a virtue of the highest consideration; reputation for this virtue, good name,"
Id.
265. Pitt-Rivers, Social Status, supra note 71, at 45.
266. Id. at 46; see also STEWART, supra note 43, at 108 (quoting a principle of medieval
German honor that "[nlo one was more dishonorable than a cuckold"). For an example of this
point from another source, consider how Don Giovanni threatened Donna Anna's and Masetto's
honor-a word both characters use-in the Mozart/Da Ponte opera. In both cases, the wrongful
act was the Don's sexual aggression, but the loss of honor would befall Masetto not directly, but
through his inability to protect Zerlina's chastity.
267. See WYATT-BROWN, supra note 43, at 164, 173, 227, 286.
268. MILLER, supra note 43, at 212-13; WYArr-BROWN, supra note 43, at 51-53. Wyatt-
Brown recounts the rather chilling story of Sam Houston's mother handing him a musket and
admonishing him not to disgrace it, saying "I would rather all my sons should fill one honorable




Having said that women and men both may partake of the
qualities of honor and shame to a limited extent, it is nevertheless
true that most conceptions of honor are anti-egalitarian, because
obligations entailed by honor are owed differentially, depending on
the status of the actors. 269 The first definition in the Oxford
English Dictionary's article on honor makes clear that it is owed
according to "exalted worth or rank," and many of the subsequent
glosses on the word pertain to nobility, high rank, or holders of
certain offices. 270 Honor in this sense is by its nature linked with
inequality, because in order for some people to have honor, it is
necessary that not everyone possess it.21 "[G]lory is like honor; if
all men hath it, no man hath it; for they consist in comparison and
precellence." 272 The economic theory on social norms also
emphasizes that people compete for scarce esteem.273 For example,
some of the cattle ranchers studied by Robert Ellickson are widely
admired, and enjoy high social status, on account of their
reputation for trustworthiness.2 7 4 While we might applaud the use
of differential status entitlements in that case, because
neighborliness is a trait that ought to be rewarded and inculcated,
one must keep in mind that honor does not correlate with moral
virtue in all cases. In Shasta County, California, the ranchers
apparently value qualities such as cooperation and honesty, but
other communities may cultivate more harmful dispositions, as
was the case in the antebellum South in the United States, where
racial inequality was fostered under the guise of honor. I suppose
it is possible, in a utopian community, for every member to be a
person of honor, but in any real society, there will be individuals
who excel at representing their community in its best light, and
these will be the objects of the esteem and deference of others.
Historically men of honor-gentlemen-hailed necessarily
from the upper classes, and entry into the "gentlemanly
269. See ROM HARRt & MICHAEL KRAUSZ, VARIETIES OF RELATIVISM 16 1-64 (1996).
270. 5 OxFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 367-69 (1933); see also Weber, supra note 59, at 81. 83,
86-87.
271. See HABER, supra note 10, at 98-99; TAYLOR, supra note 85, at 46.47.
272. MI LER, supra note 43, at 30 (quoting Thomas Hobbes, Philosophical Rudiments
Concerning Government and Society, in 2 THE ENGLISH WORKS OF TIIO.-S HOBBES 5 (William
Molesworth ed., 1841)). As Roberto Unger observes, "Glory... stimulates hostility, for it shines
by contrast to insignificance of person. There is not enough time to admire everyone, and then.
if everyone were equally famous, fame would lose its meaning." UNGER, supra note 212, at 65.
273. See McAdams, Origin, supra note 46, at 357.
274. See ELLICKSON, supra note 37, at 211.
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professions" was severely restricted by social class.275 Honor is
frequently connected with the concept of noblesse oblige and,
conversely, with the power enjoyed by persons of high rank to treat
underlings with less respect than honorable persons were owed.
"Not paying tradesmen and others of lesser social status was no
violation of the code, because honor was very much tied to
hierarchy; to manipulate the weak (within some bounds) was no
detraction from a man's reputation. v27 6 Moreover, in societies in
which honor and shame are central, honor norms are often
elaborated in terms of how a gentleman ought to treat his
inferiors. For example, here is Robert E. Lee's reflection on honor:
[T]he manner in which an individual enjoys certain advantages over others is the
test of a true gentleman. The power which the strong have over the weak, the
magistrate over the citizen, the employer over the employed, the educated over
the unlettered, the experienced over the confiding, even the clever over the
silly-the forbearing or inoffensive use of all this power or authority . . . will
show the gentleman in plain light.
277
Although this statement does not countenance abuses of power
over subalterns, it nevertheless presupposes that a gentleman is
someone necessarily of a higher status than most of his fellow
citizens. 278 Persons of honor did not engage in disputes of honor
with lower-status persons, nor did they participate in honorable
pastimes, such as gambling, with inferiors. 279 An insult by an
inferior was not an occasion for vindication-in one famous
episode, Henry Clay could not be bothered to rise to the challenge
275. HABER, supra note 10, at 5; STEVART, supra note 43, at 130-31. Talk of gentlemanliness
or honor in the professions has generally been a thin veneer concealing outright racism, sexism,
or anti-Semitism. For example, Henry Drinker, one of the most influential legal ethics scholars
of the first half of this century, lamented that much of the unethical conduct committed by
lawyers was the result of the influx of "Russian Jew Boys" into the profession. See ROBERT
STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S, at 198
n.41 (1983).
276. WYATT-BROWN, supra note 43, at 345.
277. EMORY M. THOMAS, ROBERT E. LEE: A BIOGRAPHY 397 (1995) (quoting Robert E. Lee
from his personal papers after his death).
278. See Rob Atkinson's powerful criticism of the elitism of Atticus Finch and his
condescension to blacks and lower-class whites in To Kill a Mockingbird, in Atkinson, supra
note 95, at 669-77.
279. See, e.g., GREENBERG, supra note 43, at 141-45. Regarding medieval Iceland, William
Ian Miller observes:
Feud generally did not exist across social strata. This does not mean, however,
that interclass conflict did not exist. It's just that such conflict was perceived
differently .... For the continuing hostile exchanges that constitute feud, each
party had to consider the other worthy of giving offense and worthy of
retaliation. In other words, feuding relations were congruent with the
boundaries of the field of honor.
MILLER, supra note 43, at 185.
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of a nonentity Congressman named George Kremer, but when the
gentleman John Randolph insulted Clay in essentially the same
way, Clay found himself forced to seek satisfaction in a duel.280 In
the context of legal ethics, perhaps this is a partial blessing in
disguise. A higher-status member of the community might not be
moved to retaliate against a lower-status lawyer who violated
some unwritten code of conduct. The converse is true, however,
and poses more of a threat to an equitable and fair method of
conflict resolution, for a lower-status lawyer has no means of
seeking redress against a person widely regarded as honorable.
The honorable can trample the weak underfoot, and unless they
are perceived by others of similar status as having abused their
power, they can get away with exploiting their position of
distinction within the community. The most familiar abuse of
status differentials, legitimated through the language of honor, is
surely the system of slavery in the antebellum South and the
violent reassertion of white male authority in the wake of the
failed project of Reconstruction. The distance between the rule of
law and the nonjudicial mechanisms provided by the practices of
honor permitted white Southerners to maintain domination
without recourse to legal processes, which were subject to political
interference by Northerners, and which also would have
jeopardized Northern investment in emerging Southern
industries. 28 '
The rational choice theorists also worry about the
hierarchy- and dominance-reinforcing effects of informal social
control regimes. Eric Posner suggests that members of a dominant
group may discriminate against a disfavored minority to show
solidarity with the elite. 282 Beating up on outsiders shows loyalty
to the insiders, because it does have a cost-it requires giving up
opportunities to transact with the outsiders. Perhaps this explains
280. See GREENBERG, supra note 43, at 54-57.
281. See generally ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: A.MERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION.
1863-1877 (1988); GREENBERG, supra note 43; LEON LITWACK, BEEN IN THE STORM So LONG
(1979); Stephen Kantrowitz, White Supremacist Justice and the Rule of Law. Lynching, Honor
and the State in Ben Tillnan's South Carolina, in MEN AND VIOLENCE: GENDER, HONOR, AND
RITUALS IN MODERN EUROPE AND AMERICA 213 (Pieter Spierenburg ed., 1998).
282. See POSNER, supra note 46, at 97-100. A "norm entrepreneur" may even create
fragmentation where formerly there was none. He gives the example of Joseph McCarthy, who
compelled ordinary Americans to affirm publicly that they were "one of us" and not "one of
them." See id. at 114-15. McCarthy thus fragmented the American people into patriots and
those whose loyalty was suspect. The signaling function of denouncing Communists ceased to be




the function of telling racist jokes, or other relatively covert acts of
discrimination. It does provide a neat theoretical account of
teenage rebellion: by making oneself obnoxious to adults, a
teenager raises the stakes attached to getting expelled from his
own peer group, thereby signaling that he is willing to run risks
for his friends. 283 So much is commonplace, but the intriguing
implication of Posner's claim is that this signaling behavior tends
to reinforce the existing structures of power. In order to show
loyalty to the outsider group, its members must engage in behavior
that displeases the insiders; as a consequence, whenever the
insiders punish the outsiders, this punishment tends to radicalize
the victims of the punishment, by labeling them as "authentic" or
more reliable among the outsiders. (A contemporary example may
be the phenomenon of displaying Confederate flags in the
American South. The more that Northerners succeed in
characterizing the flag as outrg, the easier it is for flag supporters
to paint Northerners as sanctimonious, and to show themselves as
"true Southerners" by flying the flag.) Outsiders actually have an
incentive to get themselves punished by insiders, as a signal of
solidarity. Giving up one's freedom to serve the community is a
particularly powerful signal of one's loyalty, so the severity of
punishment actually increases the incentives to deviate from
dominant-group norms. In extreme cases, the result is martyrdom,
as the punishment of an outsider serves to inspire and rally others
similarly oppressed. Thus, unless the insiders make efforts to
reach out to those they have excluded, the gulf between outsiders
and insiders will widen with every exercise of power against the
outsiders. 28
4
The community of course may be widened to include all
persons within its scope, but in that case status differentials will
be unavailable for the purpose of facilitating social ordering. One
important essay on honor contrasts it with dignity, which is a
person's "intrinsic humanity divested of all socially imposed rules
or norms."285 The concept of honor requires that we be identified
283. See id. at 101.
284. To be sure, this is a criticism not only of informal social control mechanisms, but also of
the exercise of state authority against marginalized groups. But it does show that any
community that is fragmented into subcommunities runs the risk of institutionalizing
pathologies of community action.
285. Berger, supra note 68, at 176. For a similar usage of "dignity," see HABER, supra note
10, at 13. And compare Charles Taylor's account of the "hypergood" of modernity and its
replacement of premodern goods that were restricted along lines of class, race, sex, or the liko.
See TAYLOR, supra note 54, at 64-65.
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with social roles-classes, occupations, genders, races, or whatever
other categories have historically been linked with obligations
owed. (Much of the rejection of the status of gentlemanliness in the
United States has been motivated by egalitarian sentiments, as
the noted American historian Richard Hofstadter has argued. The
political rhetoric in the post-Revolutionary period in this country
reveals a deep-seated suspicion of the property-holding classes and
their claims to authority.26 ) These preexisting social roles offer us
the "consolation of prototypes, ''2 the security of knowing where we
fit in the world, but at the same time they deny the worth of the
inherent human dignity that lies behind the mask of socially
constructed role obligations. Social roles, in turn, depend on a
relatively stable framework of institutions, which structure the
expectations of individuals and permit them to ascertain their
identities from observing the social roles that they have been
assigned. As these institutions decline, however, and their moral
authority correspondingly diminishes, "[t]he institutional fabric,
whose basic function has always been to provide meaning and
stability for the individual, [becomes] incohesive, fragmented, and
thus progressively denied of plausibility."28 As a result, honor is
cast aside in the process of disenchantment (to use Max Weber's
term28 9) and is no longer available to satisfy the human need for
order: "In a world of honor, identity is firmly linked to the past
through the reiterated performance of prototypical acts. In a world
of dignity, history is the succession of mystifications from which
the individual must free himself to attain 'authenticity.' "M But as
Berger and others argue, the process of demystification so
characteristic of modernity has the ironic unintended effect of
depriving humans of "the very structures that enable men to be
free and be themselves." 291 Perhaps it is true that radical freedom
286. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, The Decline of the Gentleman, in ANTI-NTELLECTUALISM IN
ATMERICAN LIFE 145 (1962). Samuel Haber describes the attempt by one mid.nineteenth-century
scholar to establish a new category of "American gentleman" whose exalted status would be the
result of character and virtue, not lineage. See HABER, supra note 10, at 99-102.
287. Berger, supra note 68, at 175.
288. Id. at 178. Stevens's lament, in The Remains of the Day, over the decline of the
occupation of butler can be read as a metaphor for the process of de.institutionalization, and the
accompanying anxiety generated in individuals. See KAZUO ISHIGURO, THE REtAINS OF THE DAY
(1988).
289. See Max Weber, Science as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER 155 (C. Wright Mills &
H.H. Gerth trans. & eds., 1958).
290. Berger, supra note 68, at 177.
291. Id. at 180; see also Pitt-Rivers, Social Status, supra note 71, at 11-12 ("The
fragmentation of Western society, the multiplicity of models put forward for imitation, the lack
of a clear hierarchical order of preferences between these models, are deeply puzzling for
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produces anxiety, and that a world with strong traditions and
institutions-and therefore the possibility of honor-offers comfort
and security.292 To return to an honor-based system of norms,
however, even in part, is to submerge the hard-won recognition of
intrinsic human dignity that motivated the disenchantment of
traditional institutions. Moreover, honor can be lost, but dignity is
indefeasible. 293 We should be wary of a normative scheme which
seems to deny an inalienable right to be treated as a worthy
member of the community, and may regard honor as "the world
well lost."
Of course, it is precisely the argument of observers like
William Ian Miller and Robert Jackall that inherent human
dignity and the moral and legal equality of all persons is not the
only mode of valuation we apply to ourselves, and in many
contexts it may be the least important.294 "Though we proclaim
that first-class citizenship is at once crucial, universal, and
inalienable, in fact ... the status that matters most to [people] is
respectable membership in their class ... ; a fall from this status
would not be regarded as mere decline in rank but as some sort of
catastrophe." 295 In social interactions, not much turns on the
ascription of inherent moral worth to all participants. To be sure,
inalienable rights of first-class citizenship play an important role
in legal and moral decision making, or in other social practices
where public reason-giving is central. In practices of informal
social control, however, very contingent differences in status and
ascriptions of honor and shame matter more than the baseline
assumption that all humans are equal, in virtue or moral worth.
"[I]t is hard to get through a life without having a feel for some of
the things at stake in the world of honor, whether they be in the
horrors of high school, in the pressures of career, or in the simple
exchange of gifts and meals with family, friends, and
workmates." 296
modern youth. With what group do we identify ourselves? Should one belong to many
interlocking groups? Is the primary identification with one of them constant? Indeed, who are
our peers and for how longT'); TAYLOR, supra note 54.
292. Wyatt-Brown argues that the importance of honor stems from the human fear of being
alone in the world. See WYATr-BROWN, supra note 43, at 329; cf. TAYLOR, supro note 85, at 2-3
(observing ambivalence about the cultural individualism that has replaced the security of
knowing one's place within the "older moral horizons").
293. See STEWART, supra note 43, at 23.
294. See supra notes 110, 232-35 and accompanying text.
295. Waldron, supra note 215, at 1798.
296. MILLER, HUMILIATION, supra note 45, at 51.
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The philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre has advanced a much
deeper critique of liberal ideals such as individualism and rights.
He argues that the liberal, or post-Enlightenment, conception of
the self cannot account for the process of rational argument and
understanding, which can take place only when situated within
rich historically described traditions. 29 Rationality does not stand
apart from traditions, it is inscribed within traditions. Traditions
establish what counts as a good reason, what counts as a move
within the language-game of rational argumentation.29 Therefore,
the tradition-bound nature of reasoning undercuts the possibility
of a genuinely critical morality. "The more demanding we are from
the standpoint of rational argument, the harder it is to remain
within the bounds of a particular tradition."299 If MacIntyre's
account of rationality is correct, then it is difficult to see how the
concept of dignity-that is, inherent human worth separate and
apart from traditionally given hierarchies-can be intelligible. He
argues convincingly in After Virtue that much of the contemporary
discourse of liberalism is merely a pastiche of concepts lifted out of
context from other traditions, and that the liberal emphasis on
autonomy separates individuals from the sources of self-
understanding that are provided by locating oneself within a
living, vibrant tradition. 300 As a result, liberal political philosophy
is incoherent. The goods promised by a contractarian liberal
account like Rawls's-social justice and individual liberty-cannot
be realized because these goods cannot be defined independently of
an association of individuals who share an understanding of the
good for human beings and the good of the community.30 1 Dignity
cannot be won, because the hope of a concept of human worth
standing apart from traditions is incoherent. The implication of
MacIntyre's argument for the questions considered here is that
community-based social control systems are likely to be the
principal locus of professional regulation, since any other
297. See generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE]; MACINTYRE, supra note 92. I am indebted to Greg Cooper for
reminding me of the force of MacIntyre's arguments here.
298. There is some dispute over whether MacIntyre wishes to claim only that reasons can be
understood fully only when located in their historical context, or whether he-intends to defend
the much stronger claim that one can never stand outside of all traditions and consider their
respective claims using neutral or tradition-independent reasoning. See, e.g., Julia Annas,
MacIntyre on Traditions, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 388 (1989).
299. Selznick, supra note 193, at 461.
300. See MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 297.
301. See Stephen Mulhall, Liberalism, Morality, and Rationality: Maclntyre, Rails, and
Cavell, in AFTER MACINTYRE 205 (John Horton & Susan Mendus eds., 1995).
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regulatory scheme deprives moral argumentation of the grounding
in tradition that is necessary for its intelligibility.
30 2
Within the confines of this Article, I can do little more than
allude to these metaethical questions. It is perhaps sufficient to
mention a middle ground between MacIntyre's ethics of tradition
and the liberal contractarian position. As Charles Taylor argues,
the concept of pure practical reason and total abstraction from the
context of a practice may be a chimera, but that does not mean
that trying to move in that direction is not a worthwhile
endeavor. 30 3 A Platonic concept of inherent human dignity,
abstracted from all traditions, may not exist, but within a given
tradition, the conceptual resources may exist for representing the
concept of inherent worth and equality as a political ideal to which
just societies should aspire. In other words, the value of free,
rational moral agency may be a good within a tradition, not
something that purports to stand outside actual social practices.
"When one understands practical reason aright, one can see that
the goods about which one reasons in its context-related way
include transcendent ones, and that this reasoning does not by any
means have to be comprehensive only, but can be highly
revisionist."' 30 4 We can recognize ideals of absolute dignity or
equality, which transcend local particularities, at the same time as
we acknowledge legitimate expectations and entitlements that are
the product of a particular historical and cultural context. These
values may of course stand in opposition to one another, but the
fact of conflict does not by itself establish that either consideration
is the result of faulty practical reasoning. What Taylor calls "local"
and "transcendent" goods may coexist within one set of social
institutions and practices-that is, within a single tradition. 305
Thus, the norm-enforcement practices of communities, which are
intended to enforce local norms, may conflict with transcendent
norms founded in universal ethical values such as autonomy and
agency.
302. Tradition-based ethical systems are hostile to liberal ideals such as modern freedom,
understood as the capacity to stand aside and call into question all our existing customs Ind
practices, and the social contract, which is the subsequent attempt to fashion a scheme of
morality that stands apart from these traditional value commitments and institutions. See
Charles Taylor, Justice After Virtue, in AFTER MACINTYRE 16, 31-33 (John Horton & Susan
Mendus eds., 1995).
303. Id. at 35.
304. Id. at 36.
305. Id. at 37-42.
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Concerns about the inegalitarian nature of social norms
have not been confined to critiques of the ethics of honor. The civic
republican movement in legal theory has also been attacked by
representatives of marginalized groups, such as people of color. 306
Republicanism assumes that a shared vision of the common good
will emerge from a process of uncoerced deliberation, but as these
critics remind us, there are many voices that have never been
heard in public debate. Neo-republicans naturally reply that
although the history of the republican tradition in American law
has witnessed the systematic exclusion of blacks, women, and non-
property owners from public discourse, 30 7 the fault is not with
republicanism per se, but with its instantiation in a racist, sexist,
and elitist polity. (Similarly, contemporary moral philosophers who
admire Aristotle assiduously repudiate some of his anachronistic
beliefs, like the doctrine of natural slaves.) The reply of liberals
and other critics of civic republicanism is a challenge to the very
idea of communitarianism-it is impossible to enact deliberative
politics in an unjust society, because there is no way to screen out
social injustices from the debate. Indeed, the very idea of shared
values is suspect to those who have never been included in the
sharing of anything and whom the normative consensus has
always placed in a subordinate position.308 As an historical
example, ratification of the Constitution was ensured only by
finessing the issue of slavery and reducing the status of blacks to
three-fifths of a person.30 9 The Aristotelian ideal of public-spirited
engagement in politics also presupposes sufficient material well-
being to support the leisure time necessary to participate in public
debate. 310 It is difficult to imagine any society in which some
citizens do not find it easier than others to become part of the
ongoing deliberation required by republicanism. Republican theory
can attempt to accommodate excluded voices within the
conversation; Frank Michelman explicitly argues for the inclusion
of the "hitherto excluded" in political discourse. 31' The problem,
however, is that exclusion is not a pre-social fact. One must make
a normative judgment about the justice of an existing society in
order to determine how the conditions of the debate ought to be
306. See, e.g., Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican ReviL'al and Racial Politics, 97
YALE L.J. 1609 (1988).
307. See Sunstein, supra note 50, at 1539.
308. See Bell & Bansal, supra note 306, at 1610-11.
309. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cL 1.
310. Bell & Bansal, supra note 306, at 1612.
311. See Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 50, at 1529.
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modified. This judgment depends on a theory of rights, or of the
essence of the political self, that stands apart from the
conversation about justice that is the essence of civic
republicanism. The republican is then hoist by his own petard-in
order to ensure fairness in public discourse, it is necessary to
remove aspects of a conception of justice from discursive revision.
(Rawls is frequently criticized in similar terms, for loading up his
"original position" with a contestable theory of the good. 312) Rather
than avoiding the countermajoritarian difficulty, a republican
constitutional theorist is in jeopardy of sliding into Lochner-style
reasoning about the essence of democratic self-rule. 31 3
D. Pluralism
When the concept of the exemplar of community virtues is
loosened from its moorings in a society which structures all
relationships around widely shared values, the risk of incoherence
immediately arises. "It has often been remarked that to be a
gentleman is to know how to behave without ever being told the
rules."3 14 If the ethical maxim, "be a gentleman," is to provide
guidance to people, however, there must be broad agreement on
what constitutes gentlemanly behavior.31 5 In a pluralistic society,
with multiple subcommunities structuring human lives (sometimes
in ways that cut across one another), constructing an idealized
figure who embodies the norms of the whole community is virtually
impossible. The problem, of course, is made exponentially more
complex when different communities seek to identify excellence
with diverse, even contradictory ideals. 31 6 Relying on community
norms in a pluralistic society with diverse subcommunities
312. See Thomas Nagel, Rawls on Justice, 82 PHIL. REV. 226 (1973) for an early and
influential statement of this objection.
313. See Bell & Bansal, supra note 306, at 1616. From the opposite political standpoint,
Suzanna Sherry argues that republican-type regulations of speech, such as university hate
speech codes, tend to enshrine leftist principles as "virtuous" and suppress speech from the
right. See Suzanna Sherry, Speaking of Virtue: A Republican Approach to University Regulation
of Hate Speech, 75 MINN. L. REV. 933, 938-41 (1991). This critique is a major theme of Sherry's
and Farber's book on left-critical scholarship in law schools. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA
SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADIcAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAw (1997).
314. TAYLOR, supra note 54, at 21.
315. See McAdams, Origin, supra note 46, at 358-59 (noting the importance of consensus for
his esteem-based model of norms); cf. THOMAS, supra note 277, at 397 (observing that university
honor systems depend upon a relatively small, homogeneous population of students for their
legitimacy).
316. See STEWART, supra note 43, at 32-33.
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involves several dangers. First, the ascription of "honor" or esteem
in public discourse may become merely a makeweight-a post hoc
explanation offered for a decision that was reached on the basis of
independent reasons. Second, the threat of accusation of
dishonorable conduct may become a sword of Damocles, hanging
over the heads of marginal community members who must guess
at their extreme peril whether the increasingly pluralistic,
disputatious group of citizens from many different races, ethnic
groups, and social classes will judge an act as a breach of the
foundational norms of the community.
Lest this latter concern seem only an academic fantasy,
consider the controversy that has dogged the University of
Virginia's enforcement of its unwritten, loosely elaborated honor
code, which defines the term "honor" only in terms of lying,
cheating, or stealing. For a decade or more, minority students have
accused the mostly white group of students who administer the
honor code of enforcing its provisions more stringently against
students of color. 317 The recent settlement of a discrimination
action against the university resulted in the publication of
statistics that appear to support the allegations of bias. Of the
students expelled from the school after an accusation of an honor
violation and a trial, sixty-three percent were people of color, at a
university which is sixty-eight percent white. Perhaps more
alarming, ninety-seven percent of the students accusing other
students of honor violations were white. The most benign
explanation offered for the disparity in honor charges is the
phenomenon of "spotlighting"-students of color appear different
from their white classmates, and thus their actions are subjected
to greater scrutiny. A more troubling possibility is that social
biases are reflected in the honor adjudication process. "When there
are identical tests," one student surmised, "the implication is that
if they are white students, they studied together, and if they are
black students, they cheated."3
18
In the domain of law, unwritten codes of conduct that
depend for their content on facts not readily ascertainable would
present constitutional due process problems that would probably
be fatal to their enforcement. A regulation that "either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men [and
women] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential
317. See David S. Fallis, Questioning U-V.s Honor, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 1999, at Cl.
318. Id.
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of due process of law."319 The vagueness doctrine requires the
government to provide clear guidelines for law enforcement, so
that the threat of sanctions does not have a chilling effect on
lawful activity. 320  Impermissibly vague laws also enable
government agents to target enforcement efforts selectively,
usually against unpopular individuals or groups. 321 Under the
closely related overbreadth doctrine, a court may invalidate a
regulation that, while designed to punish activities that are not
safeguarded by the constitution, includes within its scope activities
that are constitutionally protected. 322 A facially vague or overbroad
statute may be narrowed through judicial construction,
administrative guidelines, or social context. For example, in one
vagueness decision, the Supreme Court was unimpressed with the
defendant's argument that statutory language requiring a retail
outlet to obtain a license to sell drug paraphernalia was vague.
32 3
The village's licensing guidelines employed terms like "roach clips"
and "pipes," which the Court concluded were adequately clear in
the context of illegal drug use.324 In many contested cases of
honorable behavior, however, the social meaning of "honor" is
unfortunately not as clear as the readily understood term "roach
clip" as elaborated in the drug-using community. Honor is more
similar to the term "offensive personality," found unconstitutionally
319. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
320. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390-97 (1979) (holding that provisions in state's
abortion control act addressing determinations of fetal viability and standard of care
considerations were unconstitutionally vague); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963)
(holding that state statute prohibiting NAACP from assisting in litigation matters was
unconstitutionally vague in light of the First Amendment).
321. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-62 (1983) (holding that state anti.
loitering statute was unconstitutionally vague under the due process concerns of the Fourteenth
Amendment because statute encouraged arbitrary enforcement); Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (stating that a "vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy
matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with
the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application"); Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972) (overturning vagrancy ordinance because it encouraged
arbitrary arrests and convictions of "poor people, nonconformists, dissenters, idlers").
322. See, e.g., Bd. of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 573-75 (1987)
(invalidating a ludicrously overbroad ban on all "First Amendment activities" in Los Angeles
International Airport); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1973) (stating that the
First Amendment requires "breathing space" and that statutory restrictions or burdens on First
Amendment rights must therefore be narrow and specific); RONALD D. ROTUNDA AND JOHN E.
No WAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 20.8, at 26 (2d ed. 1992).
323. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,
495-99 (1981).
324. Id. at 500-02; cf. Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 940-44 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that city ordinance against loitering remains vague if the imprecise terms are equated
with another vague term-in this case, "hanging oue').
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vague by the Ninth Circuit in the context of a California statute
that prohibited attorneys from exhibiting any offensive
personality.325
Consider an anecdote about community standards from the
legal ethics literature. 326  The chair of the American Bar
Association's ethics committee was once asked whether lying was
ever proper for a lawyer. "No," he replied, "lying is
ungentlemanly." The questioner then followed up, asking whether
a lawyer might misrepresent his client's settlement authority or
instructions in a negotiation. "Oh, that's different," he replied,
"that's tactics." In this case, the touchstone of "gentlemanliness" is
supposed to determine that a settlement gambit is "tactics" and
not a "lie." Put another way, the community's conception of
professional virtue, as used by the ABA committee chair here,
must be thick enough to resolve contested moral questions. 327 If it
is not, then the label of "gentlemanly" or "honorable" is merely a
makeweight, a label applied to a decision that has already been
reached on other grounds. Somehow the profession has forged a
distinction between acceptable and unacceptable deception, so that
some acts of deception count not as "lying" but as "tactics." This
distinction is captured in the Model Rules, which prohibit
"knowingly . . .mak[ing] a false statement of material fact to a
third person,"328 but which modify this seemingly clear proscription
with a proviso that "[u]nder generally accepted conventions in
negotiation, certain types of statements are not taken as
statements of material fact,1329 a familiar example being the limits
of the lawyer's settlement authority. As many critics have pointed
out, this redescriptive strategy is a dodge-a misleading statement
about one's settlement authority is a deliberate falsehood, told
with intent to deceive, so it is a lie in ordinary moral terms.
330 It
may be a justified lie, but the argument purporting to justify the
325. See United States v. Wunsch, 54 F.3d 579 (9th Cir. 1995). reh'g granted, opinion
withdrawn, 84 F.3d 358 (9th Cir.), superseded by, 84 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 1996). The court was
construing a provision of the California Code which stated: "It is the duty of an attorney
to ... abstain from all offensive personality... unless required by the justice of the cause with
which he or she is charged." CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(0.
326. See JETHRO K LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR 32 (1978), quoted in DEBORAH L. RHODE,
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD 345 (2d ed. 1998).
327. For the terminology of "thick" and "thin" evaluative concepts, see ELIZABETH
ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993); BERNARD WILLIAIIS. ETHICS AND THE
LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY (1985).
328. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1.
329. Id. at R. 4.1 cmt. 2.
330. See, e.g., ARTHUR ISAKAPPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES 104-09 (1999).
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deception is a complex moral argument requiring the specification
and satisfaction of numerous conditions, such as the necessity of
the lie for the continuing stability and success of the practice of
negotiation, the overall efficiency of the practice of negotiation,
and the potential ex ante consent that would be given by the target
of the deception.
331
The flippant assertion that lying is ungentlemanly attempts
to short-circuit the difficult work of moral evaluation by appealing
to a distinction that members of the community already recognize.
If the professional community does in fact agree on the location of
the line between permissible and impermissible deception in
negotiation, then the reliance on shared understandings of
gentlemanliness can succeed. It is much more likely the case,
however, that there are multiple professional subcommunities,
each of which may have a differing understanding of the extent of
permissible deception. Empirical studies have revealed that the
bar is markedly stratified by social prestige, with lawyers serving
business clients at one end, and lawyers serving individuals at the
other. 38 2 As one might expect, practitioners from these diverse
subcommunities disagree on what constitutes "sharp practice" or
unethical behavior.333 For example, lower-status lawyers, such as
the plaintiffs' personal injury bar, express concern that corporate
lawyers at large firms are able to "turn the process into a
hypercivilized game of manners, at the expense of more
substantive ideals such as truth, justice, and efficiency."
3 34
Comments like this one suggest that the "sharp practice" epithet is
assigned to lower-status lawyers because the work done by these
lawyers-representing individuals against powerful institutions
like the government and large manufacturing enterprises-is
threatening to the clients of the higher-status lawyers. Legal
ethicist Monroe Freedman argues that the first codified rules of
professional conduct were "motivated in major part by the large
numbers of Catholic immigrants from Italy and Ireland and Jews
331. See id. at 113-35.
332. See, e.g., JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (rev. ed. 1982); ELLIOTT A. KRAUSE, DEATH OF THE GUILDS:
PROFESSIONS, STATES, AND THE ADVANCE OF CAPITALISM, 1930 TO THE PRESENT 50-51 (1996).
333. See HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 332, at 69-71; see also Mark C. Suchman, Working
Without a Net: The Sociology of Legal Ethics in Corporate Litigation, 67 FOEDHAM L. REV. 837,
848 (1998) (reporting comment by a large-firm associate that lawyers in smaller firms "are
typically quite hardworking, but they do tend to be people who ... are more uncivil than they
ought to be").
334. Sucbman, supra note 333, at 848 n.21, 865 n.46.
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from Eastern Europe .... [Tihe established bar adopted
educational requirements, standards of admission, and 'canons of
ethics' designed to maintain a predominantly native-born, white,
Anglo-Saxon, Protestant monopoly of the legal profession."33 Thus,
by manipulating the terms of discourse, the powerful
subcommunity uses the term "gentleman" to legitimate its own
practices, and to block recourse to substantive moral arguments
that would reveal these tactics to be subversive of justice.3 6
For this reason, many have been suspicious of civic
republican models of politics or constitutional decision making.
Republicanism requires that citizens be devoted to ascertaining
the common good, but critics reply that in a multicultural society,
there is no such thing as a unitary common good.337 As Isaiah
Berlin never tired of reminding us, any worthwhile form of life
necessarily involves a repudiation of goods that can be realized
only through a different form of life.3 38 Any attempt to pursue one
of these diverse "highest" goods would result in denying or
suppressing the goods available only through the alternate life.3 9
An individual may permissibly choose one form of life over the
other, but state-sponsored attempts to align citizens' lives with the
pursuit of the common good could degenerate into totalitarianism,
as the government sought to stamp out the "deviant" visions of the
good that interfered with its realization of the other form of life.
E. Anachronism
By "anachronism" I do not mean simply that reliance upon
informal social norms has gone the way of the duel, the charivari,
and the blood feud, leaving only vestiges such as university honor
codes, "the holding of doors for ladies [and] a quaint prickliness
about insults."340 Indeed, I have argued that enforceable social
norms are not anachronistic in this way, but recur frequently in
contemporary social practices. Rather, the anachronistic aspect of
335. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 3 (1990).
336. For further sociological studies showing the manipulation of ethical discourse in favor
of lawyers with powerful clients, see for example JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE:
LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (1976); JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS'
ETHICS: A SURVEY OF THE NEWYORK CITY BAR (1966).
337. See, e.g., Don Herzog, Some Questions for Republicans, 14 POL THEORY 473 (1986).
338. See, e.g., ISAIAH BERLIN, TWo CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY (1958).
339. Isaiah Berlin, The Decline of Utopian Ideals in the West, in THE CROOKED TIMBER OF
HUMANITY 20, 45 (Henry Hardy ed., 1990).
340. WYATT-BROWN, supra note 43, at 23.
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community enforcement of social norms is that it seems
fundamentally unsuitable as a means of social control in a large,
impersonal, bureaucratic, market-driven culture. Community
norms are most strongly felt in small-scale societies or
subcommunities, where individuals interact personally and face-to-
face, as opposed to anonymously, through bureaucracies or
markets, and where interpersonal relationships are of paramount
importance. 341 "All else being equal . . . shaming penalties are
likely to be more effective in Kenosha than they are in
Manhattan."342 The association of lawyers in a town the size of
Fairbanks, the reading group described by William Ian Miller, and
the circles of corporate managers studied by Robert Jackall are all
small enough subcommunities to be aware of the claims to respect
of their various members and the reactions of others to those
claims. Corporate managers might care deeply about what
members of their clubs and residents of their neighborhood think
of them, even though they do not care about the reaction of others
outside their social and professional circles. 343 (Similarly, English
barristers traditionally were regulated only by the Inns of Court,
and by the unwritten codes of English gentlemen, while the
significantly larger and culturally heterogeneous group of solicitors
was subject to more extensive legal regulation.3 44) In economic
terms, the marginal cost of acquiring information about other
community members is low, because individuals interact with each
341. See ELLICKSON, supra note 37, at 167, 177-82 (emphasizing the limitation of his theory
to closely-knit groups); HONOR AND SHAME, supra note 43, at 11; Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the
Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J.
LEG. STUD. 349 (1981); Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture and American Criminal Law, 89
MICH. L. REV. 1880 (1991). A sympathetic critic of Massaro's article observes that some
contemporary shaming sanctions remain effective in a large-scale modern society, because they
take advantage of the special psychological vulnerability of a particular class of offenders, such
as patrons of prostitutes. See Whitman, supra note 87, at 1064-66; see also Lessig, supra note
122, at 995-97. Shame in this sense can be experienced alone--"[t]here is ... no reason to think
that sexual offenders will feel shame only when confronted with familiar neighborly faces."
Whitman, supra note 87, at 1065. In order for a person to feel shame, however, he must have
internalized the norms of the judging group, even though they may not be present at the time so
that the offender feels shame. See MILLER, HUMILIATION, supra note 45, at 117-24. Thus,
whatever the community's size, it still must elaborate, transmit, and enforce effectively its
standards, so that individuals within the society internalize them as part of their moral
education.
342. Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 753
(1998); see also Weber, supra note 59, at 89 ('Mobility affords escape from your clan's fama or
infama, as from your own.").
343. See Kahan, supra note 91, at 643.
344. See HABER, supra note 10, at 76.
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other on a frequent basis.3 45 We would, by contrast, expect
community-based norm enforcement to be a less efficacious means
of social control in large, fragmented, pluralistic societies. For one
thing, unless individuals are repeat players with respect to other
individuals, they will have very little incentive to take into account
the perceptions of others, which are necessary to maintain the
scheme of honor and shame in the community.346 Moreover, if the
domain of social norms does not extend beyond a subset of
individuals in a society, if there are people even within that
subcommunity who do not consider themselves bound by that
group's esteem, in effect a free rider problem results. "The person
who does not subscribe to the norms of honor will not feel shame
for having violated them even if real third parties try to make him
or her feel so." 347 Short of hectoring such a person to join the
community that is trying to shame him, what is to be done?
The problem does not exist only for communities that wish
to control strangers, but also for strangers who wish to avail
themselves of the protection or privileges enjoyed by community
members as a matter of right. As historians and anthropologists
emphasize, obligations generated by imperatives of honor are owed
differentially, according to the status of the claimant, and those
who are strangers are not entitled to any privileges at all. Recall
the story related by Robert Jackall of Brady, the corporate
accountant.348 Brady sought to enforce rules of fair financial
345. See POSNER, supra note 46, at 91.
346. See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 37, at 178-80 (arguing that in order for cooperation to
arise in games, the players must unavoidably face the prospect of encountering one another in
the future); Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 20, at 543-46 (reporting that small, localized
associations of lawyers are conducive to the development of reputational markets); Gordon,
supra note 202, at 717 (stating that lawyers hypothesize that unethical behavior is caused by,
among other factors, "[tihe dilution of cultures or conventions of trust, cooperation, and mutual
restraint by growth in firm size, specialization, and cultural heterogeneity within firms...
except in smaller towns or cities or very specialized practices (like Delaware corporate practice),
which are still controlled by repeat-player insiders who all know each other and have to deal
with each other all the time"); Interim Report of the Committee on Civility of the Seventh
Judicial Circuit, 143 F.R.D. 371, 392 (1991) (observing a "kill or be killed attitude" between
lawyers who will almost certainly never again be adversaries); Vhitman, supra note 87, at
1066-67 (noting the efficacy of shaming sanctions among merchants in a business community
who fear loss of their commercial reputation and the veneer of bourgeois respectability).
347. MILLER, HUMILIATION, supra note 45, at 118. As Julian Pitt.Rivers observes,
concerning Andalusian society: "The tribunal of public opinion is not of much use when dealing
with people from another town or from the city .... [Tlhe possibility of relative anonymity is
open to the man who moves from one district to another, and the force of public opinion is
diminished when it is no longer omniscient The diminished concern with the ethical aspects of
honor in the large towns must surely be related to that fact." Pitt-Rivers, Social Status. supra
note 71, at 59-61.
348. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
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reporting, which were designed to protect third parties, such as
investors and creditors, from being defrauded by corporate
managers. The managers in the story closed ranks against Brady,
thereby devaluing the interests of outsiders to the corporate circle.
The community's norms recognized the interests of the corporation
as paramount, giving virtually no weight to the public's interest in
fair and honest accounting practices. Classically, a person of honor
is limited in the scope of her concern to those persons known to her
as being worthy of protection. Because duties of honor are not
owed without regard to the social position of the parties, the
distinction between community members and strangers interfered
with any nascent humanitarian style of thinking and blocked the
development of ethical norms grounded in universal attributes
such as human dignity or the capacity of others to experience
pleasure or pain. "It was not that Southern men of honor felt no
sympathy for the suffering of strangers; they simply felt no
responsibility."349 A person in need of assistance would first need
to prove herself worthy of being included in the community; only
then would members of the community be likely to do anything to
alleviate the suffering. As Kenneth Greenberg points out, this
myopic focus on the prerogatives of community members fueled
Southern resentment of Northern and English criticism of slavery.
Other groups should take care of their own poor and downtrodden,
the Southern pro-slavery writers argued, and let us worry about
the slaves. "Southern masters, it was felt, should be responsible
for the care of their slaves, other dependents, kin, and 'neighbors.'
Northern and British capitalists should be responsible for the care
of their workers." 350 Once again, this example shows how honor
may have the effect of disabling criticism of the community's
standards. It also shows quite clearly that threats to individual
equality and dignity do not come only from the state; indeed, in
some cases the state has been forced to intervene (though the
mechanism of civil rights lawsuits) to prevent oppression by
private associations. 351
349. GREENBERG, supra note 43, at 85.
350. Id. at 86.
351. See, e.g., Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). These cases denied First Amendment right-of-
association challenges to statutes that required the admission of women to civic and
professional organizations. A similar challenge by the Boy Scouts to a statute requiring the




One possibility for expanding the reach of community norms
to nonmembers is to expand the boundaries of the community
aggressively to include the stranger within its sphere.35 2 The legal
profession does this by enforcing prohibitions against the
unauthorized practice of law, by requiring would-be members to
attend law sbhool for three years and pass an exam, and by
promulgating ethical codes that are binding on all members of the
bar. It may also attempt to ameliorate the problem of one-time
players by setting up mechanisms to transmit information about
an individual to the community.353 Thus, even if a lawyer never has
precisely the same adversary as an opposing counsel, he or she
must fear a lack of credibility and respect from other lawyers who
learn of the offending lawyer's reputation for dishonorable conduct.
Certain procedural reforms, such as changing from a system of
rotating judges who hear motions to an individual calendaring
system in which one judge is assigned to supervise all aspects of a
case from filing to trial, reduce information costs and thereby
eliminate the one-shot-game aspect *of practicing in a large
community. A more difficult problem is posed when community
members do not feel any obligation to a stranger; they may not be
motivated to stretch the borders that divide friends from strangers
to encompass the outsider. In legal practice, this phenomenon
occurs when disfavored subcommunities interact with those of
higher status. The bar in any sizable city is markedly stratified,
with higher-prestige lawyers serving business clients and lower-
prestige lawyers representing individuals. 35' In general, too,
lawyers representing challengers to powerful institutions
(challengers such as unions, injured consumers, criminal
defendants, and so on) are ranked lower in prestige than those
working on behalf of large entity clients. 355 This fragmentation of
the bar into diverse, frequently conflicting subcommunities poses a
serious challenge for the proponent of informal, community-based
controls as a means of professional regulation (to say nothing of
the problem of higher-status lawyers assuming control not only
352. See Glen 0. Robinson, Communities, 83 VA. L. RE V. 269, 296-97 (1997).
353. See ELLICKSON, supra note 37, at 180-81 (observing that cooperation may not arise,
even in iterated games, where the players lack information about the behavior of others);
Charny, supra note 136, at 415-17 (discussing informational intermediaries in bond and labor
markets).
354. See, e.g., HEINZ & LA-MiANN, supra note 332; KRAUSE, supra note 332, at 50-51.
355. HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 332, at 85.
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over the formal disciplinary apparatus, but also over the rhetoric
of professionalism.)
356
Furthermore, as the practice of law becomes increasingly
national in scope, with the rise of multi-office mega-firms, not to
mention technology like jet travel, fax machines, and the Internet,
it is more important for lawyers in different jurisdictions to have
similar professional skills, attributes, and duties. For the first
time in the profession's history, the 1969 Code of Professional
Responsibility imposed unitary disciplinary standards for
lawyers. 357 The effect of the Code, and the subsequent Model.Rules,
has been to provide lawyers a measure of predictability in
multijurisdictional transactions and litigation, with respect to
issues such as conflicts of interest and confidentiality obligations.
(Similar reasoning explains why accountants have generally
adopted uniform standards for audits and financial reporting. It
would do little good to require inspection of a company's books by a
certified public accountant if accountants in other states did not
share the same criteria for pronouncing the company financially
sound.) Reliance on informal social discipline, however, will
undermine the move toward uniformity on a national scale.
These remarks are not a criticism only of explicitly
republican or communitarian political systems, but of any scheme
that relies on personal relationships and face-to-face interaction
for its enforcement. In this way, some versions of the ethics of care
or interpersonal connectivity are vulnerable to the same objections.
Elsewhere I have criticized the rather utopian-sounding proposals
to orient professional ethics toward considerations of care, mercy,
and the value of maintaining human relationships. 358 Urging
lawyers and their clients to care about others sacrifices some of the
motivational force of arguments from rights and duties, either
legal or moral. Rights are impersonal-they do not depend for their
force on sentiments of care and attachment. Rights-based
arguments therefore have some currency with strangers, while a
stranger might respond to an argument about connectedness and
love with the apt rhetorical question, "Who cares?" Moreover,
arguments based on the preservation of an existing network of
relationships naturally favor the status quo against reform efforts.
356. Consider the history of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, which began
its existence in implacable hostility toward Jacksonian reformism. See HABER, supra note 10, at
208-11.
357. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.6, at 50 (1986).
358. See Wendel, supra note 200.
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Marginal or powerless members of a community are not likely to
get very far by urging their oppressors to maintain a framework of
stable interpersonal relationships. Change can sometimes be
accomplished only by invoking impersonal considerations, like
rights, duties, and due process, to force one's opponent to take
one's claims seriously.
35 9
In a similar vein, discarding formal legal regulatory
mechanisms tends to make altering behavior more difficult.
Changing social circumstances, technological innovations, or
evolving standards of public morality sometimes necessitate
changes in norms of professional self-regulation. If an occupational
group were governed only by generally accepted norms-not
explicit rules-then the only possible mode of change in the group's
mores would be the gradual evolution of customary norms, through
the slow processes of growth and decay.360 If, on the other hand,
moral norms were embodied in written codes which could be
changed like any other law, through a political process of
amendment and promulgation, then professional norms may be
made responsive to rapid changes in social norms. To illustrate
with an example from the jurisdiction in which I practiced, in
Washington State, concern had been growing among lawyers about
pervasive gender bias, and somewhat less pronounced racial bias,
among judges and lawyers. A movement developed to amend Rule
of Professional Conduct 8.4 (simply entitled, "Misconduct") to
prohibit discrimination against protected classes of lawyers,
clients, and third parties. 361 The supporters of the Rule 8.4
amendments hoped to use punitive sanctions, administered under
the authority of the state bar association, as a means to eliminate
discrimination by lawyers. Without an express rule that could be
modified publicly, and given binding effect, opponents of racial and
gender bias in the practicing bar would have had a much more
difficult task of launching a campaign of persuasion, aimed at the
359. See Monroe Freedman, The Trouble with Postmodern Zeal, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 63
(1996); Waldron, supra note 216.
360. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 92 (2d ed. 1994). A few mechanisms of limited
efficacy are available to permit individuals to register dissent from the community's existing
norms. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLIN4E IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970); see also Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 46, at
912 (discussing "norm entrepreneurs" who affect public discourse and, therefore, the shape of
social norms).
361. There is a similar movement within the American Bar Association; also, several
states-including Illinois, Minnesota, and New York-have adopted antidiscriminatory rules of
professional conduct. See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND
ETHICS 780 (5th ed. 1998).
2001] 2047
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
hearts and minds of their fellow professionals. The rule
amendment, however, focused reform efforts on a particular
phenomenon that needed attention, by sending a clear signal that
discrimination would be regarded as sanctionable professional
misconduct by the organized bar.
Finally, community-based sanctions mechanisms are
complicated by the capacity of people to occupy more than one
community simultaneously, and by the possibility that a
community may become rife with factions that disagree about
fundamental normative values of the community. 362 These diverse
communities may require different actions of the individual and
may create cross-cutting incentives through their sanctioning
practices. Where lawmaking is centralized, as with a legislature
promulgating rules of general applicability, the lawmaker can seek
to eliminate inconsistencies between legal norms. Informal norms,
by definition, are not managed by a central authority, and are
therefore highly susceptible to divergence and inconsistent
application. Divergence may have the effect of weakening another
community's regulatory power; for instance, it has frequently been
observed that large law firms promulgate ethical norms that may
conflict with lessons learned from other communities, such as
neighborhoods, churches, and schools. 36 3 Thus, to the extent that
uniformity and the elimination of inconsistent incentives are
regarded as goods for a system of social regulation, informal
community-based sanctions are potentially troublesome.
VI. CONCLUSION
No one proposes abolishing state-sponsored, legalistic
oversight of the professions, but it is also futile to ignore the
process of norm elaboration and enforcement that occurs within
professional communities outside of state control. The salient
question, therefore, is the optimal mix of formal and informal
authority in a scheme of professional regulation. 364 There are a
number of practical lessons to be drawn from the study of social
norms, which can usefully be applied to this normative issue.
First, state actors ought to be aware of the advantages and
pathologies of professional communities and calibrate their
362. See Posner, supra note 46, at 161-64.
363. See, e.g., Schiltz, supra note 10.
364. Cf. POSNER, supra note 46, at 4.
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intervention accordingly. In some cases, informal sanctioning
regimes are less costly, better targeted, and more flexible than the
formal alternatives. For example, open-fie discovery systems,
although not constitutionally required, can considerably reduce the
expense of criminal trials; judges can put pressure on prosecutors
to adopt open-file practices, even though they do not have the legal
authority to compel this regime. 365 Drafters of disciplinary rules
struggle to demarcate boundaries between meritorious motions
and those filed merely for purposes of harassment or delay,366 but
experienced lawyers quickly perceive the difference, and may be
able to control an aberrant lawyer more readily through informal
means such as ostracism or retaliation. Indeed, as Tanina Rostain
notes, informal social norms are sometimes so well entrenched
that they will exert pressure against a legal rule that is
significantly at odds with prevailing community practices. 36 One
might observe the relative infrequency of disciplinary complaints
brought bjy lawyers, despite a legal duty to do so in some states,368
possibly due to a social norm against ratting out a fellow
professional. Alternatively, a community (e.g., personal injury
litigators) may value a reputation as a "junkyard dog" advocate,
and thus fail to take any action against a lawyer whose behavior is
inefficient, in the sense of driving up dispute resolution costs, or
otherwise ethically troubling.
369
Information costs are also likely to be lower when norm
enforcers are "in the trenches," so to speak, rather than dependent
on reports of violations prepared after the fact and transmitted
through multiple layers of government bureaucracy. 3 0 Lawyers
365. See Brown, supra note 12, at 814.
366. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1; MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY
DR 7-102(A).
367. See Rostain, supra note 5, at 1320.
368. See, e.g., In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790, 795-96 (M11. 1988) (suspending attorney's
license for failure to report another attorney's misconduct in accordance with professional
responsibility rules); Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. v. Miller, 568 N.W.2d 665, 666.68 (Iowa 1997)
(suspending attorney's license upon consideration of ethical violations as duly reported by
another attorney in accordance with rules of professional conduct); Attorney Grievance Comm'n
v. Brennan, 714 A.2d 157, 162-63 (Md. 1998) (suspending attorney's license for assisting and
sharing fees with lawyer who had himself been suspended for practicing); Wieder v. Skala, 609
N.E.2d 105, 107-10 (N.Y. 1992) (holding that defendant law firm breached employment contract
when it fired an associate for insisting that the firm comply with professional responsibility
rules mandating reporting of attorney misconduct).
369. See Rostain, supra note 5, at 1321.
370. Consider the example of "harbor gangs" who enforce informal fishing quotas among
New England lobstermen; it would be nearly impossible for government regulators to detect
cheating, but the fishermen, who are on the water checking their traps every day, can readily
observe overfishing. See, e.g., John Tierney, A Tale of Two Fisheries, N.Y. TwIES, Aug. 27, 2000,
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who are sensitive to community norms may effectively serve as
peacemakers, by virtue of their ability to recognize the interests of
all parties and broker some kind of mutually acceptable
compromise; sociologist Don Landon reports that small-town
lawyers frequently play exactly such a role. 371 The modern
alternative dispute resolution movement emphasizes equitable
values like discretion, flexibility, and contextual decision making,
i.n contrast to rigid formalistic models of adjudication. The
practices of community-based norm enforcement therefore support
these goals. Furthermore, the peacemaking function of lawyers
suggests that it may be well to decentralize power from remote,
bureaucratized government agencies in favor of the people who are
actually affected, in order to maintain a sense of connection
between citizens and public order.372 Finally, informal sanctions
may be able to reach conduct that is beyond the reach of state-
imposed regulation for constitutional or other reasons. The
organized bar, for example, is probably prohibited by the First
Amendment from imposing viewpoint-based "character and
fitness" requirements for admission; thus, an avowed racist or
someone with similarly antisocial values must be let into the bar if
he applies.37 3 Once in, however, there is no constitutional
impediment to community-based sanctions, like ostracism and
refusal to cooperate with the antisocial lawyer. Informal sanctions
also do not raise the same administrability concerns as formal
legal rules; 374 for instance, we need not fear clogging the dockets of
already overworked disciplinary agencies with complaints about
trivialities if community-based sanctions mechanisms do the job.
Conversely, formal regulatory mechanisms possess what
might be termed rule-of-law virtues: they are relatively
predictable, stable, and ostensibly free of invidious discrimination
§ 6 (Magazine), at 38, 40. The harbor gangs enforce catch limits by opening the poacher's traps
to free the lobsters, cutting the buoys free from the traps, or even by sinking the boats belonging
to the cheater. For an anthropological study, see JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF
MAINE (1988).
371. See LANDON, supra note 220.
372. See TAYLOR, supra note 54, at 505.
373. See W. Bradley Wendel, Free Speech for Lawyers, 28 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 305 (2001)
(discussing the case of Matthew Hale and applicable constitutional principles).
374. These arguments are familiar in common-law discourse as reasons recognizing now
causes of action. One famous article on emotional distress torts, for example, recommends that
"instruments of social control other than the law" ought to be employed to control bad manners.
See Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbances in the Law of Torts, 49 HARv. L.
REV. 1033, 1035 (1936).
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in the application of rules.3 7 5 (In some ways, the tradeoffs between
formal and informal regulatory schemes are similar to those
required in a legal system that seeks to accommodate both legal
and equitable principles. 76 ) The content of legal rules may be
ascertained in advance, and actors may plan their conduct to avoid
legal sanctions. Legal rules administered by an impartial tribunal
are also less likely to become the basis of escalating feuds as tit-
for-tat retaliation spins out of control. Furthermore, changing
social circumstances, technological innovations, or evolving
standards of public morality often necessitate changes in
professional regulatory practices. If the legal profession were
governed only by informal social norms, not explicit rules, then the
only possible mode of change in these regulations would be the
gradual evolution of social norms, through the slow processes of
growth and decay.3 7 7 Anyone who was concerned with the present
state of the profession's norms could do little to modify them,
except perhaps launch a campaign of persuasion, aimed at the
hearts and minds of her fellow professionals. Finally, formal rules
promote uniformity of regulation of the legal profession. As the
practice of law becomes increasingly national in scope, with the
rise of multi-office mega-firms, not to mention the diffusion of
technology like jdt travel, fax machines, and the Internet,
providing lawyers a measure of predictability in multi-
jurisdictional transactions and litigation becomes increasingly
important. Because of the importance of face-to-face interaction
and the low information costs of informal norm-enforcement
mechanisms, professional communities so regulated are likely to
be small and localized. The nationalizing practice of law not only
raises problems of disuniformity but also tends to vitiate the
information cost advantages of informal social control systems.
375. Recall Lon Fuller's description of the "inner morality of the law" and the parable of the
hapless King Rex. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-91 (1964). In an important
article, Judith Resnik argued that informal management of civil litigation by federal judges
presents a threat to the rule of law; managerial judging tends to create a set of informal rules
that are not apparent to observers unschooled in the arcana of local customs, to immunize
judicial decisions from appellate control, and to increase the risk of bias in adjudication. See
Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 414, 426, 430.31 (1982).
376. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION
OF RULE-BASED DECISION-IMIAKING IN LAWv AND IN LIFE (1991); Duncan Kennedy. Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Stephen Macedo, The
Rule of Law, Justice, and the Politics of Moderation, in THE RULE OF LAW 148 (Ian Shapiro ed.,
1994).
377. See HART, supra note 360, at 92.
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Second, a frequently articulated objection to using informal
mechanisms of social control to regulate the legal profession is
that power ought not to be devolved to institutions that do not
accomplish useful ends. Scholars who favor reliance on informal
norms as a method for social control generally have in mind
communities in which virtues are celebrated and vices
suppressed-for example, Robert Ellickson's cattle ranchers who
are respected for their trustworthiness and neighborliness, 78 or
the lawyers in Fairbanks who warn pointedly against engaging in
"Rambo" litigation tactics. 379 Examples can be multiplied, however,
of communities that exalt qualities contrary to moral norms. The
antebellum South is the most striking example, but the country
lawyers surveyed by Don Landon who valued neighborliness over
their clients' potential civil rights claims also reveal the capacity of
honor to undercut reform efforts. 380 It is little more than a
fortunate coincidence that the Shasta County ranching society has
cultivated virtues of honesty and cooperation-there is nothing
internal to the concept of honor that guarantees this result. The
corporations studied by Robert Jackall show that, if anything,
communities tend to develop informal norms that are justified by
little more than economic self-interest. 381 The smaller and more
exclusive the community, the more likely it appears to promulgate
socially harmful norms. (The rancher society in Shasta County is
small and geographically isolated, but it does include a sizable
proportion of the local population. 82) Unfortunately, the efficacy of
community-based social control mechanisms decreases with the
size of the relevant group, so as it becomes larger and more
pluralistic, the community becomes less capable of supporting
informal norm-enforcement practices.
On the other hand, there is no guarantee that self-interest
will not also influence the development of formal regulatory
regimes. From a sociological standpoint, ethics rules perform the
function of bolstering the public image of the profession, which in
turn permits the profession to continue to exercise self-regulation,
relatively free of intrusion from legislatures and administrative
378. See ELLICKSON, supra note 37.
379. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
380. LANDON, supra note 220, at 137.
381. See JACKALL, supra note 45.
382. See ELLICKSON, supra note 37.
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agencies. 383 Nonprofessionals are less likely to demand stringent
regulation of an occupation if they feel that the members of that
occupational group are doing a satisfactory job policing
themselves. 384 To some extent, the project as it relates to lawyers
has been successful. The relative paucity of statutes and
regulations applicable to the legal profession is striking in
comparison with the comprehensive regulatory regimes under
which other industries, like pharmaceutical manufacturers and
public utilities, must operate. The suspicion that disciplinary codes
are merely window-dressing is reinforced by the inadequate
mechanisms in place for their enforcement, and the consistent
underreporting of violations. 385 Moreover, formal mechanisms of
exercising state power are susceptible to capture by powerful, well-
organized interest groups. In the case of lawyers' communities, it
has long been observed that the organized bar tends to be taken
over by lawyers working for large, prestigious law firms,
representing corporate clients. Enforcement practices accordingly
tend to favor these interests. (Consider the energy that bar
associations expend in regulating advertising by plaintiffs'
personal injury lawyers, and compare this with the acceptance by
the bar of large-firm business development practices, like
"schmoozing" potential clients at country clubs.) Thus, it is not
possible to make an unqualified claim that formal legal regulatory
mechanisms are more likely to serve socially beneficial ends, as
compared with informal methods of social control. One may still
give a slight edge to formal systems on the grounds of
transparency: because of the requirement that legal rules be
articulated and publicized, those outside the profession can
observe and criticize formal rules much more easily than informal
norm-enforcement practices.
I am loath to end with some kind of noncommittal
conclusion that informal and formal regulation both have roles to
play in professional ethics, but that statement seems basically
right to me. In any event, the two domains, formal and informal,
do not exist in hermetic isolation; there is inevitably a spillover
383. See Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional
Codes, 59 TEX. L. REv. 689, 692-93 (1981).
384. The disciplinary rules frankly acknowledge their function of warding off external
regulation: "To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional calling, the
occasion for government regulation is obviated. Self-regulation also helps maintain the legal
professions independence from government domination." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
pmbL 10.
385. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERiCAN LAWYERS 142-57 (1989).
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from one domain to the other. 38 6 For localized problems and for
conduct that is difficult to define in legalistic terms, informal
social control mechanisms are superior to their formal
alternatives. Norms of civility, respect, and fair play, for example,
are best enforced through community-based means. For one thing,
concepts like "civility" are beset with constitutional vagueness
problems, so that a state actor may not be permitted to intervene
to enforce civility without running into due process and First
Amendment problems. 87 The community, acting apart from state
institutions, is not constrained by these constitutional norms
(although the freedom from limitations on arbitrariness is exactly
the reason why informal controls cannot carry all the weight of
professional regulation). In addition, local communities should
have some flexibility to define the range of conduct they will
tolerate, without being straightjacketed by widely applicable
formal rules. For example, subcommunities sometimes develop
efficient practices, such as "open-file" discovery by criminal
defense lawyers of documents in prosecutors' offices, or deposition-
scheduling customs that seek to accommodate both parties'
preferences. Of course, communities may also develop
dysfunctional practices, such as the norm of evasive discovery
responses excoriated by the court in Fisons.388 Alternatively, a
lawyer may be whipsawed between legal and informal norms-
recall the example of a local community's norm against filing
motions for discovery of prosecutors' files. 389 Given these norms, a
defense lawyer must weigh the benefit of maintaining good
relations with the prosecutor against the possibility of waiving a
constitutional objection to the prosecutor's failure to provide
exculpatory material.
386. For example, a well-known study concluded that the moral (or community-based)
evaluation of a person who refused to come to the aid of a drowning victim was influenced by
whether or not failing to render aid was unlawful. See Henry Kaufmann, Legality and
Harmfulness of a Bystander's Failure to Intervene as Determinants of Moral Judgment, in
ALTRUISM AND HELPING BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF SOME ANTECEDENTS AND
CONSEQUENCES 77, 77-81 (J. Macaulay & L. Berkowitz eds., 1970).
387. See, e.g., United States v. Wunsch, 84 F.3d 1110, 1119-21 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that
state's professional code provision addressing "offensive personality" by attorneys was
unconstitutionally vague); In re Finkelstein, 901 F.2d 1560, 1563-65 (11th Cir. 1990) (reversing
suspension of attorney for a single act of rudeness or lack of professional courtesy because such
was insufficient grounds for determining attorney was unfit to practice law); Comm'n for
Lawyer Discipline v. Benton, 980 S.W.2d 425, 440 (Tex. 1998) (holding that section of
professional conduct rule using the term "embarrass" was unconstitutionally vague as applied to
attorney's post-judgment letter to jurors).
388. See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
389. See Brown, supra note 12, at 820-24.
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The Fisons case, the story of Brady the accountant, as well
as sociological studies of lawyers in small towns who are prevented
from opposing powerful institutions or individuals, all show that
the community-generated criteria of reasonableness may conflict
with the criteria that would be developed from a critical, or extra-
community, standpoint. The nub of the problem, then, is to balance
external and internal normative stances. As a step toward
achieving such a balance within the legal profession, this Article
has sought not so much to offer generalizations in the abstract as
to show how communities can work well or badly in particular
cases.

